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- EXAMINING BILLION DOLLAR WASTE THROUGH IMPROPER PAYMENTS [House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING BILLION DOLLAR WASTE THROUGH IMPROPER PAYMENTS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 __________ Serial No. 114-166 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 26-168 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin WILL HURD, Texas GARY J. PALMER, Alabama Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director Andrew Dockham, General Counsel Katy Rother, Senior Counsel Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Government Operations MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina, Chairman JIM JORDAN, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia, TIM WALBERG, Michigan, Vice Chair Ranking Minority Member TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina Columbia KEN BUCK, Colorado WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on September 22, 2016............................... 1 WITNESSES Mr. David Mader, Controller, Office of Federal Financial Management, Office of Management and Budget Oral Statement............................................... 3 Written Statement............................................ 6 Ms. Sheila Conley, Deputy Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Oral Statement............................................... 17 Written Statement............................................ 19 Ms. Laurie Park, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Finance, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Oral Statement............................................... 29 Written Statement............................................ 31 Ms. Marianna Lacanfora, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Policy and Chair of the Improper Payments Board, U.S. Social Security Administration Oral Statement............................................... 35 Written Statement............................................ 37 Mr. Jeff Schramek, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Debt Management Services, U.S. Department of the Treasury Oral Statement............................................... 49 Written Statement............................................ 51 EXAMINING BILLION DOLLAR WASTE THROUGH IMPROPER PAYMENTS ---------- Thursday, September 22, 2016 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in Room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Meadows [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Meadows, Connolly, Maloney, and Clay. Also Present: Representative Palmer. Mr. Meadows. The chair would ask unanimous consent that we can suspend the rules, the House rules, and go ahead and start this subcommittee hearing. And hearing no objection from my learned colleague and friend, since there is no objection, the committee is considered in order and starting. So we'll go ahead. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. And as we have noted, I want to thank each of you for being here today. Certainly, as we come to this time of the year where we look at improper payments and where we are and what has taken place, what should have taken place, what may have taken place, I look for each one of you to, hopefully, help us eliminate what changes that we can make in terms of, not only our accounting process, but our expenditures. And part of it is just reporting. And when we look at that, the American people expect us to truly be the stewards of their hard-earned taxpayer money. And the interesting thing that I found is, in light of so many improper payments and where we are, it is troubling many times because of the number and how high it is. And eventually, as I said, it adds up to real money. And so when we look at the numbers, it can be troubling. I would also say, however, though, what I have found is going from agency to agency to agency is a real dedication on behalf of the Federal worker to be accountable, and that has been one of the interesting aspects. So sometimes it is a number of our Federal employees who have to deal with a bureaucracy that they did not create. And by saying that, it is imperative that this committee look at the bureaucracy that has been created and, hopefully, start to address that and how we can, not only have better reporting, but also have an issue where we start to really focus in on making sure that we are accountable to the American taxpayer. So in that, I just--I've got a longer written opening statement that we'll submit for the records, but because my good friend, Mr. Connolly, has now arrived, I will--if he is ready, I will recognize him for his opening statement. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My opening statement is going to be eerily similar to that of Mr. Clay. So we'll enter something for the record and forgo a verbal statement. He and I are like twins. We think alike, we act alike, we speak alike, and I can't add to the wisdom of my friend from St. Louis. Mr. Meadows. Well, I will go ahead and acknowledge the presence of the twins here to my right and also go ahead and introduce our witnesses. I will hold the record open for 5---- Mr. Connolly. I have been informed my friend did not read our brilliant statement. Lord Almighty here. Here's what he would have said, Mr. Chairman. No, I will enter it into the record and not take up the time of the committee. Thank you. Mr. Meadows. I'll hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement. We will now recognize our panel of witnesses. I'm pleased to welcome the Honorable David Mader, controller at the Office of Federal Financial Management and Office of Management and Budget, OMB. Welcome. Ms. Sheila Conley--is that correct, Conley? Ms. Conley. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. Spelled wrong, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meadows. I wanted to verify. -- deputy chief financial officer at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Welcome. Ms. Laurie Park, deputy assistant secretary of finance at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Welcome. Ms. Marianna LaCanfora--that's close, right? Ms. LaCanfora. Right. Mr. Meadows. All right. -- assistant deputy commissioner of policy and chair of the Improper Payments Board at the U.S. Social Security Administration. Welcome. And Mr. Jeff Schramek, assistant commissioner of the Bureau of Debt Management Services at the U.S. Department of Treasury. Welcome to you as well. And pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. And so if you would please rise and raise your right hand. All right. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Thank you. Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. And in order to allow time for discussion, please limit your oral testimony, if you would, to 5 minutes, but your entire written statement will be made part of the record. So I'll go ahead, Mr. Mader, we'll recognize you for 5 minutes. WITNESS STATEMENTS TESTIMONY OF DAVID MADER Mr. Mader. Thank you, Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and distinguished members of the subcommittee for inviting me here today to discuss the administration's efforts to reduce improper payments. Addressing improper payments has been a central component of this administration's overall effort to eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. When the President took office in 2009, the improper payment error rate was 5.2 percent, an all-time high. Since then, the administration, working together with this Congress and the IGs, has made progress strengthening accountability and transparency through annual reviews by agency IGs and has expanded the review requirements for high- priority programs. As a result of this concerted effort in fiscal year 2015, the past year, the rate was 4.39 percent. It's important to note that agencies recovered almost $20 billion in overpayments through payment recapture audits and other methods in fiscal year 2015. However, this recovery amount is not factored into the calculation of the 2015 improper payment rate or amount. Two notable success stories of major government programs that experienced significant decreases in improper payments is the Unemployment Insurance Program and HHS' Medicare fee-for- service. Under the improper--under the unemployment program, decreased improper payment rates amounted to $2 billion, or 1 percent, between fiscal year 2014 and 2015. This program was able to achieve this reduction by using an enhanced national directory of new hires crossmatch and providing enhanced monitoring and assistance to the States. The HHS Medicare fee-for-service improper payment rate also decreased by $2 billion between 2014 and 2015 by reducing improper payments for inpatient hospital, durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, supplies and claims through the use of prior authorizations, new regulations, and changes in agency's provider education. And I mention these two programs in particular because, as you know, these are programs--and there are many programs--that while funded by the Federal Government, are actually administered by States, and that adds to complexity in ensuring that proper payments are made. Prior to fiscal year 2015, agencies were required to categorize their improper payment estimates into three categories. However, several years ago, these categories were recognized as providing limited value in determining the root cause of improper payments. As a result, OMB developed improper payment categories that expanded the existing categories and created 13 predefined categories for agencies to use. Page 3 of my written statement actually has a nice graphic that shows the before and after. And these allow agencies now to do a better job of analyzing the root cause in particular programs. Corrective actions to address root causes are an area we want agencies to do more of. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, with the issuance of OMB Circular A-136, OMB began to address a disconnect between agencies' corrective action plans and the root cause analysis. OMB has held townhall meetings with both agency representatives and IGs over the past 2 years. Also in 2015, MITRE, a federally funded research and development center, conducted an independent research project that focused on governmentwide payment integrity and improper payments. And as a result of that study, my office is looking at exploring and determining whether there's a viable need to create another program integrity group at the executive level. Although, I do note in some of the--my fellow witnesses here, actually, from the agencies have started their own group over the last several months, which allows them to share best practices and other ideas on how to improve improper payments. In May of 2016, we also facilitated a meeting between senior officials from GAO, HHS, and CMS to discuss corrective action plans and specific challenges in their particular high error programs. GAO--and Gene Dodaro was there for this entire meeting--was able to offer some insights around additional areas where HHS may want to explore corrective actions. The administration appreciates the opportunity to work with the Congress to achieve the passage and enactment of S.614, the Federal Improper Payment Coordination Act. And I'm pleased to report that OMB is working now with agencies to implement those requirements. And my colleague from Treasury has responsibility for implementing a lot of that as part of the do-not-pay initiative, and I'm sure he'll touch on that in his testimony. We also worked with Congress on S.2133, the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015, which was recently signed into law. And, again, when we reissued our Circular A-123 in the summer, we actually started including now some of the requirements for that. So in both of these cases, we've moved aggressively to implement these new requirements in the legislation. In December 4 of 2015, we submitted to Congress the first report required by OMB for the do-not-pay initiative. The report outlined the multiple components of our phased strategy for screening payments. And Mr. Schramek is going to talk extensively about the successes that they've had since the initiation of this program. I think it's important to note that, in addition to Treasury, there are agency payment integrity centers at CMS, at DOD, at SSA, and the Department of Labor. So it's not just unique to the do-not-pay initiative at Treasury. We have multiple efforts going on across the executive branch. There's a compelling evidence that investments in administrative resources can significantly decrease the rate of improper payments and recoup many times their initial investment. That's why this administration for multiple years has proposed making significant investments in program integrity initiatives, both in the 2016 as well as the 2017 budget. And many of these initiatives do not involve additional expenditure of funds. They actually require legislative changes. And I believe that this is an area where this committee can help with other committees in Congress in educating them on the wisdom of making some of these legislative changes. Combating improper payments continues to be a top priority for this administration, and we continue to explore new and innovative ways to address these problems. Although progress has been made, much more remains to be done, and we need your help. We look forward to working with the Congress to pass many of the provisions contained in the President's 2017 budget. Thank you for inviting me today, and I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Mader follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you so much. Ms. Conley, you're recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF SHEILA CONLEY Ms. Conley. Good afternoon, Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your leadership in improving Federal financial management, and thank you for inviting me to testify about the Department of Health and Human Services' efforts to reduce improper payments. I appreciate the opportunity to describe HHS' commitment and progress in addressing improper payments as well as some of our major initiatives. With outlays of approximately $1 trillion and responsibility for some of the government's largest programs, strengthening program integrity and reducing improper payments is a top priority of the Department. This focus extends to every member of HHS' senior leadership team and throughout all of our operating divisions and programs. While we've made significant progress, more work remains. Improper payments result from many circumstances, including a lack of or insufficient documentation to support a sampled claim. Improper payments are not measures of fraud, although the concepts are often mistakenly used interchangeably. HHS is focused on improper payments since 1996 when we worked with the HHS Office of the Inspector General to establish a Medicare fee-for-service error rate. Since then, we've established error rate processes for several additional programs and continue to implement targeted corrective actions. For fiscal year 2015, HHS reported error rates for seven programs that are susceptible to significant improper payments. Two programs, Medicare fee-for-service and foster care, reported lower rates since last year. However, five programs reported higher rates compared to the previous year. Through these seven programs, about 95 percent of the Department's outlays are subjected to the rigors of an annual error rate measurement process and the scrutiny of public disclosure. In fiscal year 2015, we also reported rates for seven Superstorm Sandy programs as directed by law. We've learned that our efforts to reduce improper payments must be strategic, multifaceted, and continuous. To that end, we're pursuing three approaches that deliver results: Leveraging technology, strengthening key partnerships, and exploring innovative solutions. As for leveraging technology, one of our major initiatives is the fraud prevention system, which uses predictive analytics technology to automatically screen Medicare fee-for-service claims prior to payment. That's an average of 4-1/2 million claims per day that are screened. It also flags suspicious patterns and identifies investigative leads. For 2015, we reported a return on investment of $11.50 for every dollar the government spends on this system. As for strengthening key partnerships, it's important to recognize that many of our programs are State administered, which make the States critical to our success. We're working closely with State and Medicaid and CHIP officials to implement important requirements that will both strengthen program integrity and directly impact the error rates. A very promising innovative solution relates to HHS' use of prior authorization initiatives in Medicare fee-for-service, an approach used in the private sector and other healthcare programs. HHS began using prior authorization for power mobility devices and is expanding this practice to other areas. While our priority is to make payments properly in the first place, we also focus on recovering improper payments when they do occur. For example, the Medicare fee-for-service recovery audit program has collected over $10 billion since 2009. While the Department has made progress, more work remains. We have a proven track record of working hard to address improper payments, and this area is and will continue to be a top priority for the Department. We look forward to working with this subcommittee and our partners and other Federal agencies as well as the States to reduce improper payments and strengthen our programs. Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I'm happy to answer any questions that you may have. [Prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Ms. Conley. Ms. Park, you're recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF LAURIE PARK Ms. Park. Good afternoon, Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss VA's accomplishments and plans for reducing improper payments and achieving sustained compliance to IPERA. As the VA deputy assistant secretary for finance, I am responsible to the interim chief financial officer for the departmentwide financial management activities. I am keenly aware that VA's financial management needs to improve, and I assure you that the Department is taking aggressive action to address our financial management challenges, including compliance with IPERA, as part of our stewardship of taxpayers' dollars. The Department is currently responsible for ensuring accurate testing, projections, and annual reporting of improper payments in 14 programs. These 14 programs provide a wide range of goods and services, including care in the community for our Nation's veterans, medical supplies to VAhospital and clinics, benefits including compensation for disabilities, education, and vocational rehabilitation for our veterans, rebuilding after Hurricane Sandy, and payments to Federal employees. I am responsible for issuing departmentwide guidance for implementing IPERA and for providing oversight on related departmental activities. In an effort to ensure commitment and accountability, a senior accountable official is responsible for identifying and reducing improper payments in their programs. In May 2016, the VA Office of Inspector General reported that VA did not comply with two of six IPERA requirements because it did not meet reduction targets and maintain a gross improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for all programs. Eight of these programs did not meet reduction targets established in fiscal year 2014, and two of these programs also exceeded the 10 percent threshold. OIG also reported that VA's increase was due primarily to improvements in estimating improper payments. In 2015, the Department improved its testing in response to an OIG finding that acquisition regulation requirements were not appropriately considered. VA collaborated closely with the Office of Management and Budget and the IG to ensure the accurate understanding of the effect of this concern. As a result, VA classified payments that did not comply with applicable Federal procurement laws, including the Federal Acquisition Regulation, as improper. Prior to 2016, VA's longstanding practice had been to rely on authorization with individual providers to procure care in the community when other arrangements were not practical or would delay care that our veterans urgently need. Some smaller providers and those who only treat a few veterans a year may consider following all five requirements a disincentive to treating veterans. In an effort to find a way to comply with statute and regulation, the VA has sought legislative authority to enter into provider agreements. This legislation would greatly reduce improper payments that were considered technically improper, but do not represent any form of fraud, waste, or abuse. In 2015, the VA increased senior leadership collaboration and awareness of improper payment challenges. We also repurposed existing resources to establish a new office focused on driving identification and reduction of improper payments. This office's singular focus on achieving IPERA compliance has elevated the priority and awareness of this important objective across the Department. Furthermore, the VA is working with the Department of Treasury through Do Not Pay and the Social Security Administration using death-to-match capabilities to identify improper payments in both the pre- and the postpayment phases. We still have additional opportunities to leverage these resources, and VA supports Treasury's legislative proposal to enhance the effectiveness of Do Not Pay. We are continuing our collaboration with Treasury on debt collection and utilizing other Treasury offerings that improve our financial management performance. In addition, we have initiated a planning for a new financial management system, which will strengthen our internal controls, provide an opportunity to reengineer our financial business processes, and increase the visibility of our financial position. VA acknowledges its current improper payment rate and is taking actions to increase IPERA compliance, while at the same time providing veterans the benefits and the services that they have earned and deserve. Those actions include continuing to ensure that the improper payment definition is applied correctly and may result in an increase of reported improper payments in some programs in 2016 as well. However, most of these new improper payments are instances where VA paid the right person the right amount for goods and services received and do not represent a loss to the government. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support of veterans. I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of Ms. Park follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Ms. Park. Ms. LaCanfora, you're recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF MARIANNA LACANFORA Ms. LaCanfora. Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to discuss our efforts to reduce improper payment. I'm Marianna LaCanfora, assistant deputy commissioner for Retirement and Disability Policy and chair of Social Security's Improper Payments Oversight Board. Few government agencies touch as many people as we do. This fiscal year, we expect to pay more than $906 billion in Social Security benefits to more than 60 million people and about $59 billion in supplemental security income to more than 8 million people. For fiscal year 2014, we did not meet our accuracy targets for the SSI program or for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program. Pursuant to IPERA, we sent a remediation plan for each program to Congress. Although we didn't meet our targets for the OASDI program, we have maintained a very high payment accuracy rate in that program. In fiscal year 2015, for example, 99.6 percent of the benefit dollars we paid were free of overpayment. Our greatest challenge is the SSI program. SSI is a means- tested program for aged, blind, or disabled individuals with limited income or resources. The SSI program has inherent complexities. We're required to consider many factors each month, including income, resources, and living arrangements, in deciding whether and how much a recipient should receive. Since these factors can change often, the program's design makes it vulnerable to payment errors. The SSI overpayment accuracy rate for 2015 was 93.9 percent, our highest rate since 2003. We've made progress, but we must continue to target the root causes of improper payment and further improve accuracy. Our remediation plan focuses on strategies to address these root causes. For example, we're combating errors concerning financial accounts by using an automated process to verify bank account balances with financial institutions to identify access resources. In addition, last year's Bipartisan Budget Act gave us several important new authorities. Perhaps most critical will be the ability to obtain timely and accurate earnings information from third-party payroll providers. We're working now to implement that and other provisions. We're also identifying new sources of reliable and timely data that will allow us to lessen our reliance on beneficiary reporting. Also worth noting is our creation of a data analytic center of excellence to inform our efforts and help measure progress, as well as two Federal communities of practice; one for data exchange and another for improper payment prevention. Through these efforts, we bring together more than 30 agencies to collaborate and share best practices. Before concluding, I'd like to emphasize our need for funding. We're among the most efficient and effective agencies in the Federal Government. Our administrative costs represent only about 1.3 percent of the benefits we pay. Our medical continuing disability reviews save $8 on average over 10 years for every $1 invested, and our SSI nonmedical reviews save $3 for every $1 invested. While we appreciate the recent increases in program integrity funding, we also need adequate and sustained funding to provide basic Social Security services. Since 2010, this part of our budget has decreased by nearly 10 percent after adjusting for inflation, while the number of our beneficiaries has increased by 12 percent. Consequently, we are seeing service degradation in many areas, including increased wait times in our field offices and on our telephones. Moreover, we're dealing with an unprecedented backlog in our program service centers where we handle much of the work to prevent improper payment. The fiscal year 2017 President's budget request would allow us to increase our program integrity efforts, while providing quality service to the millions of people who depend on us. Conversely, under the House Appropriations bill, we would be forced to furlough all employees and close field offices around the country for up to 2 weeks next year. It's imperative that we receive adequate funding in fiscal year 2017. We appreciate your interest in our efforts to maintain high payment accuracy and quality service. Thank you for inviting me to testify, and I'd be happy to answer questions. [Prepared statement of Ms. LaCanfora follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you. Mr. Schramek--I tell you, for a guy from North Carolina, that's a tough one to be able to pronounce. You're recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF JEFF SCHRAMEK Mr. Schramek. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Treasury's efforts to help federally funded programs to prevent improper payments through the Do Not Pay Business Center. The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012, IPERIA, directed OMB to administer the do-not-pay initiative. To implement section 5(d) of IPERIA, OMB designated the Department of Treasury to host the do-not-pay initiative working system. Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service carries out this assignment, which is consistent with our mission to promote financial integrity within the Federal Government. The Do Not Pay Business Center, which I will refer to simply as Do Not Pay, is a broader government effort-- governmentwide effort that is designed to prevent improper payments. Four agencies, represented by some of my colleagues here, have robust payment integrity programs. This direct support puts them in the best position to address improper payments in their own programs. Though we do partner with these agencies, Do Not Pay can have a bigger impact on agencies that do not have their own dedicated analytic center. In short, we fill an important gap. Do Not Pay's goal is to provide timely, accurate, and actionable information in a secure environment. Do Not Pay provides a secure Web-based portal that automatically matches pay data to sources that can indicate a payment may be improper. In addition to the portal, Do Not Pay provides advanced analytic services to detect systemic improper payments. Fifty-seven agencies currently use the portal, and since 2015, we completed 21 analytics projects for nine agencies. Our work has resulted in a number of successes. For instance, this year, agencies identified nearly $18.4 million of improper payments through the use of the Do Not Pay portal. This is more than doubled the amount reported in fiscal year 2015 and is significantly more than in previous years. This increase is the result of two factors: More agencies are using the portal, and through technology we introduced in 2015, agencies can report the amount of improper payments more easily. Do Not Pay developed a customized function that helped one agency this year stop nearly $34 million in improper payments before the payments were disbursed. In addition, through its partnership with OMB, Do Not Pay has helped agencies meet IPERIA's requirements. We did this providing agencies centralized access to the data sources identified in the law, including information about deceased individuals, government vendors, Medicare and Medicaid providers, and individuals and entities that owe a delinquent debt to the United States. Do Not Pay has accomplished much by working closely with OMB and the agencies, and we are committed to continuous improvement and innovation. Our partnership with agencies are critical. Without them, we could not test advances in our analytics, such as new risk models and better data matching techniques on real world challenges facing those agencies. Through our services and existing data sources, Do Not Pay helps agencies identify improper payments that their internal processes may have missed. In addition, the President's fiscal year 2017 budget contains two proposals that would expand Do Not Pay's data sources. Specifically, one proposal would amend the Social Security Act to provide do-not-pay access to the full debt file. A second proposal would allow programs to access the national directory of new hires through Do Not Pay, if those programs are already authorized to use the data. In sum, Do Not Pay's data matching and advanced analytics have evolved significantly, and agencies' use of Do Not Pay has grown substantially. Do Not Pay is viewed more and more as an important tool for improving payment integrity and ensuring that the right recipient receives the right payment for the right reason at the right time. I welcome any questions you may have. [Prepared statement of Jeff Schramek follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you so much. And the chair recognizes himself for a series of questions. Before I get started on those, however, all of you, thank you for being here. Thank you for your testimony. You have staff that is probably behind you that has done much of the yeoman's work to get that done, and so I want to acknowledge them, as I'd like to acknowledge both the majority and minority staff on the work that we get done. It is often really that hard work that gets overlooked, and so I wanted to make sure that we did that. The other part of that that I would say is, is because of some of the questions on improper payments become uncomfortable, I want to make sure that no one takes it personally as an indictment on their work as much as, hopefully, a benchmark for starting to make progress going forward. Does that make sense? So let me go ahead. Mr. Mader, let me come to you first. And as we look at OMB and the role that we have, there are some statutory requirements in terms of reporting improper payments and the reports that need to come along with that. It appears that we have a little bit of a difference, our staff talking to your staff, in terms of what that report may or may not look like or should look like, because I think you refer more to paymentaccuracy.gov, which I would suggest is less than robust and illuminating in terms of its full detail. And so can you help me understand when we are going to see a more robust report from OMB as it relates to improper payments and complying with the statute? Mr. Mader. So a little history to add to the question. My predecessor, back in 2010, in implementing the statutory requirements, I guess, made that decision back at that time to use the--to create the paymentaccuracy.gov Web site as the way to satisfy the requirement that's in the legislation. That required an annual report to Congress, and they implemented that payment accuracy. And that, you know, started in 2010, 2011. So they were updating it. I arrived in the summer of--as, you know, the summer of 2014. We updated it in 2015. I assumed that what was being reported on paymentaccuracy.gov was meeting the letter and the spirit of the legislation, only to discover this summer when your staff called us and said, did you know that you weren't doing this and you weren't doing that, that we realized that what started in 2010 was not meeting the--both the spirit and the letter of the law. To put it in context, what we were displaying was probably roughly 93 percent of the improper payments, but we were missing almost 7 percent of that. And there were a couple of other data elements that the statute required that we were not displaying. So we had a great conversation with your staff back the summer that I participated in personally with my staff, all of who are new and so weren't around in 2010. So that's on me to make the correction. And right after the conversation and in our subsequent analysis, we said, okay, we're going to have to totally revise this Web site. So we've been, since the course over the last couple of months, looking at, okay, what are the requirements? What does it look like now? What do we need to do to meet the spirit and the letter of the law? We're ready to launch, in the next couple of weeks, a complete redo of paymentaccuracy.gov in a way that will capture and display the data so that not only the annual report to the Congress, but I think--Mr. Chairman, your earlier point in your opening statement, this is something that the American public needs to see. So, you know, not only will it meet the legislative intent of the annual report, but we believe it will also provide the transparency. We intend to have that done and updated with the new data in the January through March timeframe. Mr. Meadows. Okay. Well, I don't want to prejudge your new innovation, so I won't. But I'm going to withhold, I guess, comment until we see what you come up with. Because I think, clearly, when we look at a report, we're about to put out a report. That's the kind of report that we should be getting from you. The data on the payment accuracy Web site, you know, doesn't really correspond. And so as we start to integrate that--my good friend, Mr. Connolly from Virginia, knows more about the IT side of things than I ever did,--but when we look at the Data Act, when we look at FITARA, when we look at all of these other issues, we made a bipartisan commitment to have good quality data that actually gives us actionable things. And to that extent, I don't want to create something that's new that doesn't follow along those two lines and implement that data. But the other is I don't want to suggest that just having a Web site is a report. And so I'm going to be optimistic. You know I'm a trusting individual, and--but we will verify. So I'll wait to see what you have coming up. In January, is that when you said we can expect---- Mr. Mader. Well, so our plan was to actually, starting next week--and I'm going to get weekly reports from the project team--to actually start now working on what this new display of data will look like. Maybe what we ought to be doing is coming up and meeting with the staff, sort of walking them through what we're about to do. Because what I don't want to do is spend a lot of time and money between now and, you know, March and then go, like, well, that's not meeting your needs. Mr. Meadows. Yeah. If you can do that, I think that will be great. Mr. Mader. So we can do that. I mean, we have--Mr. Chairman, we also have an executive order that requires, you know, us to do this as well. So, you know, we're going to have to do it for ourselves. You know, if the Congress wants, you know, a different written report, we certainly can do that. But we have to fix the data. Mr. Meadows. Yeah. And I'm not looking for redundancy. In fact, if anything, I'm looking for us to not be redundant. And I guess what I'm saying is, if that meets our needs, we'll all be together and be happy about it. The more we can have it online and the less we have it in terms of a written report, the better off, I think, we all are. I just want to make sure that it's in keeping with finishing. I want to ask one other question, then I'll recognize the ranking member. And we've got a series of things that I'd like to go over. But, Ms. Conley, let me come to you. And you had a great opening statement, and we look at the numbers that, you know, your--the 800-pound gorilla in terms of improper payments, in terms of moneys going out, you and the Social Security Administration. The problem is, is each time we have this, we hear that it is a top priority, and each time the number continues to rise. And we have different hearings where, you know, we get stakeholders that are blamed or States that are blamed and, yet there are times when the States want to come in and help and there seems to be a reluctance from different agency heads on doing that. My question is real simple. If it's the top priority, is it better suited for someone else to look at improper payments where we start a trend that goes down versus one that continues to go up? Because we continue to--we're not making progress, I guess. And I'm saying that in a kind way but in a frustrating way. This is our third improper payments hearing, and it continues to go up, and we don't seem to be making much progress. What do we need to do? Ms. Conley. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your question. These are critically important programs, and we take them very seriously, as well as program integrity, relating to each of our programs. These programs are large and they are complex---- Mr. Meadows. Listen, I'm a numbers guy. I get all of that. Ms. Conley. You understand. Yes, sir. Mr. Meadows. And I understand that you can talk about percentages when you have a big budget, because the percentage is small but the dollar is big. I get that. I guess what I'm saying is, is there someone else that needs to look at this to be able to figure it out where we start to get the trend, we're not making progress? Improper payments at HHS continue to go up at a disproportionate rate to the amount of benefits that are being paid out. And that's my concern, is--it'd be different if it were--we were shrink--you know, the numbers were going but the percentage--but that's not happening. Ms. Conley. So if I may follow up on that. One, I think it's important to note, as Mr. Mader indicated in his opening remark, our Medicare fee-for-service program, our rate has come down from last year---- Mr. Meadows. Right. Ms. Conley. --to this year, and we were well under our target. It is still a very large program. So while we're making progress there in measuring improper payments and complying, it's--these are still very large numbers. We've made significant improvements in this program, and you can--we use the improper payment rates. We're very keen on the trajectory, whether we measure them uniformly and then we look to these trends. And in the case of fee-for-service, we can see that there's some key actions that we're taking in the fee-for-service program that are really paying off and driving that rate down. So as part of our root cause analysis for fee-for-service, we determine---- Mr. Meadows. So it went down by what, $2 billion is what we're looking at? So I'm looking at the numbers. But Medicare part C went up by $2 billion, Medicare part D went up by $1 billion. I mean, so--Medicaid went up by $12 billion. And so when you look at it, it's easy to highlight the one where we've made a little--and I guess what I'm saying is, when you look at the overall number, we're now up at $89 billion. And, again, that's real money. I mean, it's not my money, it's not your money, it's the American taxpayer's money. So here's what I would like, and I'm going to recognize the ranking member. I need from you, specifically, what we're going to do different between now and next year this time when we have this same report that comes out where we start to reverse the trend. I need a specific--not that it's important, not that it's this. I need how are we going to address these particular issues? And I'll recognize the ranking member, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend. And I echo a lot of what he had to say. I will say, however, Congress can't have it two--both ways. We can't ding on you for not getting down that number to the lowest possible number when we're not willing to invest in the tools and resources necessary to recover those dollars or prevent them in the first place. And we know that in certain respects, certain investments have huge payoff. My friend and I have talked on a bipartisan basis on our committee about, you know, you invest more money in GAO, for example, and it has a big payoff. We invest in-- I'll speak only for myself. We invest in IRS. It has a big payoff. So if you're looking for enhancing revenue and getting down---- Mr. Meadows. Well, they'll just get your tax return. I mean, we can almost balance the budget on---- Mr. Connolly. I'll take my chances. So anyway--so we in Congress also need to take responsibility for our part in this. But I know that my friend, Mr. Meadows, and I share a goal, though, that this is something we could do something about it, it seems to me, on a bipartisan basis. And, actually, in an odd way, if I can use this phrase, it's free money. Every dollar we recover that's not--or we avoid as an improper payment, however you define it, is a dollar we don't have to raise in new taxes. It's a dollar we don't have to cut from a critical investment that we know we need for the future. It's a dollar we don't have to have from sequestration. And why we don't pay more attention to this as a Congress, I don't know, or as a government. And I just thank my friend for continuing this tradition. My first improper payment hearing was in this room on this--the predecessor subcommittee with our friend, Todd Platts, who was the Congressman from Pennsylvania at the time, who took this very seriously and set the kind of bipartisan cooperative tone I think we need on this. Mr. Mader, what is the universe, total universe, of improper payments we're talking about right now? Mr. Mader. So the last---- Mr. Connolly. Dollar figure. Mr. Mader. So the dollar figure fiscal year 2015 is $136 billion. Mr. Connolly. Okay. Now, I want to say, when I first went to my first hearing on this, it was roughly about that. It might have been about $150 billion then. Sound right, 5 years ago? Mr. Mader. So 5 years ago, the percentage was higher, the dollar amount was lower. Mr. Connolly. A little lower. Okay. So it made some progress? Mr. Mader. We've made progress on the rate, yes. Mr. Connolly. Okay. Of that $136 billion, how much is Medicare fraud? Mr. Mader. I would have to defer to my colleague from HHS on that. I don't keep that data. Mr. Connolly. All right. Ms. Conley? And you're talking to your cousin here, don't fudge. Ms. Conley. No relation, right? So you raise a very important question and important topic, because I think when we're talking about the extent of improper payments, it's important to go back and understand what improper payments are and what they are not. So an improper payment is making sure that--an improper payment can arise from a payment to the wrong person or on behalf of the wrong person, in the wrong amount, for the wrong benefit, or without documentation. Mr. Connolly. No, we understand. The reason I'm trying to get at fraud is this: There's different strategies. Right? Ms. Conley. Right. That's right. Mr. Connolly. So the nature--what's behind my question isn't to ding on you for--it's a big program and there's going to be fraud. Human nature is going to be human nature and people are going to cheat. So working with Mr. Mader or with the Treasury Department, we can come up with systems that start to reduce the number of, oops, you know, we double billed, we double paid. We thought you were 65; you weren't. Whatever it is. We thought you were a veteran, and it was your cousin or your neighbor; a mistake. It happens. And if we can make systems more and more efficient and fool proof, we can cut down on that error rate, save taxpayers' dollars. Fraud's a different matter. Fraud, I've got to go after it. I've got to have investigative resources. I've got to have prosecutorial resources. I've got to persuade U.S. attorneys that this is really a high priority, and it can become win-win. You know, I've got to make some serious investments. That's a very different kind of improper payment, but I've got to do both. So I need to know your universe. What is--of the $136 billion, how much of that is Medicare fraud? Ms. Conley. We do not have a commonly accepted methodology for measuring the extent of fraud. We do, though, have other processes whereby we assess the various risks that fraud could occur. Mr. Connolly. Ms. Conley. Ms. Conley. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. I can't believe you're a relative. Is it not somewhere around $50- or $60 billion, best estimate, Mr. Mader? Mr. Mader. Well, I'm not sure of the--the $136 billion, I don't know, but let me see if I can answer your question maybe a little bit differently. So of that $136 billion, $45 billion, 33 percent of that, is related to documentation errors. And I dare say it's probably not fraud. Okay? Mr. Connolly. Right. Mr. Mader. If they filled out the form or they didn't fill out the form. And what's also interesting to note is that this issue--and it's a lot around insufficient documentation, you know, 33 percent of that total, actually isn't required to be reported as improper payments under the underlying statute. It was actually introduced in the previous administration. And that's not making an excuse, but I think, Congressman Connolly, makes--the point that you're making is that there's ways to deal with those kinds of errors and then there's fraud. And a lot of the things that we're talking about in the way of program integrity initiatives or some of the examples around Do Not Pay, merely speak to that, how do I--how do I get to the documentation errors? How do I do a better job of getting it right the first time? Because if I picked a sample, and a form is missing, improper payment. Mr. Connolly. Right. But we know that fraud occurs. For example, I know of one U.S. Attorney's Office that recovered--I think, almost identified and helped recover almost $3 billion in Medicare fraud. That's one. We have 99 U.S. attorneys. So, I mean--and I--this is not a new question, because I remember-- unless I'm smoking something, but at this very room, this very subcommittee, we've looked at a figure of estimates of around $50- to $60 billion. It could be more. We don't know. So I'm trying to look at the whole pie. That pie is $136 billion, 43 percent are documentation error. So what percent do we think are fraud? Mr. Mader. We're going to have to come back and--I don't know and I don't--you know, I don't want to guess. Mr. Connolly. All right. Treasury Department, do you want to help guess with me? Do you know? Any idea? Give me the universe of potential fraud. I mean, out of this pie. Ms. Schramek. I don't have the universe. Mr. Connolly. Don't have the universe. Ms. Schramek. Not for fraud. Mr. Connolly. All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm frustrated by this because I don't know how we devise strategies that try to get at this if we're not willing to put some percentage or number. And I understand it's an estimate, a guesstimate, fraud's--how much potential fraud is going on out there I know is a tough thing, because-- well, to quote Donald Rumsfeld, there are the known knowns and the no unknowns and the unknown unknowns, and okay. But it's kind of important we get our arms around this so we at least, for planning purposes, declare a universe so that we can devise strategies to reduce it. Mr. Meadows. And I would agree with the gentleman. Mr. Connolly. Yeah. But let me just say a final thought here. Boy, would I love--I mean, the chairman asked that you come back to us with strategies that we can sort of sink our teeth into in the new year. I would love to see a--sort of a spitball strategy that says--okay. In theory, we know we can't ever get to zero, but what would it take, in theory, to get that $136 billion to zero? Because every one of those dollars is a dollar for new investment or a dollar where we avoid having to put new burdens on taxpayers or a dollar to reduce the debt if we want to dedicate it to that. I mean, there are lots of possibilities with this, that's why getting the fraud piece is important. And I'd love to, at some point, have somebody do some spitballing about this. I mean, I don't want to raise false expectations. It can be zero. But surely, we can do better. Surely, as the chairman indicated, and I echo his sentiments, I mean, it's a little bit like Groundhog Day when we have these hearings, because I thought we might be making not so much incremental progress as maybe spectacular progress with new data systems and new technology investments and the like. So I think we approach this in the spirit of trying to partner with you, that get our arms around this collectively as a government, because a lot of good can come out of this. And bad things happen when this is left unaddressed. So I wish you'd get back to us with the fraud estimates so that we have--we can work with you in devising strategies and try to fight for getting the resources you need for those strategies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman. So let me--let me see if I can summarize that, because I-- if we're going to address this--and we have it titled improper payments for a reason, because we don't put it in a bucket. And that--I mean, we know that it's improper. Here's what I would like to ask you to do, and it gets, I think, to the gentleman's question, is if we can look at a couple of subbuckets. Coding errors is one--so I'm going to take HHS, because I know that probably better. So we know that the RAC audit say, okay, you've got coding errors, you've got issues where you've got the wrong date. And it shows as an improper payment when, indeed, it is--really, it's probably a proper payment that's improperly coded, but yet it shows up and so it drives the numbers up. That's part of it. The other part of that is, is there are--is the suspected activity that may not be fraud, but we're not sure. And so that's got to go in a bucket, because you're going to have your general counsel who say you can't say it's fraud because we can't prove it's fraud. And we understand the legal requirements here. But if you can put it in a bucket. Then if we can look from a historical standpoint, and that's what the gentleman is talking about, is a percentage of those that are collected, how much do we go after for fraud? And I'm willing to work with the gentleman to look at these numbers to not say it has to go back to Treasury. So, you know, if we're looking at SSA, and you're saying, well, we're having a tough time, and you do a better job on that, I'm willing to invest the political capital to say, okay, we have to return it. It's part of what I talked about with Mr. Mader on real estate. You've got one group that disposes of it, but they don't get the money back, so there's no incentive to do it. And so we're willing to work in a bipartisan way. We've got to get the number down. And I'd rather have accurate numbers and accurate reporting versus all of that. Does that make sense? All right. I'm going to ask for a unanimous consent to have Mr. Palmer join us, because I've got to run to a WRDA hearing on one critical area that we're trying to address when he comes in. And I may--I didn't want to interrupt the gentleman from Missouri. Mr. Clay, you're recognized. Mr. Clay. Thank you. In 2009, President Obama signed an executive order to reduce improper payments by, quote, ``intensifying efforts to eliminate payment error of waste, fraud, and abuse in the major programs administered by the Federal Government.'' Pursuant to this executive order, in 2011, Department of the Treasury established a Do Not Pay Center that offers tools and resources for agencies to use for the reduction of improper payments. Mr.--pronounce your name. Mr. Schramek. Mr. Schramek. Mr. Clay. --Schramek, what services does the Do Not Pay Center offer agencies to help curb improper payments? Mr. Schramek. Thank you. We offer a couple of services. The first service is that we provide data sources to agencies so they can do a single online search, like a Google search. They can do--if they have more searches they need to do for prepayment or preeligibility, they can send over a file of those information that we can match against data sources. And then before they make a payment, they can send that file again to match--to make sure nothing has changed from when they looked the first time on their validation. We also, through IPERIA, have entered where payments go across to data sources before they go out the door, to provide information back to the agencies on if those payments are proper and they can adjudicate them. And then our last piece is we offer analytic services to agencies so that--because we have most of the payment data that Treasury disburses, we can look at payments within an agency, within agency--within programs within an agency and even across agencies. Mr. Clay. And how many agencies have signed up with the Do Not Pay Center? Mr. Schramek. So we have 57 agencies that are currently signed up with the do-not-pay program. Mr. Clay. And have these services been effective at stopping improper payments? Mr. Schramek. They have been, as we've got more and more agencies onboard. So just this year, we had accumulatively identified $25 million, and this is significantly higher, almost more than double, than we did last year because of the use of this program. Partially because agencies, when we give them the information back to determine if a payment is proper or improper, they--we gave them the ability to tell us how much that back is. So that is helping us to more and more determine how much of those payments are identified in the agency side. Mr. Clay. And, Mr. Schramek, I'm pleased to hear that the Do Not Pay Center has saved agencies millions of dollars in improper payments. There are still billions of dollars in improper payments that are spent every year. How can the Do Not Pay Center use its resources to save additional improper payment dollars? Mr. Schramek. So it's very critical for us to continue to work with the agencies and with OMB to do this process. So the data sources we have, we will continue to provide the agencies and talk to them about which ones are best for them and get more agencies to use those data sources. We've also put--and we agree with the President's budget for additional data sources. So right now we only have the public version of the Death Master File, and when we get the private version, that would help us as well. And then access to the National Directory of New Hires database would give us that information as another tool to provide agencies. Mr. Clay. And do some agencies prefer to use their own methods to identify improper payments? Mr. Schramek. Agencies do have other programs. Do Not Pay is one of the tools the agencies get to use in identifying improper payments. Treasury cannot make the decision of whether a payment is improper or not. We provide the information to the agencies and then we work with the agencies to determine if it's improper or not. Mr. Clay. All right. Thank you for that response. And, Ms. LaCanfora, I heard you say that currently you allow recipients to volunteer data to make a determination on a monthly basis to determine how much they are paid. Isn't that an easy way to game the system at SSI? Ms. LaCanfora. You're right. What I said in my testimony was that the Supplemental Security Income program, or the SSI program, is our greatest challenge because we rely very heavily on beneficiaries to tell us information. And the structure of the program is such that we need to track lots of different factors, your income, your resources, who you live with, all of your living arrangements, lots of different data points that we need that we rely on beneficiaries to tell us about. So one of our greatest strategies that holds the most potential is to try to move away from reliance on beneficiaries and move more toward data. And thank you to the Congress for giving us the Bipartisan Budget Act. One of the most powerful provisions in there is our ability to use third-party payroll data so that we do not need to rely on IRS data, which oftentimes comes very late in the process. We can get timely wage data from payroll providers, and we are working to implement that now. So moving from self- reporting to data is where we think we're going to get a tremendous payoff in improper payment prevention going forward. Mr. Clay. And how much, an estimate in savings, do you think you'll be able to identify? Ms. LaCanfora. I don't have an exact number, but I will say it's in the billions, with a B---- Mr. Clay. Okay. Ms. LaCanfora. --because wages or earnings are the greatest--one of the greatest sources of improper payment at our agency. Mr. Clay. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. My time is up. Mr. Palmer. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes itself for questions. To follow up on Mr. Clay's questions about the apparent inability--or to identify people who have died, I mean, there are companies in the private sector that can track everything, I mean, from what laundry detergent we buy to what Web sites we visit, I mean, what political party we affiliate with. How is it--why is it so difficult to gather information when people are deceased so that you stop the payments? And that's to Ms. LaCanfora. I'm having trouble seeing over this. I'm just average height, so---- Ms. LaCanfora. Thank you for the question. We actually receive 2.5 million death reports each year. So our death data is pretty comprehensive. We receive information from States and from funeral directors and from a host of other places, including families who report death records to us. We share that data with nine Federal benefit-paying agencies directly so they have access to that today. We are restricted by law from sharing all of our death data with Do Not Pay because the law specifically allows us only to share that data with the Federal benefit paying agencies. So I think Mr. Schramek mentioned a proposal in the President's budget that would authorize us to share all of our death data with Do Not Pay. Mr. Palmer. Are they calling votes? Okay. All right. I'm going to continue with this. You said there were 2.5 million deaths reported to Social Security. Is that correct? Do you have any idea how many deaths there were nationwide? Ms. LaCanfora. Yeah. That number is comparable to the CDC estimates on the number of people who are actually deceased. There's always going to be a few deaths that we don't get because there's strange things happening, but by and large, our death data is comprehensive. I will say, however, that historically, it hasn't always been comprehensive, because our death reporting processes have gotten much better over time and there's something really important in the process that we have called electronic death registration, otherwise known as EDR. It's a very high-quality reporting process that makes our death records virtually error free, but that is a relatively new process for most States and it's not rolled out in every State. So there's also a President's budget proposal to expand electronic death registration to ensure that our death records are complete. Mr. Palmer. So over the last 2 or 3 years, and the last report I saw was for 2014, and it was what, $3 billion, something in that range, that went out in death benefits improperly paid? Did that number decrease last year? Ms. LaCanfora. For the Social Security Administration, death is actually not a leading cause of improper payment. In fact, we use our current set of death records to prevent---- Mr. Palmer. I understand that. I'm just asking you, because you just said that--you lauded where you are on your death reporting. And I come from a think-tank background prior to that engineering degree. I'm very linear in my thinking. So if you got from A to B and B is where you needed to be, there should be some result. Okay. So have we reduced the amount of improper payments related to death benefits? Ms. LaCanfora. Yes, but I want to just correct. So the $3 billion I think that you cited is not related to death. That's our overall improper payment rate for the OASDI program. The death-related overpayment amount for Social Security is much smaller than that. It's actually less than 1 percent of all of our improper payment. I think the broader concern is sharing that data with other agencies that might use it. But improper payments related to death are tiny at the Social Security Administration. Mr. Palmer. Well, going back on the report that I read last year--actually, I'm on the Budget Committee and that's when I brought this up--65 percent of the improper payments were attributed to Medicare fee-for-service, Medicaid, and earned income tax credit program. It is about $81 billion. And in 2014, I think we sent out about $125 billion in improper payments. Last year, I think it was about $130 something billion, and prior to 2014, it was a lower number. So it seems to be getting worse, not better. And one of the things that I found interesting was that the Treasury hasn't corrected the issue with the earned income tax credit and it appears to be getting progressively worse. Can you address that? Are you qualified to address that, Mr. Schramek? Mr. Schramek. Yes, sir. At the Bureau of the Fiscal Service, I don't have access to the information on the IRS side of the tax information. Mr. Palmer. Okay. Sounds like that the people I need to talk to are not here, because I'd also like to know why--what statutory limitations there are on Treasury that prevent us from requiring States estimating improper payments in terms of TANF benefits. Can you answer that? Mr. Schramek. Yes, sir. That would be at IRS. Mr. Palmer. All right. Well, given that they've called votes, let me ask that question to Health and Human Services on the TANF benefits. Ms. Conley. Ms. Conley. Sir, I'm sorry, could you repeat the question about TANF? Mr. Palmer. Well, in my doing my background on this, I found that there's some statutory prohibition against the States reporting improper payments for TANF benefits. And I apologize, I was working on earned income tax credit with Treasury and now I've switched to TANF, and this question should have been directed to HHS. What are the statutory limitations that keep the States from reporting improper payments on TANF benefits? Ms. Conley. Yeah. Thank you very much for your question and for clarifying. With regard to TANF, the statutory framework for TANF, this is the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, is set up such that we don't have the authority to either request or compel States to calculate improper payments, nor do we--are we authorized to compel them to provide us with the information that would be necessary to develop an improper payment rate for TANF. And we--so even though we don't have an error rate methodology because of the statutory constraints, we do still execute program integrity activities with TANF. For instance, the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996, were recognized in the TANF statute of 1996. And those--the single audit basically is an annual audit process at the State level of the TANF funds that are administered by the States, and they're subjected to an annual audit process by either the State auditors or independent audits. And we go through those audit findings and resolve those findings and ensure that the States are following up to strengthen the integrity of the TANF programs at the State level. Mr. Palmer. So do we know how much we paid out in improper payments in TANF benefits? Ms. Conley. So there is not a calculation of an error rate for TANF, because of those statutory limitations that we have. Mr. Palmer. Well, that doesn't make any sense to me that we don't at least have an estimate from the States. I mean, is there no concern of making improper payments using Federal money? I mean, what do we need to do to correct that? Ms. Conley. So perhaps we could reconsider, as TANF is reauthorized, to think about an error-rate methodology process and whether or not that makes sense given the statutory framework for TANF. As I mentioned, while we don't have an error rate, there are other things that are going on in the TANF program, the oversight of it, as well as the work that is happening at the State levels to ensure we're complying with the program requirements. TANF has very high level Federal requirements. They're very broad and overarching, and so the States--the State-administered program and the States develop the various compliance requirements at a more detailed level. Mr. Palmer. Well, here's my concern about this and the whole issue of improper payments, is that being on the Budget Committee we do everything in a 10-year window. And if we use the last 3 years, say, for example, as an average, we're sending out somewhere in the range of $110- to $120 billion a year in improper payments. In that 10-year window, that's $1.1, to $1.2 trillion. That's a lot of money. You know, it has a big impact on our ability to do business, and I think particularly considering that we're approaching $20 trillion in debt, it's incumbent upon us to do everything that we can to make sure that the money we spend is spent properly. I want to shift back to Treasury, to Mr. Schramek, if I can. Treasury was required to issue a report on the data analytics performed at the Do Not Pay Center under the Federal Improper Payments Coordination Act of 2015. It is my understanding that the report has not been issued. When do you expect to issue that report? Mr. Schramek. Now that report has been issued. Mr. Palmer. It has? When was it issued? Mr. Schramek. This past week. Mr. Palmer. Okay. We need to make sure the committee gets a copy of that report. Let me ask you this: What are the current data analytics capabilities of Do Not Pay? Mr. Schramek. So in the Do Not Pay program, our current analytics come around a couple of different mechanisms. One, we do data source matching and provide that information to agencies. Two, because we have access to payment data that agencies have provided us, we use that data to provide information related to data-quality errors of the payments that they provide to Treasury to make sure the data is better. We look at if there's duplicate payments or if there have been duplicate eligibility information and provide that to agencies to validate. For example, if somebody paid something twice or paid the same amount twice, is that proper or not? And we're also looking across the Federal Government for agencies to look at if similar payments went out on the same day. So our analytics programs have grown. We've, as I mentioned, we've got--we've done 21--22 analytics projects for nine agencies just this year. Mr. Palmer. Ms. Park, Social Security Administration and HHS use third-party payroll data to verify payments and the VA doesn't. Why doesn't the VA use third-party payroll data? Ms. Park. So we use various methods to verify pay in the program. Specifically, I can't talk to exactly what those are. I would need our senior accountable official, so I'll have to take that for the record. We are looking at opportunities to partner with industry to get that information and we'll be working on that in the coming year. Mr. Palmer. Are you--do you know if the VA is considering using additional data sources? Ms. Park. Yes, we are, sir. I mean, just this year, we awarded a new contract to support us in our IPERA efforts, and we're hoping that the contractor will bring different methods for us to use, and we're also exploring other areas. Mr. Palmer. I'll switch over to OMB because I don't want Mr. Mader to feel like he's being left out. So Mr. Meadows has already asked him these questions, well, then you haven't been left out. I want to go back to Ms. Conley and HHS. And the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services failed to meet reduction targets for Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program. Why weren't you able to meet those targets? Ms. Conley. Thank you very much for your question. I think maybe I'll start with the Medicaid program because this is an important large, broad program. In 2014, we began implementing new requirements of the Affordable Care Act as well as HIPAA, to require States to do three basic things: One, to screen all new enrollees into the program; and two, to reenroll all of their providers; and the third thing is to have all electronic claims include a national provider identification. So these three efforts, which were very substantive and challenging for agencies, has taken--excuse me, for States--it has taken the States--they're adopting these new requirements at different rates. This is an example--each of these three new requirements is an example of where we're actually strengthening the underlying integrity of the program by knowing who we're doing business with with these--with the new screening and the enrollment process, as well as being able to identify and track payments. So we can reduce the likelihood of fraud by knowing who we're doing business with and having screened them, as well as reduce improper payments by encouraging the States, assisting them, if you will, in complying with these three requirements. We measure Medicaid over a 3-year period, and so 2014 was the first year that we measured against the first batch of States in compliance with this requirement for 2014, second batch in 2015, and the third and final batch would be captured in our 2016 error rate measurement. So that is why you see that error rate going up from 2014 to 2015 to 2016. We expect States to be in compliance. We're doing a lot of outreach. We're sharing with them information about the enrollment process that we have encountered at--or executed at CMS for fee-for-service. We're doing a variety of outreach efforts and communication to assist the States, and we expect those rates to go down. Mr. Palmer. According to the inspector general, Medicare Advantage did not report any recovery amount audits in 2015. How does CMS justify not conducting recovery audits, given the estimated improper payments report? Ms. Conley. So with regard to Medicare part C, we have taken action to begin the procurement process for recovery audit contractors. That program, the Recovery Act, or the RAC, rather---- Mr. Palmer. Wait a minute. I want to make sure that I understand this. You have begun the process to---- Ms. Conley. To procure RACs for the part C program. Mr. Palmer. But why have you just now started the process when we've been losing billions of dollars? Ms. Conley. So we started a while back. So we did a request for information from the private sector to share with us ideas and options for how we could actually carry out the recovery audit contracts in a meaningful way. Information was provided and we are now in the process of--we've done a Request for Proposal and we're going through the procurement process at this point in time. Mr. Palmer. Well, see, here's the thing that I don't understand. Private companies who have to make sure they don't incur losses in order to stay in business require 100 percent claims to be audited for accuracy in billing, I think. They may be under legal requirements for that as well, and it just--I don't quite understand why CMS doesn't do a better job auditing, why they audit such a small percentage. Ms. Conley. So one thing that I should mention is that with regard to Medicare part C, we conduct what are called RADV audits, risk adjustment data validation audits, of the various plans; about 30 plans destined to go up to about 100 plans of the total 600 eventually. And what happens is we conduct the audit at that contract level so that the results of that testing can be extrapolated out to that particular contractor. These RADV audits have been executed for a period of time and we're beginning to see the impact of that audit process, not just on the entities subjected to that audit process already, but also on some of the plans that have yet to be audited. In addition to that, we have implemented a new regulation that requires these plans to submit back to CMS any overpayments that they identify in the process. The combined effect of those two activities has resulted in $650 million being returned to CMS as a result of this collective work. Mr. Palmer. Well, obviously, $650 million is a lot, but it pales in comparison to the $125 billion that's been lost over the last 3 years. And the thing that concerns me about this, and again, the enormity of the improper payments over the last 3 years, is that the Medicare trustees estimate that Medicare, the program will be bankrupt in 12 years. And I mean, this is serious stuff. They've called votes. I'm going to transition because I have got to--I know Mr. Meadows asked the question, but just for my own purposes, I'd like to know why OMB hasn't produced an annual report to Congress, including these subjects. Mr. Mader. Congressman, as I explained to Chairman Meadows, my predecessor in 2010 made a decision that they would use this paymentaccuracy.gov approach to satisfy, not only an executive order, but also the legislative requirement from the annual report to the Congress. I arrived in the summer of 2014. You know, we're in, obviously, the fourth year of generating it, and I assumed that this was meeting the statutory requirements, until we had a call this summer from the staff saying, you know, by the way, you're not. You're missing this and you're missing that. We had a good conversation with the staff at the time. Immediately then, I took the action to actually start doing an analysis of what was missing and what could we do to relaunch the site going forward so that it was in compliance and totally accurate. We have a project plan underway that would allow us to relaunch the site in the January through March timeframe. The exchange that I had with Chairman Meadows was, well, maybe we should talk more about, you know, do we want a, you know, a paper document report or do we want a, you know, a Web site that would meet all of the requirements? So my commitment to the committee is to get together with the staff and sort of work through what, you know, what are the interests, what are the requirements, and you know, come to a decision on what makes sense. I mean, we're going to do the-- we're going to relaunch the Web site regardless. If the committee wants a written report, we can do a written report. Mr. Palmer. Well, I'll discuss that with Chairman Meadows, but I do appreciate the fact that there's been some initiative taken to address this. I tell you what we're going to do. I'm going to recess the hearing, so you need to hang around, and I'll get with Chairman Meadows on the floor to determine if we need to come back. I don't want to adjourn the hearing without talking to the chairman. And---- He's okay with it? Apparently, someone has talked to the chairman. This is like at home. I'm the last one to know. So I'm very comfortable in the situation. But anyway, if there's no further business, our hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [all]