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- FOLLOWING THE TRAIL OF U.S. TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS ABROAD: ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN [House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] FOLLOWING THE TRAIL OF U.S. TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS ABROAD: ON BUDGET ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 29, 2015 __________ Serial No. 114-19 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 94-837 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin WILL HURD, Texas GARY J. PALMER, Alabama Sean McLaughlin, Staff Director David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director Andrew R. Arthur, Staff Director, Subcommittee on National Security Sang Yi, Professional Staff Member Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk Subcommittee on National Security RON DeSANTIS, Florida, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR. Tennessee Ranking Member JODY B. HICE, Georgia TED LIEU, California STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma, Vice Chair ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois WILL HURD, Texas BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on April 29, 2015................................... 1 WITNESS The Hon. John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Oral Statement............................................... 4 Written Statement............................................ 7 FOLLOWING THE TRAIL OF U.S. TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS ABROAD: ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN ---------- Wednesday, April 29, 2015 House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Ron DeSantis (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives DeSantis, Mica, Hice, Lynch, and Lawrence. Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. Since 2002, the United States has appropriated more than $107 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan. These funds are provided to assist once Afghanistan in building its national security forces, promoting good governance, conduct development assist, and engage in counter-narcotics and anti-corruption efforts. For Fiscal Year 2016, the President has requested more than $5.3 billion in additional reconstruction funding for Afghanistan, consisting of over $1.5 billion for State U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID efforts and $3.8 billion for the DOD to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, which include the Afghan army and police. Congress created the Office of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR, to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. Two recent reports from SIGAR on personnel and payroll data have called into question how efficiently U.S. funds have been spent on the Afghan National Security Forces and how effective that funding has been. In a January 2015 report, SIGAR found that the process used by the Afghan National Police for collecting attendance data, which forms the basis of all Afghan National Police personnel and payroll data, has ``weak controls and limited oversight.'' To ensure that attendance data is correct, Afghan Police personnel are supposed to sign in and out on a roster daily. According to SIGAR, though, even these rudimentary safeguards are not followed. Instead, it was found that commanding officers have been recording and reporting patrolman attendance manually as part of daily food provision requirements. Because personnel receive a cash stipend to purchase food for each day they work, a lack of oversight controls could incentivize commanding officers to falsify officers' attendance to obtain this stipend. SIGAR found no examples of direct oversight during attendance data collection and reporting to ensure that such malfeasance did not occur, and police personnel could therefore collect pay for days that they did not work. Moreover, SIGAR determined that data systems used to store, access, transfer and use police personnel and payroll data contained incomplete and incorrect data and weak internal controls. Finally, not even the unique identification number issued to each member of the force is being used consistently or effectively to track attendance and to pay salaries. Similar issues were identified in a report SIGAR issued yesterday on payroll and personnel issues in the Afghan National Army. In that report, SIGAR found that the only control in place at the unit level to ensure accurate attendance reporting on a day-to-day basis, a roster that individual army and air force personnel sign daily, was not consistently used across Afghan National Army locations. Specifically, although two of the three units that SIGAR visited presented signed roster books, the third roster book did not contain such signatures. Rather, attendance was verified by checkmarks apparently entered by a single individual. Even where rosters were used as intended, Government officials did not observe the signing of the rosters, review the rosters for verification purposes, or reconcile them against other personnel or payroll data. SIGAR found that these weaknesses in Afghan National Army attendance data collection process could result in personnel being paid for days that they did not work. Further, it found that as U.S. and coalition forces draw down in Afghanistan, the U.S. Government will become even more dependent on the ability of the Afghan Ministry of Defense to verify the accuracy of the personnel and payroll data it collects. Unless and until the Ministry develops the capability to ensure and verify the accuracy of this data, SIGAR determined, ``there is a significant risk that U.S. funding for Afghan National Army salaries will be wasted or abused.'' The payroll and attendance data collected by the Afghan National Security Forces has two purposes. First, it is collected to ensure that officers are paid for the days they work and are not paid for the days they don't. In addition to ensuring against corruption, accurate payroll data helps protect the American public's money by making it more likely that U.S. aid is spent appropriately. Of equal importance is the fact that the data is collected to assist the Afghan National Security Forces in assessing whether they have the manpower that they need to carry out their crucial mission of protecting the Afghani people and, by extension, American interests. SIGAR's findings call into question how effectively U.S. taxpayer dollars are being spent in Afghanistan and whether a different scheme for U.S. funding to the Afghan National Security Forces is needed to achieve the dual goals of protecting the Afghani people and advancing U.S. security interests in Afghanistan. The subcommittee will address these two issues with Mr. Sopko today. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, the ranking member, for his opening Statement. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to, first of all, thank you for holding this hearing to examine the recent audit reports issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction on the accuracy of the Afghan National Security Forces data, and I would also like to thank Inspector General Sopko for helping the subcommittee with its work. As announced by President Obama on December 28, 2014, the U.S.-led international security assistance forces combat mission in Afghanistan has not only concluded after over 13 years from its inception. During Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's recent visit to the U.S. last month, President Obama announced that the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan will now remain at approximately 10,000 through the end of the fiscal year. The President noted that the majority of these U.S. forces are currently deployed in a training and advisory capacity in furtherance of the NATO-led mission, Resolute Support, that began on January 1st, 2015, approximately 1,000 U.S. special ops personnel supporting regional counter-terrorism operations as well. Given that additional training of Afghan National Security Forces is now our primary mission in Afghanistan, it is absolutely critical that the Afghan government provide the U.S. and our NATO partners with reliable and accurate data regarding the size and strengthen of the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. As noted by Inspector General Sopko in his April 2015 quarterly report to Congress, ``Numbers matter. In Afghanistan, some numbers have a life and death weight to them. Without reliable data on Afghan National Security Forces strength, the United States cannot determine whether the billions of dollars it has spent on recruiting, training, equipping, and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces since Fiscal Year 2002 has been spent properly or accurately calculate what additional funding may be needed.'' Precise data is essential to our determinations of the Afghan government's ability to provide adequate security for its citizens against the Taliban insurgency and attacks by Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Accurate data also provides a basis for U.S. and Coalition decisions on the pace of withdrawal and the scope of our counter-terrorism missions. Regrettably, the two recent audits conducted by Inspector General Sopko of personnel and payroll records provide good reason to doubt the accuracy of Afghan data. In particular, in January 2015, audit reports on the Afghan National Police found that there is no documentation that unit commanders are accurately reporting personnel attendance or that police personnel are receiving their full share of their salaries. Officials appointed by the Ministry of Interior could be taking as much as half of a policeman's salary. According to an audit report on the Afghan National Army released by the Inspector General just today, a daily sign-in roster is the only mechanism in place to collect National Army attendance data, and it is not used across army posts nationwide. In addition, the Ministry of Defense still calculates National Army salaries using a manual process that is highly susceptible to manipulation. Furthermore, the audit highlights the irregular use of National Army-issued identification cards. This is particularly troubling given the incidents of green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, most recently, and regrettably, on April 9th, when U.S. Army Specialist John M. Dawson, of Whitinsville, Massachusetts, was killed by an Afghan soldier in Jalalabad, and my prayers and thoughts are with his family. The absence of reliable data on the Afghan National Security Forces aggravates the potential for the waste, fraud, and abuse of U.S. taxpayer dollars. It also compromises the safety of our remaining U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to examining the inspector general's various recommendations in his report on how to enhance the reliability of the critical data and yield the balance of my time. Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. I will hold the record open for five legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written Statement. We will now recognize our witness this morning. I am pleased to welcome the Honorable John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Welcome, Mr. Sopko. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? [Witnesses responds in the affirmative.] Mr. DeSantis. The witness answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written Statement will be made a part of the record. You are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to testify today about SIGAR's recent work on the Afghan National Security Forces personnel and payroll systems, and the Afghan government's capacity to manage and account for U.S. on-budget assistance. Over the past 14 years, the United States has spent approximately $1 trillion and has lost thousands of lives to build a secure and stable Afghanistan that will never again be a safe haven for terrorists. Of that amount, almost $110 billion has been invested to create a capable and competent Afghan government that can provide security and basic services to its people. More importantly, the United States has committed to spend billions more over the years to come to sustain the Afghan government we helped create. Properly overseeing these funds is essential to ensuring that this vast investment in Afghanistan does not go to waste. Every dollar we spend now on training, advising, and assisting the Afghans, as well as, and I would say more importantly, on oversight should be viewed as insurance to protect our 14-year investment. We at SIGAR are concerned that managing and overseeing this massive ongoing effort is being left to a decreasing number of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan. With limited resources to conduct the reconstruction mission, transparency and oversight are more important than ever, especially now that we appear to have a willing partner in the new National Unity Government of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. Because of our draw-down, U.S. decisionmakers and implementing agencies have become more reliant on obtaining accurate and reliable data on the reconstruction effort produced by the Afghan government. This includes basic information on the numbering capacity of Afghan soldiers and police. Unfortunately, as my written testimony highlights, neither the United States nor our Afghan allies truly know how many Afghan soldiers and police are available for duty or, by extension, the true nature of their operational capability. Such basic information is especially critical now, as we enter the 2015 fighting season with the Afghans being fully responsible for their own security. The importance of accurate and reliable personnel data to the United States and Afghan governments cannot be overStated. Every professional standing army or police force begins each day by identifying how many personnel are present for duty and what their capabilities are. In Afghanistan, this data will also determine the overall amount of U.S. funding for the ANSF. I think The New York Times story, that broke just before noon, about the Afghan military operations and U.S. military operations highlight the importance of knowing what is the capability of the Afghan forces. As the United States continues to shift its reconstruction funding to on-budget assistance, it is also important that this assistance be based on accurate and reliable data, and that the Afghan government is able to manage and account for such funds. Again, SIGAR's work shows that the Afghan government still lacks the capacity to do so. The withdrawal of U.S. military and civilian personnel, as I said, is making this even more challenging to manage and oversee the reconstruction effort. Likewise, audit and law enforcement agencies have substantially reduced the number of staff they have based in Afghanistan. For example, the other IGs in law enforcement agencies have reduced their in-country staff by 45 percent, and may reduce it further as the State Department seeks to ``normalize'' civilian personnel staffing in Afghanistan. By mid-summer 2015, four other U.S. investigative agencies have indicated they intend to completely leave Afghanistan. Since I was appointed Special Inspector General almost 3 years ago, I believe SIGAR has conducted highly effective, productive, and independent oversight. But our ability to do so may now be at risk. Just this past week, the U.S. embassy in Kabul informed SIGAR that because of the State Department requirement to normalize or right-size the civilian presence in Afghanistan, SIGAR must reduce its staff by 40 percent, from 42 to 25 deployed positions by the summer of 2016. SIGAR was told just Monday, at a senior leadership meeting at our embassy in Kabul, by a senior member of the embassy team, that that cut was non-negotiable. To be more precise, do not come back with an alternative number. We were not consulted about this number, nor were we given any explanation for how this arbitrary number was determined. Now, I am concerned about the impact these cuts will have on SIGAR's mission and on the U.S. reconstruction mission on a whole, because SIGAR is the largest oversight body in Afghanistan. While the U.S. reconstruction effort may have declined, compared to its highpoint, Afghanistan is still the largest single recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, and is projected to remain so for years to come. In other words, while our troops may be coming home, the checks will still be going over there for some time to come. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. [Prepared Statement of Mr. Sopko follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. To what extent does the U.S. Government have oversight over the U.S. funding that is paid to the Afghan National Security Force personnel? Mr. Sopko. Well, our oversight is the two audits report, and I would highlight that the appendices at the end that actually lists every U.S. agency and international agency and their weaknesses is very limited. We have no visibility, really, below what they call the core level. So at the brigade, the kandak, and the company, we have no visibility; and we have limited visibility even at the corps level. I think we are trying as hard as we can. I think General Campbell and General Semonite and his team and CSTC-A are trying, but they have very limited resources and they have indicated to us they don't have enough people. Mr. DeSantis. So at least for those subordinate units, the U.S. Government, we are basically entirely relying on the government of Afghanistan to oversee the accuracy and reliability of the payments? Mr. Sopko. Accuracy, reliability, and the capabilities of the troops. We don't have any visibility at the company level, the kandak level, brigade level; and the last time I was in Afghanistan I was told by some of the CSTC-A officials that they are actually being told don't even look down there. Mr. DeSantis. So no U.S. personnel involved in taking attendance, overseeing any payments? Mr. Sopko. No. No, sir. Mr. DeSantis. Does the U.S. military in Afghanistan have the resources it needs to help the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense improve their personnel and payroll systems, and to better account for on-budget assistance funding? Mr. Sopko. I would say based upon our body of work, and based upon my observations, and based upon Statements made to me by senior military officials and others, they do not have enough resources. Now, this doesn't mean you have to change the number of troops on the ground; you just have to think out of the box. Maybe bring in people on TDY, maybe utilize better resources. But as of now they don't. Mr. DeSantis. With the pending cuts to your staff due to the ``right-sizing'' that you alluded to, what do you estimate will be the impact on your ability to conduct oversight? Mr. Sopko. It will be adversely impacted, particularly now, when we have a willing party in the palace. We are bringing cases, working very closely with General Semonite, bringing fraud cases to the attention of the president of Afghanistan and the CEO. They are willing to work with us, and now our resources will be limited. I can't say how many audits will be lost or how many investigations, but the on-the-ground truth is now we have an opportunity to work with a willing partner, and for some reason we have a decision being made to make Afghanistan embassy normal. Now, sir, I know you have been to Afghanistan; I know some of the other members. And this is not meant as being derogatory. Afghanistan is not normal. This isn't Norway. This isn't Germany. This isn't Brazil. This is a country where there is a war going on; we have an active insurgency; we have troops' as well as American civilians' lives being put on the line. But we have a willing partner who wants to help and needs our help. So that is my concern right now with this normalization of the chief mission, that this may not be a wise decision. Very risky. Mr. DeSantis. When we had the Afghan president address the joint session, some of my constituents would ask, well, is this a lot better than Karzai. So in your experience, at least in terms of the ability to have accountability, you do think that there is a significant improvement? Mr. Sopko. I do, sir. And I am not Pollyanna-ish about this. I follow the lines of President Reagan: trust but verify. But this president, when we uncovered a billion dollar contract in which $200 million was being stolen on direct assistance because of fraud and because of bribery and because of actually tampering with the contracting, we brought the CSTC-A. CSTC-A, which is the military command, we went in and the president demanded a meeting, a briefing, and he personally got briefed on it. He fired generals; he ordered a new commission to look at it. But more importantly, he ordered a commission to look at changing the entire way they do contracting. This is good news. I am cautiously optimistic because of the new unity government. And the same thing applied to Abdullah Abdullah, who, the last time I was there, he asked to be briefed by me and my staff. My staff are working very closely with the new government. We had a very little relationship, very small relationship with the prior government. Mr. DeSantis. Great. Well, thank you for that. My time is expired and I will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you again, Inspector General Sopko. You are doing some great work here. Although I have to say it is very troubling to read your reports, the lack of accountability here. According to your report, and I believe it is correct, we have spent over $60 billion training and equipping and maintaining national Afghan security forces since we went into Afghanistan. Is that correct? Mr. Sopko. That is correct, sir, approximately $60 billion. Mr. Lynch. OK. Now, let's start with the Afghan National Army first. Can you tell me how many Afghan National Army personnel we have trained? Mr. Sopko. I can't. We don't know. There is no way to give you that number. Mr. Lynch. How about Afghan National Police? Mr. Sopko. We don't know. There is no way to give the number because the records are so bad. We can tell you what the top level numbers are; it is 167,000 for the ANA, which is the National Army, and 155,000, approximately, for the police. Mr. Lynch. That is standing right now? Mr. Sopko. Well, that is what the plan is that is standing right now, but we have no idea how many have been trained. Mr. Lynch. Well, we have been doing this for 13 years, so can you tell me the attrition rate? For instance, in Iraq, because we get a quarterly report and we track this, we know that we have spent $25 billion in Iraq and we have trained up 938,000 Iraqis for border patrol, police, and military. Now, you spent more than twice that in Afghanistan. Different circumstances, obviously, but you cannot tell me how many people we have trained? Mr. Sopko. Sir, let me just qualify. I didn't spend that. Mr. Lynch. Oh, no, no, no. Of course you didn't. Mr. Sopko. I wish I had a budget that big. Mr. Lynch. No, no, no. I apologize. I apologize. Our Country has spent over $60 billion in taxpayer money doing all this training and equipping and maintaining them. And you are telling me today, because of the way we account for things over there, you can't tell me how many folks we have trained? Mr. Sopko. I will check with my auditors, who are smarter than I am, but I think that number is beyond our capability. [Pause.] Mr. Sopko. No, we can't. Mr. Lynch. OK. All right. That is sad. That is sad. But that is the way it is. I don't doubt your answer, I don't. And on top of this, I know that a number of weeks ago we had a little bit of a situs with General Campbell in Afghanistan because he wanted to keep some of the reports classified. We had been getting these reports on the amount of money spent and number of people trained up, and we had been getting those regularly from Iraq and fairly regularly from you as well, and your predecessor as well, and then General Campbell didn't want to give us that information anymore. That is No. 1. I know we had a back and forth, and now they realize they made a bad decision and they have reversed that, and now they are going to supposedly continue to give us this information. He said the reason I wanted to keep it classified and not tell us or the American people was that he thought the enemy might get ahold of it, how much money we are spending over there, and that would weaken security. So now he has agreed that he is going to give us that information. But, in addition to that, now he is reducing the number of personnel with your group, from 40 to 25, is that correct? Mr. Sopko. It is not General Campbell; this is coming from the State Department, because we actually fall under Chief of Mission rules when we are in State. So, no, it is not General Campbell. Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Sopko. We are working very closely with his team. Mr. Lynch. But there will be less people tracking this information for us, doing oversight? Mr. Sopko. That is correct, sir. Mr. Lynch. And just so you know, Congress is also subject to limitations getting in there now, as well, so we are doing less oversight because of the limitations of assets there, we are told. So we can't do that oversight anymore. That is a troubling development. With the amount of money we are spending over there, it is a disgrace that we don't have an accountable system. I think a lot of this money is being stolen. We are having a fight in Congress right now over the budget about how much money our overseas contingency operations should get, and here is all this money being stolen. I commend you on your work. We just have to figure out a way to stop this. Maybe it is coming to a point where we just stop all the funding going over there, and that is the way we solve this. I yield back. Mr. Sopko. Could I respond, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Hice [presiding]. Yes, sir, please. Mr. Lynch. Please. Mr. Sopko. Mr. Lynch, my only concern about that, and I can understand your frustration, the reality of the situation on the ground is, if we stop funding, probably the Afghan National Security Forces will collapse, the Afghan government will collapse, and the entire $1 trillion investment will be lost. So I caution you, sir, on that. Mr. Lynch. We will visit that again, but thank you. I appreciate that. Mr. Hice. The gentleman yields back. The chair will now recognize himself for 5 minutes. Along these lines of the attendance records that you have referenced a few times, this certainly goes far beyond just mismanagement of taxpayer dollars. There is obviously a lot at stake in all of this figuring. When the U.S. and Afghan officials are planning offensive or defensive military operations and they have inaccurate numbers with which they are working with in terms of personnel and whatever location they are, what are the national security implications? Mr. Sopko. Well, the most serious implication would be that a corps or a kandak or brigade would be a hollow brigade that doesn't really exist. And I can only allude to, although it is not a totally exact comparison, but to what happened in Iraq, where it was discovered that those were hollow brigades and that a lot of the troops were ghost, they didn't exist; they were created out of thin air so that the officers could steal the salary and steal everything else. So I assume that is the biggest concern that we would have and you would have, and General Campbell would have. The other concern is if we don't know who is showing up, we don't know what their qualifications are. Are they medics? Are they trained medics? Are they literate? Are they weapons specialists and all that? They may just not exist. And you know as well as I do, if you are in the military, you have a roll call every morning. Well, we don't have basic roll call. We don't know who shows up at that roll call. And the same applies to the police. I know we have incidents right now in Baltimore. I am certain every morning in Baltimore there is a roll call in every one of those precincts so the chief of the police, the station precinct knows who is there. We don't know in Afghanistan. Mr. Hice. Well, obviously, the results of that could be enormous, and you referenced the trillion dollar investment. How is the Afghan National Security Forces operating right now, in this season, without U.S. military support, are they holding? Mr. Sopko. I am probably not the best person to answer that, but on my latest meetings over in Afghanistan we had positive responses from General Campbell on their operations. But I am not an expert and we don't have the capability to actually do that assessment. But apparently they had a very good or pretty good operation in Helmut. They now are up north in, I believe, the Kunduz Valley and doing an operation. I don't know how well they are doing, I can't really tell you. There was some newspaper articles recently about that from the local press which gave you mixed results. And I think The New York Times article actually talked about that we may be coming back in to help the Afghans. This is an important year, sir. I can just say that. Mr. Hice. I would certainly agree with you. You mentioned also fraud and bribery. Just how deep is the corruption? Mr. Sopko. Oh, I think the corruption is endemic in the country. I think President Ashraf Ghani recognizes it, and the CEO, and they are trying to do something about it, and that is why it is so critical now to be working with that government. We actually have a willing partner for a change, so we are hopeful that more can be done. But it is an overwhelming task. Mr. Hice. So with the corruption, though, that is there, although there appears to be attempts to correct some of it, can they be trusted to conduct oversight of salary payments, attendance, that type of thing? Mr. Sopko. Well, that is why we are encouraged that General Semonite and his team are trying to design a system that will protect the money and protect the contracts, and that is why we are encouraged that we are working with General Semonite on our team with the palace on trying to design contracts and design a system that can make a difference. Mr. Hice. Are we talking an electronic system? Mr. Sopko. Electronic systems where we can--I was very encouraged. Yesterday my staff received a 4-hour briefing from a member of the Pentagon. They finally decided they have heard us and they are bringing in experts who know how to design H.R. systems. They have never done that before. Basically, General Semonite and his team have been doing the best they can, but they are war fighters. We finally have convinced the Pentagon to devote the resources to design an H.R. system. This should have been done years ago. They didn't. Well, now we have an opportunity and a willing government to respond, so I am encouraged by that. Mr. Hice. Well, you would think as long as the U.S. is making so many of the payments for personnel and so forth, that, with the money flow going in, they would want that relationship to be healthy and that they would want to address some of the abuse, the fraud, and that type of thing. Is that an accurate assessment? Mr. Sopko. Yes. The new government is interested in that, and they have not only spoken on it, but actually carried out some deeds that we are impressed with. So, again, trust but verify. But at least with the National Unity Government we have somebody who is very willing to change the way things have worked in Afghanistan for a number of years. Mr. Hice. All right, sir, thank you. My time has expired. The chair will now recognize the representative from Michigan, Mrs. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Sopko, for being here today. Ensuring that the daily attendance of Afghan police and military personnel is collected and recorded in an accurate manner is essential. I do want to say about your Statement that an H.R. system is put into place, my career prior to coming here to Congress involved almost 30 years in HR. So I find it unacceptable and hard to understand how we are paying people without having an H.R. system that validates who we are paying. But with that being said, we know we can't have an effective personnel and payroll system if we don't know who showed up for work, simple roll call, and how often they were there. You agree, you made that Statement. So let's look at the ANA signature reporting for a moment. In the report being released today, SIGAR found that the only control in place at the unit level to ensure accurate reporting on a day-to-day basis was a sign-in roster. Do I have that correct? Mr. Sopko. That is correct, ma'am. Mrs. Lawrence. But this roster was not used by everyone. As I understand it, officers used it, but enlisted personnel did not. Mr. Sopko. That is correct. Mrs. Lawrence. OK. I also understand that SIGAR found that the ANA-issued identification numbers are not consistently used to track attendance. Is that correct? Mr. Sopko. That is correct also, ma'am. Mrs. Lawrence. But is it a fact that all of the personnel are actually issued an identification number? Mr. Sopko. We don't know for sure. Mrs. Lawrence. OK. So I know that SIGAR visited two military units and reviewed their roster books. I understand what you found regarding the lack of oversight and weakness in data collection was concerning, and you have kind of outlined it. These weaknesses in attendance data collection process could result in personnel being paid our Federal tax dollars, being paid for days, for work that didn't happen either without knowledge of a supervisory personnel. Make me understand and State again how can we pay someone and the supervisory personnel is not connected with that payment. Can you explain that to me? Mr. Sopko. Well, there are multiple payroll systems; there are multiple electronic systems that don't talk to each other. We assume if you are an employee you have an ID card. Mrs. Lawrence. Yes. Mr. Sopko. Well, it turns out that they are not all issued cards; the cards aren't always put into the system. It also turned out that they have never collected any of the cards of the people who have left. And that is serious not from a security point of view, which I think the chairman alluded to, but you have people walking around with ANA Army ID cards and police ID cards in the country, meaning you can sign them up and collect. It is hard to explain how messed up this system is. If you look at the appendices, we listed--I am not trying to defend the system. This is something that has been identified going back years by the GAO, DOD IG, State Department IG, we have done it three times. Finally I think we have gotten their attention. By we, I think the Afghans want to fix it because I think they are concerned. I can't speak for the president, but I believe he is concerned that he doesn't know how many soldiers he has out in such a province. Mrs. Lawrence. Now, I have only a few minutes, so can you please tell me how the recommendations that are being made with the subcommittee would improve things? Can you tell me your sense of expectation? Mr. Sopko. Essentially all of our recommendations to DOD have been accepted and they are moving on them, so we are encouraged by that. Our recommendations to you and the committee is to keep watching DOD, and bring us back and bring them in, if necessary, to see if they are implemented. They have promised to do this. Trust but verify. Let's see if they do it. Importantly, I think you have to look at the staffing and capabilities of our military in Afghanistan and whether they have adequate resources to do this. When we did our audits, we talked to our military, and they basically told us they don't have the bodies to do adequate oversight. That is why we are doubly concerned that the largest oversight body of the U.S. Government is being cut by 45 percent in Afghanistan, by the State Department, without consultation. And the other issue is we are an independent inspector general. Since 1978, independent inspectors general determined their staffing level and where they are located. Now we get an edict from the State Department that basically says this is your number, live with it. Mrs. Lawrence. I want to tell you thank you so much for your testimony, and you have my commitment that I will join with the members of this subcommittee to keep an eye on it. Thank you. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hice. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired. The chair will now recognize the ranking member from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for five more minutes. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe in this overseas contingency operation we can put an amendment in that would maintain the current level of oversight by the Special Inspector General in Afghanistan. We could try to do something like that. Mr. Sopko. We would appreciate any help you can provide us, sir. And I am certain my other brethren and the other IGs would appreciate that help too. Mr. Lynch. OK. Absolutely. The $61 billion that the American taxpayer has paid so far, and that is as of March 31, 2015, does that include the $900 million that was stolen out of Kabul Bank? That was also for paying personnel; that was salaries. Mr. Sopko. Well, technically, that money was generated by the Afghans. Mr. Lynch. That is the third version I have heard. I actually went to a classified briefing in Afghanistan. I have been there 14 times, I think, but one of my earliest ones after they robbed the bank, this is the president's brother and the vice president's brother, this is when the $900 million went missing, I was told at a classified briefing then that none of that was U.S. money. Then, a couple years later, I was told all of it was U.S. money. So maybe you can enlighten me a little bit on whose money was that. Mr. Sopko. Well, the best way to explain it is in one of our charts we talk about how we lose visibility over---- Mr. Lynch. Yes. I only have 3 minutes. Mr. Sopko. OK. I will do it quickly. Once the money goes to salaries, it is the Ministry of Finance, it is no longer U.S. money. Mr. Lynch. They are not getting it from tax money; they are getting it from donors. Mr. Sopko. I agree totally with you, sir. They only raised $2 billion, and it cost $8 to $10 billion to keep that country afloat. So it is mainly being supported by us. Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Sopko. That is why it is so critical. And I know I don't want to take your time, Mr. Lynch. Mr. Lynch. You already have, my friend. Mr. Sopko. OK. Mr. Lynch. Look, look, here is my problem. When we did this in Iraq, we did the exact same thing and we were having folks walk away with weapons, sell their weapons to militant groups. We came up with a system in Taji, the weapons depot, where we took a picture of the soldier when they came out of training, we did a retina scan so they couldn't fool us. We had a good ID. We had the number of his weapon assigned to that; we had an ID card that we had. And we knew who these folks were. Why did we get away from that in Afghanistan? Mr. Sopko. I don't have an answer, sir, but we don't have that visibility anymore. Mr. Lynch. It would seem to me that it would be pretty easy to measure the scale of robbery in Afghanistan of U.S. taxpayer money by just taking four or six units. You have the payrolls that are coming in, so just pick six or eight of them, go in there and do actual ID on them and watch where the checks go. And once you realize that there are a whole lot more checks being paid out in relation to how many people are actually on the job, you will know how much you are being ripped off. I think we did one pilot program a while back. I don't know why we haven't continued that, but it is pretty depressing that we are losing good Americans like the young man that got killed a couple weeks ago from Massachusetts, Mr. Dawson, and others. We are trying to do the right thing here and we are being robbed blind, as far as I can tell from the reports that you have provided. Do you have any suggestions on what we can do? I mean, I know you don't want to cutoff funding, but it would seem that if we are paying all this money, the American taxpayer, we have a little bit of leverage here. In other words, we are not going to pay the money unless we have an accountable system where we can actually track where the money goes, because I think a lot of these--look, you are absolutely right when you tell me that corruption is endemic. It is absolutely the rule, it is the rule in Afghanistan. It is the rule. Corruption from top to bottom, inside out, backward forwards. Total corruption. We have to try to operate within that system, but not be robbed blind. We have to be a little bit more responsible, I think. And CSTC-A, as far as I am concerned, they are complicit in this because they haven't put in place a system where we can catch these people, or at least discourage the level of theft that is going on. It is extremely discouraging, to say the least. Mr. Sopko. Well, Mr. Lynch, can I respond, and can I take time from somebody else to respond? Because I have been stealing his time already, Mr. Chairman. I think you are directly on point. But the thing we can do is conditionality. We can condition. You are right, we have the piggy bank. I have been harping on conditionality for 3 years. I was originally told we could never do that, but CSTC-A is now, we have a new team in there which is doing conditionality. And when I met with the president of Afghanistan, he said he believes in conditionality; he will go along with conditionality. So the reality on the ground has changed a little bit, and that is why I am cautiously optimistic. I am usually Dr. Doom, but I am cautiously optimistic. That is why it is counterintuitive to now cut oversight, to cut our resources to the bone in the State Department, at AID, as well as with the military, who have to oversee all this money. The Secretary of Defense just announced he wants to increase our support for the military in Afghanistan by 50 percent, a 50 percent military increase. Well, that means more money, more guns, more contracts. You are not increasing CSTC-A at all. So that is the disconnect. You know, we can't do programs by press release, and that is the problem here. Mr. Lynch. Mr. Chairman, you have been very generous and indulgent, and I appreciate that. Thank you. Mr. Hice. Thank you very much. Votes have been called, so we are going to need to hurry up. I do have another couple of quick questions, if you could be quick on your responses. Are you familiar with the new embassy construction project? Mr. Sopko. Yes. Mr. Hice. OK. From what I understand, there are ballooning costs taking place. There are a thousand desks, for instance, in that embassy, according to the GAO's briefing last year. And yet you described a moment ago 40 percent cuts. How do we equalize this? Is there a way to? Mr. Sopko. There is a way to equalize it, but I think you have to do it smartly. I think putting a number out of the air and dictating it is not the way you do this. That is not the way you would do it in business. I don't know why we are doing it in Afghanistan, by pulling a number, not just for me, but for everybody else, and saying design a program around it. We should look at what our program needs are and then design the number of bodies to fit that. Mr. Hice. How does this fit with our oversight over our direct assistance? Mr. Sopko. The building, sir? Mr. Hice. Yes, the whole complex. Mr. Sopko. Oh, the complex? I will be honest with you. That complex is something we haven't looked at; that is a State Department inspector general's job to look at that. I think he is actually reviewing the construction there, but I don't know. Mr. Hice. OK. Well, I know that you are an oversight body, but what type of mechanisms would you recommend to have stricter control with what is happening here? Do you have recommendations? Mr. Sopko. I am happy to provide them to you. Stricter controls for the State Department? Mr. Hice. U.S. dollars that are provided for direct assistance. Mr. Sopko. Well, for direct assistance, sir, I think we have to use conditionality. We have to design the programs realizing we are dealing with a corrupt regime, so we have to have people in place to review them. If we don't get access to records, we don't get access to facilities, then I think seriously we should consider cutting the program. And I think that is what CSTC-A is starting to do; if they don't see the Afghans living up to it, they are cutting some of the money. I think that is critical to do. But you have to have somebody there to see and verify whether they are doing what they are doing. So if you cut all the oversight staff, or gut them, or gut all the CSTC-A staff, or gut the AID and State staff, then how are you going to know if you are getting the money stolen or not? Mr. Hice. OK, very good. Well, listen, I want to thank you for your witness today and for appearing before us. If there is no other business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [all]