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- BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES- RECENT EFFORTS TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST ISIS [House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES RECENT EFFORTS TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST ISIS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JANUARY 17, 2018 __________ Serial No. 115-60 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://oversight.house.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 30-259 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Blake Farenthold, Texas Jim Cooper, Tennessee Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Thomas Massie, Kentucky Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Mark Meadows, North Carolina Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Ron DeSantis, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Dennis A. Ross, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Mark Walker, North Carolina Val Butler Demings, Florida Rod Blum, Iowa Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Jody B. Hice, Georgia Jamie Raskin, Maryland Steve Russell, Oklahoma Peter Welch, Vermont Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania Will Hurd, Texas Mark DeSaulnier, California Gary J. Palmer, Alabama Jimmy Gomez, California James Comer, Kentucky Paul Mitchell, Michigan Greg Gianforte, Montana Sheria Clarke, Staff Director Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director William McKenna, General Counsel Brick Christensen, Senior Military Advisor Kiley Bidelman, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on National Security Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Ranking Minority Member Justin Amash, Michigan Val Butler Demings, Florida Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Peter Welch, Vermont Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Mark DeSaulnier, California Jody B. Hice, Georgia Jimmy Gomez, California James Comer, Kentucky Vacancy C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on January 17, 2018................................. 1 WITNESSES Sebastian Gorka, Ph.D., Former Deputy Assistant to the President Oral Statement............................................... 4 Written Statement............................................ 7 Mr. Michael Pregent, Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute Oral Statement............................................... 23 Written Statement............................................ 25 Mr. Phillip Lohaus, Research Fellow, Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, American Enterprise Institute Oral Statement............................................... 33 Written Statement............................................ 35 Mr. Robert Anthony Pape, Jr. Professor, Political Science Department, University of Chicago Oral Statement............................................... 46 Written Statement............................................ 48 APPENDIX Statement for the Record of Michael J. Morell, submitted by Ranking Member Lynch........................................... 72 BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES- RECENT EFFORTS TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST ISIS ---------- Wednesday, January 17, 2018 House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Washington, DC The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Duncan, Amash, Hice, Comer, Lynch, Welch, and DeSaulnier. Also Present: Representatives Jordan, Meadows, and Krishnamoorthi. Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. We are here today to learn more about the Trump Administration's battlefield successes against the Islamic State. Since coming into office almost a year ago, President Trump has made great strides in the war against ISIS. At the time of his inauguration, the Islamic State controlled major cities in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State's black flag flew over Raqqa in Syria and over Mosul in Iraq. Today, both cities are liberated. ISIS lost thousands of square miles in territory at an astonishing rate. Unfortunately, the American people are not seeing this good news story. Instead, they see nightly stories in the mainstream press about Russian interference and other issues. The American people deserve to know the facts about what changed between administrations and how President Trump is keeping us safe. We are here, then, to talk about real, concrete successes and what the United States Government can do to build on these wins to ensure the safety of the American people. We have before us a distinguished panel of experts with deep national security experience. Dr. Sebastian Gorka served as Special Assistant to President Trump and advised the President on the existential threat posed by radical Islamic terrorism. He has a distinguished career of service in counterterrorism, is on the advisory board of the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs. We look forward to his testimony and thank you for coming. We will also hear from Mr. Michael Pregent, an Adjunct Fellow from the Hudson Institute. He is a former intelligence officer with nearly 30 years of experience and is an expert on the Middle East and North Africa. We hope he can shed light on the future challenges we face against ISIS and what we can expect moving forward. We are also joined by Philip Lohaus, a research fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He is an expert on unconventional and emerging national security challenges. He served as an embedded analyst with the Department of Defense and the Multinational Force-Iraq, and also embedded with the U.S. Army in eastern Afghanistan. We thank him for coming and for his testimony. We also have Dr. Robert Pape, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He has studied this subject in detail and written numerous books on the topic. We look forward to his perspective on this matter and thank him for coming. I am confident we can do more in this battle against radical Islamic terrorism. I am heartened by the President's dedication to our military and his emphasis on defeating, not simply deterring, ISIS. The days of feckless leadership, of underestimating our foe, those days need to be over. The naive declarations that ISIS is simply a JV squad, those days are over. We have an administration that appreciates the danger posed by the Islamic State and I think critically is actually playing to win against the Islamic State. I hope the witnesses can shed light on what the administration has gotten right, but also what we can improve on, and where we go from here, because the successes, while real, are not the end of the ballgame. So, thank you, and I will yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Lynch, for his opening statement. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to join you in this hearing to examine the progress of efforts to combat the terrorist group known as the Islamic State, or ISIS. I would also like to thank today's witnesses for their willingness to help this subcommittee with its work. As reported last month by the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve, ISIS has no capital, no physical caliphate, and across Iraq and Syria has lost nearly all of its territory that they once held. Since the establishment of the U.S.-led coalition to combat ISIS by President Obama back in 2014, the terrorist group has lost nearly 40,000 square miles of its claimed territory and currently holds approximately 2,000 square miles. ISIS has also been reduced in deployed force strength from peak estimates of tens of thousands of insurgent fighters to less than a thousand. The liberated territory includes the former ISIS stronghold of Mosul, Iraq, recaptured by U.S.- backed Iraqi security and Kurdish Peshmerga forces last July following a nine-month effort that began in October of 2016. The self-declared ISIS capital of Raqqa, Syria also fell in October of 2017 to the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces. However, the decimation of ISIS territorial control does not signify the outright defeat of a terrorist organization whose motto is remaining and expanding. In a statement submitted for the record, former Acting Director of the CIA, Michael Morell, who served under both George W. Bush and the Obama Administration, notes that the elimination of the so- called caliphate cannot be confused with the elimination of ISIS itself. In the wake of surmounting battlefield losses, insurgent fighters have moved underground to perpetrate traditional and destabilizing terrorist attacks in the region while continuing to rely on affiliate organizations and social media to direct or inspire terrorist attacks globally. I ask for unanimous consent to enter into the record Director Morell's statement into the official hearing record. Mr. DeSantis. Without objection. Mr. Lynch. The Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point similarly reports that following the fall of Mosul, ISIS leadership made a calculated decision to withdraw its fighters from further sustained clashes with regional security and coalition forces in the city of Tal Afar in the town of Hawija in Iraq, in contested areas along the Euphrates River Valley, and even in the battle for Raqqa. Their sole purpose was to preserve manpower for a pivot to an all-out insurgency and the use of guerilla tactics, including hit-and-run attacks on secure areas by small units, the assassination of security personnel, and the recruitment of new members among displaced civilians for suicide bombings. We have continued to witness this marked shift to guerilla warfare in the form of a coordinated terrorist attack committed by ISIS operatives in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and other regional countries. Just this week, two suicide bombers reportedly associated with ISIS sleeper cells killed nearly 40 people at an open-air market located in Baghdad's Tayran Square, marking the first major attack in the Iraqi capital since Iraqi Prime Minister Haider-alAbadi declared the victory over ISIS. This attack came on the heels of an ISIS suicide bombing detonated at a market in Kabul, Afghanistan on January 4th that killed at least 20 people, and another at a Shia cultural center in Kabul on December 28th that killed more than 40 people. The persistent threat of ISIS-directed or inspired attacks in the West also remains. Last week the Department of Justice announced the indictment of Akayed Ullah on terrorism and explosives charges for his detonation of a bomb in a subway station near the Port Authority bus terminal in New York City in December of 2017. Ullah stated in his initial law enforcement interview that, quote, ``I did it for the Islamic State.'' This attack followed an ISIS-inspired truck attack in November of 2017 along the Hudson River bike path in New York that killed eight people. Clearly, our national security strategy must adapt to combatting a terrorism group that the commander of the U.S. Central Command, Joseph Votel, recently deemed a different kind of organization that has been very adaptive. We should all be concerned that at this point we lack a fully articulated and detailed plan to address the remaining pockets of the ISIS insurgency in Iraq and Syria, or implement a full-spectrum response to combat the rise of affiliate organizations in Libya, the Philippines, the Sinai, and other areas, which will require close collaboration with our international partners. President Trump has proposed a 32 percent cut, or a nearly $19 billion cut, from the State Department budget and has left vacant the U.S. ambassadorships in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other key nations in the fight against ISIS. We simply cannot combat ISIS by neglecting the long-term security and political stability of the region. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to discussing these and other issues with today's witnesses, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. The Chair notes the presence of our colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, and I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to fully participate in today's hearing. Without objection, it is so ordered. With that, I am pleased to introduce our witnesses. We have already mentioned in my opening statement Dr. Gorka, Mr. Pregent, Mr. Lohaus, and Dr. Pape. Welcome to you all. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So if you can all please rise, raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? All witnesses answered in the affirmative. You can be seated. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. You will note the clock in front of you shows your remaining time. The light will turn yellow when you have 30 seconds left, and red when your time is up. Your entire written statement will be made part of the record, and in the question and answer period you will obviously be able to hit on points that you may not be able to reach in your opening statement. So please abide by that time limit, and remember to turn the microphone on before speaking. With that, I will recognize Dr. Gorka for 5 minutes. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF SEBASTIAN GORKA Mr. Gorka. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis. Thank you, Vice Chair Russell and Ranking Member Lynch, for this opportunity to address the subcommittee today. To begin, I would like to reiterate what the Chairman has already stated. This is perhaps one of the greatest untold stories of the last 11 months, meaning this administration's success against ISIS, along with the untold story or the story which isn't getting enough attention with regards to the rebounding U.S. economy. My message is a very simple one. The victory or victories against ISIS are a function of the first rule of war. One must not only have the capabilities to win, but one must have the will to win. What happened at 12:01 on January the 20th last year is that we have a new commander in chief who had the will to win and to devolve the decision-making, the military decision-making to the right commands and the right commanders in the field so that will could be translated into successes on the battlefield. We had been told by the last president that ISIS represents a generational threat to the United States. It seems as if President Trump has crunched a generation down to just a few months. How do we know this? ISIS, less than three years ago, held territory in more than three countries of the Middle East and had 18--according to the NTCT, the National Counterterrorism Center, had 18 fully functional affiliates in 18 different countries around the world. It was making, according to the Financial Times, $2 million every 24 hours in illicit oil sales, racketeering hostage-taking, and even through its local taxation system. And most important of all, ISIS was the first jihadi organization in almost 100 years to successfully reestablish a theocratic caliphate. The Trump Administration, which I had the honor of serving, we made the destruction of the physical caliphate our number- one priority, and as the Vice Chairman has already noted, we have already succeeded thanks to our military forces in the field. None of the above attributes of ISIS is true today. It is not a caliphate, it does not hold significant amounts of territory, and it no longer has more than 6 million people living on the territory of that so-called caliphate. Why is this? Because of the D-ISIS strategy, the defeat ISIS strategy that was implemented by the President and by Secretary Mattis. What is the most simple summary of the D-ISIS strategy? Very simply, we went from a war of a thousand cuts, the so-called attrition strategy that was nibbling at the edge of a global problem, to a strategy of annihilation under Secretary Mattis, and it has worked. A very clear metric of this, on one day recently more than 1,000 ISIS jihadists surrendered. We have never, ever seen this before in modern jihadist history. Why? Because the jihadist believes if he dies in a war to defeat the infidel, then he will go straight to heaven. They don't usually surrender. Now they do. In addition to the strategy changing from attrition to annihilation, we have also seen a far more intangible change, which is the morale of our armed forces. The decision-making authorities have been divested to the commanders in the field. Under the last administration, even tactical targeting decisions were taken inside the NSC. The NSC should be the place for policy and strategy, not tactical or even operational decisions. That was changed under the new administration. As one tier, one operator told me when I was very fresh to the White House, we understand now the commander trusts us and has our back, and that has an unprecedented effect on the morale of our forces and their capacity to execute their mission. Lastly, there is the aspect of the morale amongst our partners and allies. With the President's Riyadh speech, he took them to task as a friend to say they must clear their houses, they must target and isolate the extremists in their places of worship and in their communities, and they have done so, especially with the GCCC taking on Qatar as its prime role as a funder of extremism throughout the world. In sum, we have gone from a generational threat being crushed in just a matter of months. But the war is not won. As we look forward, the Trump Administration must focus on its counter-ideological policies. We must make the black flag of jihad as reviled as the Nazi swastika. That will take a full- throated counter-ideological push. I have recommended in my summary the Active Measures Working Group from the Cold War and the closer cooperation with our partners in the field, our Muslim allies, to delegitimize the ideology of all groups that share the jihadi creed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Prepared statement of Mr. Gorka follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Pregent, you are up for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PREGENT Mr. Pregent. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on National Security, on behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am honored to testify before you today about the successes against ISIS and the challenges that remain. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations achieved success against ISIS. Under President Obama, ISIS lost the Mosul Dam, ISIS was defeated trying to take the Syrian town of Kobane in Syria and lost control of Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah in Iraq. Under President Trump, ISIS lost its caliphate capitals of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, and its stronghold of Deir ez-Zor. We learned early on that ISIS lost territory every time it faced a capable force backed by U.S. airpower. The first example of this was the battle over the Mosul Dam in 2014 where the Kurdish Peshmerga, backed by U.S. Special Operation Forces and U.S. air power, retook control of the Mosul Dam and handed ISIS its first defeat. The second example was Kobane. In October 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry indicated that preventing the fall of the Syrian town of Kobane to ISIS was not a strategic U.S. objective. As ISIS moved on Kobane, international media broadcasted ISIS maneuvers and artillery barrages on the city in broad daylight. ISIS was winning, and it was being televised. The administration, embarrassed by this, finally authorized U.S. Special Forces to partner with Peshmerga forces and call in airstrikes on ISIS, and ISIS was handed its second loss. The key lesson here that emerged from both Kobane and the Mosul Dam was that the clear and hold force was from the area and had a vested interest in fighting to keep ISIS out. The most important aspect of a clear and hold strategy that was tested and proved successful during the surge of 2007 in Iraq basically is that the force from the area has a vested interest in keeping it out. So the most important aspect of that strategy is to use local force, and it has to be empowered to keep ISIS out. It has to be empowered to do so. After Kobane and the Mosul Dam, operations to take back Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul in Iraq were done with predominantly Shia forces, with the support of IRGC militias. In other words, the ``clear'' phase has been touted as a success, but the ``hold'' phase will not hold without Sunni forces empowered by their central government to protect Sunni areas. It is critically important that the ``hold'' force reflect local political dynamics for there to be success. This is not happening in Iraq or Syria. Obama and Trump have key differences in strategy, but also unfortunate similarities. The Obama Administration's anti-ISIS strategy took away from the combatant commander the decision- making process, resulting in lost opportunities to kill and capture targets of opportunity. It publicly touted victories hours after successful raids against ISIS, killing the intelligence community's ability to exploit ISIS networks and conduct follow-on raids, and it allowed the IRGC Quds Force to increase its influence and presence in Iraq and Syria. The Trump Administration's strategy has pushed resources and decision-making back to the combatant commander, restoring authorities to break the will of the enemy. It has expanded our Special Operations missions to kill and capture key ISIS and al-Qaeda leadership throughout the globe, and allowed the time for our intelligence agencies to exploit intelligence before touting success to the media and to the terrorist organizations themselves. When you tell a terrorist organization that you have effectively conducted a raid hours after that raid, they throw away their SIM cards and they go to the mattresses, and it sets back the intelligence community big time. One of the things, unfortunately, that the Trump Administration is continuing to do is it is continuing to stand by while the IRGC Kuds Force increases its influence and presence in Iraq and Syria. So now that ISIS has lost territory, challenges remain in holding liberated terrain with non-Sunni Arab forces. ISIS sought out ungoverned spaces in Iraq and Syria where disenfranchised Sunnis were oppressed by a sectarian government. That dynamic exists today in both Iraq and Syria. ISIS continues to seek out and operate in areas where Sunnis are distrustful of their government, be it sectarian, secular, or even Sunni. ISIS operates in the Sunni Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Egypt's Sinai, Yemen and Libya, and the list goes on. ISIS has lost territory but has not been defeated in Iraq and Syria. ISIS still operates in liberated areas, following the insurgent al-Qaeda model, as demonstrated by the two suicide attacks in Baghdad resulting in the loss of 38 personnel. The Institute for the Study of War has an ISIS control map. That map still shows ISIS operating in most areas declared liberated by the U.S. and Baghdad. Losing territory is phase one of many. The next phase is building and partnering with Sunni forces capable of effectively holding territory. These phases are the most important and are not likely to happen due to continued U.S. deference to Russia and Iran and Syria, and to Baghdad and Iran and Iraq. If this is not changed, we simply reset the conditions that led to ISIS to begin with. [Prepared statement of Mr. Pregent follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lohaus for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF PHILLIP LOHAUS Mr. Lohaus. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and honorable members of the Subcommittee on National Security, I am honored by the opportunity to testify before you today as you examine our nation's recent efforts to defeat the Islamic State. My testimony will show that while the Obama Administration's approach incrementally degraded the Islamic State's grip on swaths of Iraq and Syria, the Trump Administration's timely reforms have accelerated America's gains against the Islamic State. I caution that these gains should not obscure the amount of work left to do to defeat ISIS and jihadist terrorist groups more generally. Doing so will require adjustments to our strategy, a few of which I will discuss today. In response to the rise of the Islamic State, President Obama took a measured and cautious approach to reestablishing Iraq's internal security. He relied primarily on conducting limited air strikes and to putting a small cadre of Special Operators to build the capacity of the fledgling Iraqi armed forces. A similar though more restrictive approach characterized our efforts against ISIS in Syria. In both cases, partner forces did eventually grow more adept at fighting ISIS, but only after the latter had weakened significantly. The White House's decision-making style impeded rapid progress against the Islamic State. This is without doubt. Their risk aversion, inefficient target nominations process and, above all, involvement in day-to-day operational and tactical decision-making added unnecessary friction to the decision-making process. These policies made for a time- consuming approach to a problem that required rapid responses. Despite this, one cannot deny that progress has been made in the fight against the Islamic State, particularly in Iraq and Syria. I would echo the comments made earlier by the Chairman and Ranking Member in that regard. The siege of Mosul resulted in the ouster of Islamic State from that city, as did the siege of Raqqa. As of October 2017, territory controlled by ISIS had shrunk to isolated pockets mostly along the Iraq-Syria border. None of this would have been possible without the valiant efforts of American troops and partner forces. Their efforts should be applauded. However, progress in the fight against ISIS may have occurred sooner, or its rise may have been prevented entirely if friction points between the military and its civilian leadership had not impeded America's responsiveness. The Trump Administration has streamlined the executive decision-making process and authorized a more aggressive posture towards the Islamic State. For one, they appear much more willing to rely on the expertise of military advisers. This has made a difference. From personal experience, I have seen how empowering decision-makers and operators on the ground enhances operational responsiveness and increases joint and combined synergies and operations. Trump has also signaled a willingness to dedicate more resources to the fight. He deployed, for example, 400 Marines and Army Rangers to Syria in advance of the siege of Raqqa, increased the pace of air strikes within U.S. Central Command, and approved the training of YPG fighters in Syria. These developments have been timely and appropriate. These successes aside, much more work remains to be done to defeat the Islamic State and other extremist groups around the globe. An effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond air strikes and Special Operations direct-action missions. The Administration is also yet to articulate U.S. policy toward a post-Islamic State Iraq and Syria. The danger remains that recent gains will be viewed as signs of total victory and therefore used as a reason to reduce America's involvement in the region. Doing so would be pennywise but pound foolish. Defeating a group like ISIS and other jihadist groups will require more than just military victories on the battlefield. It will require a sustained commitment to our partners and allies and the creation of new ones. It will require an understanding of the ideological appeal of extremism and efforts to reduce that appeal. It will require a clever and coordinated application of all sources of national power. Above all, it will require an understanding of the long-term and ideological nature of this fight. There are several things that our political leadership and decision-makers could do to improve our global position vis-a- vis Islamic extremists. First, the White House should map out the role that individual agencies will play in implementing the counter-jihadist terrorism provisions of the recent National Security Strategy. To name just two examples, the Department of State should redouble public diplomacy efforts that incorporate local partners whenever possible in vulnerable countries around the world. I would second Dr. Gorka's attestation to taking a look at the Active Measures Working Group from the Soviet Union era, which gives a great example of how interagency groups can combat these types of threats. And the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies for their parts should emphasize the importance of military information support operations, human intelligence and Special Forces. Bombing campaigns and direct- action missions cannot succeed without or be replaced by the knowledge gained by these ground assets. For its part, Congress could consider revising U.S. code to better reflect the overlapping nature of government-wide counterterrorism efforts. It is accepted in the defense community that strategy equals ends plus ways plus means. Compared to jihadist groups, the United States does not want for means. If America's goal is to move the needle from degrading ISIS to finally defeating it, the ways and ends, however, will require ongoing examination. I thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss these issues, and I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Lohaus follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. Dr. Pape, 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF ROBERT ANTHONY PAPE, JR. Mr. Pape. Thank you very much for having me. There is a slideshow that will be starting in just a moment. ISIS has been effectively defeated as a territorial entity in Iraq and Syria, a military victory that makes America safer. This military victory is due not to any one person or any one president. This is America's victory due to the steadfastness of the American people; our superb military, diplomacy, and intelligence agencies; our regional allies like Qatar that provided an air base for our bombers; large ground forces in Iraq and Syria; and an international coalition that has grown every year since 2014. Next slide, please. The key to our success was the application of a consistent hammer and anvil strategy. In effect, Western air power and local ground power worked together like a hammer and anvil to smash ISIS to bits, while Special Forces and intelligence coordinated the effort. Next slide. Our hammer and anvil strategy progressively succeeded over three years and over three phases under the leadership of two presidential administrations. Next slide. Phase 1, the containment of ISIS expansion, occurred in the fall of 2014. Once ISIS surprised the world by taking Mosul, the most urgent problem was to prevent ISIS from going further to seize oil fields and other resources in Iraq that could have vastly increased the group's power and threat. The Obama Administration reacted quickly and decisively, leading a coalition to use air power like a hammer to smash numerous ISIS military offensives and contain it. Next slide. Phase 2, rollback, began in early 2015. The coordination of air power and ground power produced results almost immediately, with large portions of ISIS territory falling by the summer. Next slide. Rollback was nearly complete in Iraq by the time administrations changed. As you can see, by February 2017 our coalition had seized about two-thirds of Mosul, the heart of ISIS in Iraq, controlling the large grey areas to the west. Next slide. By the end of the Obama Administration, over half of ISIS- controlled territory had been liberated, the large green areas. Equally important, these two years established the essential mobilization and coordination of Kurdish and Iraqi government forces that would enable the final push in Phase 3. So when the Trump Administration took office, ISIS was losing fast, and America's coalition was a well-oiled machine, in a position to finish off the group. Next slide. Phase 3 was the final push in Syria that completed ISIS' defeat as a territorial entity. What exactly changed under the Trump Administration? Two things, one good and one problematic. The good change was cooperating tacitly with the Russians and the Syrian government so that the Kurdish-led forces could take Raqqa and other areas north of the Euphrates while Syrian government forces could take Palmyra and the area to the south of the river. This change made America's strategy of hammer and anvil more effective in Syria and accelerated ISIS loss of territory there. Next slide. The problematic change was over-escalation of air power. As this slide shows, both the escalation of air strikes and spikes in civilian casualties related to the coalition's air strikes occurred within weeks of the new administration. The sharp increase in civilian casualties is not just a moral issue. These casualties pose a strategic threat to the United States because they significantly amplify the propaganda that ISIS and other terrorist groups rely on to inspire people to attack America. Let's see how they do it. Next slide. Just last November, ISIS released Flames of War 2, a video targeting Westerners with powerful segments focused on how the escalation of bombing has killed children, and the group calls for revenge. Please show the video. [Video shown.] Mr. Pape. Under the Obama Administration, we saw similar ISIS video propaganda related to drone strikes which was leveraged to justify attacks against the West, but nothing this extreme. Sir, if I may just have 20 more seconds? Mr. DeSantis. Twenty, all right. Mr. Pape. The next slide. The main danger for the future is that we declare victory and walk away. ISIS remains a threat. The root cause is not just ISIS' ideology but its power to take advantage of political grievances and the disenfranchisement of millions of Sunnis. Without a political strategy to address this problem, a new ISIS 2.0, worse than the past, could emerge. [Prepared statement of Mr. Pape follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. Looking forward, one of the reasons why ISIS was able to inspire folks in this country via social media was because of the existence of this caliphate. People actually thought that was a romantic concept. So, Mr. Pregent, do you think, having broken the caliphate--obviously, people can still be inspired, but do you think that that is helpful in combatting the inspiration for terrorism here at home and in places like Western Europe? Mr. Pregent. Thank you for the question. What we saw early on, when ISIS had success, the foreign fighters were coming into Iraq and Syria. But after a defeat or a loss of territory, that foreign fighter flow stopped. It ebbed. Foreign fighters tried to leave the caliphate. They were captured. They were executed by ISIS, and ISIS fighters who had actually lost territory were being executed by ISIS as well. So what we saw early on was that the brand attracted people to the caliphate when it was successful, and when it lost territory that flow started to ebb. Mr. DeSantis. Dr. Gorka, when I was in Iraq back in '07, '08, we had pretty restrictive rules of engagement. I think that was under Bush. Under Obama, I think it was similar or even more restrictive. Was there an effort to obviously delegate to the commanders but say, look, fighting with one hand tied behind your back is just not going to do the job, we need adequate rules of engagement so we can actually win? Mr. Gorka. Absolutely, absolutely. There are, on the unclassified side, one can find stories of ISIS targets not being engaged because the individual who has eyes on the pilot or what-have-you was not allowed to engage unless somebody in Washington had given him the all-clear from the Obama Administration. During Vietnam we had something called the 8,000-mile screwdriver. It got even worse under the Obama Administration because that decision, once you have been trained at the cost of millions of dollars, taxpayer dollars, whether you are an A- 10 pilot, whether you are a Special Forces detachment leader, the decision to engage the enemy once you have the requisite intelligence should be taken by that military professional, not by a civilian staff who is sitting in the NSC or somebody watching a video screen in the DOD. So, yes, the operators who I had the honor of working with have said they were given the due recognition to execute the mission as they had been trained to do, which not only makes America more successful operationally but also has a requisite effect on the morale of all our fighting forces, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Pregent, don't we need to, at this point, though, support people like the Kurds more robustly than we have under either Obama or so far under the Trump Administration? Mr. Pregent. We do. The Kurdish Peshmerga of Iraq have been an ally since the beginning, since we entered Iraq. We actually entered Iraq in Kurdish areas, and they have been instrumental to not only defeating ISIS but also defeating al Qaeda during the surge effort and the initial phase of the Iraq war. What has happened, unfortunately, under this administration is our Kurdish allies have been abandoned. After President Trump's October 13th speech declaring that the IRGC in its entirety would be declared a terrorist organization based on its support for Qasem Soleimani's Kuds Force, within hours Qasem Soleimani used his Shia militias--and they had access to U.S. tanks and equipment--to move on Kurdish spaces. We should have done something about that. It sent a loud message to our Kurdish allies, but it also sent a loud message to Qasem Soleimani. Mr. DeSantis. I think it also hurts our national prestige when you have people like Soleimani that have a lot of American blood on their hands attacking an ally like the Kurds with American equipment left over from the Iraq campaign. We have to do a lot better than that. The President, I think, has rightfully spoken out in favor of the protesters in Iran. What more do we need to do? Because when you are talking about fighting Sunni Islamic jihadism, one of the problems I had with the Obama Administration is as they were doing that, they did do some good things, they were passively empowering the Iranians on the ground in places like Iraq. We cannot do that. So we need to support the protesters. What else should the Administration be doing? Mr. Pregent. Well, the good thing about this protest, initially it started off as an economic protest, but then it started complaining about the adventurism from the IRGC Kuds Force, the fact that the regime was using that windfall of money it received from the JCPOA, the Iran deal, to actually export terrorism, to destabilize Iraq, to further destabilize Syria, to destabilize Lebanon and Yemen. So what we should do is we should go after the IRGC Kuds Force in Syria, in Iraq. We can sanction the Supreme Leader's vast fortune, his network that he set up of shadow companies to skirt sanctions. Upwards of $86 billion goes unsanctioned that the Supreme Leader has access to, to conduct these operations with the IRGC and the Kuds Force. We should also listen to what they are complaining about. They are complaining about the Basij. The Basij is the most unpopular directorate in the IRGC. It is the organization that makes you disappear at night if you protest the government. There are a lot of things we should do. We should encourage our Iraqi allies to increase their Internet bandwidth to allow messages to get out of Iran. We should also do that with other neighbors that border Iran, basically hold the regime accountable for pressure on the Iranian people, but also pressure our European allies to voice their concerns. Mr. DeSantis. Our time is up, but I think 100 percent we need to be doing that, and I would just say before I yield to the gentleman that ISIS is not the sum total of militant Islamic terrorism. It is a part of it. There are other Sunni jihadist groups, and then the Iranian-inspired Shia jihadist groups. This is a good step. We have to do more. God bless those people fighting off that Iranian regime. If they could do something there, that would be such a positive environment. But we are going to continue to have to deal with this problem in the United States and in places like Western Europe. I am concerned about Las Vegas, the lack of information. ISIS claimed credit for that. We have no evidence either way, but no evidence on anything bothers me, and ISIS typically when they claim these things, they typically are borne out. So that is a very, very important thing to know exactly which attacks are being inspired by ISIS. With that, I will yield to Mr. Lynch. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree on the point of supporting our allies in northern Iraq, in Kurdistan. I think more can be done. I agree with Mr. Pregent's testimony. As a member of this committee, a lot of us have been to Iraq multiple times. I have been there 20 times with my Republican colleagues going back to 2002, 2001, to the present. One of the most remarkable changes that I can see from my early trips is that back in the day we had 165,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq. That was about our peak, 165,000. The one huge change that I think the Obama Administration brought about was that he compelled the Kurds and the Iraqi government in Baghdad to take responsibility and to carry the fight. You can see it in the casualty numbers in the fight against ISIS, several thousand Kurdish Peshmerga casualties, 10,000 Iraqi National Army casualties, and thankfully far, far fewer U.S. casualties. The change there, though, will not remain if we don't support the incumbent government and empower the local government to prevent the next iteration, as I think Mr. Pregent and all of the witnesses have said. We have to prevent the next iteration of ISIS from taking hold. It appears to me, Dr. Pape--and thank you for your great presentation--supporting the State Department is a key part of making sure that the Iraqi government that is in power now that has driven out ISIS, including the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq, that they are empowered really to provide services to those areas that they have liberated. That, I think, will be very important. Can you talk about that, please, Dr. Pape? Mr. Pape. Yes, sir. We need a political strategy to win the peace. We have won a military victory. That is only half the battle. The task in front of us is the key fight, the real fight, which is winning the peace. In order to do that, we need a political strategy, and I would just expand on your points for just a little bit. Number one, we need a political strategy that prevents score settling from undermining the military victories we have just achieved. You are hearing from Mr. Pregent that we have other instances of score settling that could easily take hold. So if we just walk away and say, ``Oh, yes, let's let them deal with this themselves,'' this is ripe for score settling across the board. Number two, we need, as you said, direct support so that the military victory can be backed up with economic strategies, economic policies to empower especially Sunnis, who actually are the heart of the problem that we have. When we toppled Saddam back in 2003, we didn't just knock off an evil dictator. We basically created a situation of massive ungoverned space, and the Sunni part of Iraq was the worst. And then with the Arab Spring, this spread. Now we had more ungoverned space in Syria, and the problem is the Sunnis need a voice in their own future. It is not enough to put them back under a repressive regime, and we need a political strategy to do that. The third thing is we need to mediate more the Sunni/Shia divide. This is in Iraq, this is in Syria. The Alawites are Shia, of course, as you all know. But in Yemen we have a proxy war effectively going on between the Saudis and the Iranians inside of Yemen, and if we just let that go, if we don't mediate that, what is going to happen is we are going to have enormous pools of ungoverned space for those millions of Sunnis, which is just going to be ripe for ISIS 2.0 to take hold. So we really need a political strategy, sir, to win the peace. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Mr. Pregent, I want to go back to one point that you made which I thought was very, very good, the presence of foreign fighters being drawn into Iraq. When the U.S. had 165,000 troops on the ground, foreign fighters were pouring in. But when the Obama Administration required Iraqis and Kurds to carry the fight, we saw the number of foreign fighters drop precipitously. Are those factors correlated? Mr. Pregent. Thank you for the question. The key difference is when foreign fighter flow was coming into Iraq, it was being facilitated by Assad, being facilitated by the IRGC Kuds Force. These foreign fighters were coming into staging areas in Syria and then being allowed to come into Iraq to carry out attacks against Americans. The foreign fighter flow in this case was foreign fighters and their families to come into the caliphate. ISIS sold them a false narrative that it was safe to come, and ISIS quickly learned that unless you could shoot down an American aircraft, it wasn't safe to plant a black flag. So the foreign fighter flow was just a little different, sir. Mr. Lynch. Very good. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the Vice Chairman of the committee, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes. Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for all the guests being here today. We appreciate the perspective. I guess, Dr. Pape, there is one major area we are in agreement on--actually, a couple--the danger of declaring victory and walking away. But no factor was more instrumental in creating ISIS than doing just that in 2011 in Iraq. We created the ISIS caliphate simply by our abandonment of what was a good strategy to win the peace in Iraq. Having commanded a task force in 2003 and 2004, and having been heavily involved in the hunt and capture of Saddam Hussein, I am very familiar with what our objectives were at the beginning of that venture. We did not leave ungoverned space, sir. In fact, after the surge in 2008, we stabilized it. We had every member of the military here begging to continue to have a presence, at least a brigade combat team, to draw down but leave a presence so that we could use U.S. advisers and air power. Instead, we abandoned it. And what did that do? It created Sunni Baathists, who now, having seen Iranian influence in Baghdad, they would no longer be accommodated and they created this narrative that they could go out and now have a better way, that there was no accommodation, there was no future for Iraq, and we began to see it unravel at the seams. How do I know? Because I am heavily invested there. I still have friends there. Whatever saving we thought we had in terms of treasure and troops we lost when it unraveled. When we lost friends in Tikrit, Samara, Hawija, all the way up to Mosul and Tal Afar, all of it unraveled at the seams. Whatever lives were spared in the U.S. military were more than compensated by human suffering on a grand scale with a million people in Mosul who lived torturous lives under ISIS. We saw barbarians gain power, and guess who was helping administrate that? We sat and wondered that they had currency or that they had administrative skills in the occupied territories. Guess who was doing that? The very people we arrested, the very people we incarcerated, the very terrorists that we tracked down and captured. The Sunni Baathists were those that were creating that. So I agree, we shouldn't declare victory and abandon anything. I am very concerned about a narrative that the United States is involved with indiscriminate bombing. I find it as a warrior offensive, and here is why. It assumes a lack of training. There is no military more trained on targeting than the United States military, period. There is none. No one spends more treasure and more training effort and more legal classes, morality classes, than the United States military in terms of targeting. It also assumes a lack of technology. We would rather spend 100 times the cost of a bomb so that we can put it in the correct place than we would to make 100 bombs and hope that we just hit it. It also assumes a lack of morality on the warrior. The warrior, perhaps more than any politician or college professor or anyone else, when they look down the rifle sights or the crosshairs of any weapon, they take dead serious that they hold in their hands the taking of human life. How do I know this? Because for me, sir, it is not academic, it is experiential. I have been there. I have done that. I have had to take human life. It is not pleasant, but it is not done indiscriminately. When we see these videos and we see things like that--okay, do you want to see dumb bombs? Do you want to see the hitting of water works? Do you want to see the hitting of hospitals? Do you want to see all of that? Just go to the Russian targeting and Assad's air force targeting and you will find examples of all of that, to include the examples of the footage that we see in these ISIS videos. One, we should not, nor should our national media, propagate such propaganda by using it as B-roll and showing these people running around, sneaking around in their tennis shoes and standing on burning equipment as if they are heroes or something. That is offensive. And as Americans, we should not allow that to happen. Instead, what we ought to do is back up the Iraqi people, back up the free Syrian people, back up those that have been trapped by this torturous jihadist, absolute absurdity that we see with barbarians sawing off the heads of people, killing children, killing women. And you know what? Thank God for our military. We can debate the politics all day long, but we should never, ever assume that it is our warriors indiscriminately taking human life on battlefields. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I don't apologize for not having any questions, but I yield back my time. Mr. DeSantis. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Vice Chairman. I know your experience ---- Mr. Pape. Mr. Chairman, may I respond? Mr. DeSantis. I will recognize Mr. Welch for 5 minutes. Mr. Welch. Thank you very much. First of all, thank you for your service and for your statement of support for our military. I agree with what you said about the military. Where I think we have a problem is with the politicians who sometimes give the military a mission that we don't support or we don't sustain. But one of the big questions I have, because I do disagree with some of your analysis, the one was the question on Iraq and the wisdom of going in. We are not going to cover that today. Two was the wisdom of totally unraveling the Sunni governing structure once we did take Baghdad, again a political decision made by the leader of that. So it totally created a vacuum. But three, the long-term question, and this is I think a real dilemma. The military will do the job we give them to do. They will do it with honor, professionalism, and integrity. But then we added a new mission for the military in Iraq, and that was nation-building, and frankly I have a question as to whether that is an appropriate job for the military. Is it a reasonable expectation for warriors to be required to essentially build a nation? On the other hand, if there are gains that our military makes, they have to be consolidated, so just leaving the field accentuates that vacuum. But, as I recall, one of the reasons that we didn't stay was not so much an unwillingness even on the part of the Obama Administration but an unwillingness on the part of the Baghdad government to acknowledge that the rule that would apply to our troops would be American law and American military law, as opposed to Iraqi law, and we were not going to allow our soldiers to be put in that kind of jeopardy in that political environment. That is my take on it. But I will ask this question, and I will start with you, Dr. Pape. How do we get this balance between avoiding the problem that Mr. Knight said, you get these battlefield gains and then you leave, and then you lose them all, but do that short of taking on the responsibility of full-scale nation- building that costs hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, something that we are continuing to do in Afghanistan? Mr. Pape. The first step is to avoid this false dichotomy that it is either nation building or no political strategy whatsoever. Mr. Welch. Can I interrupt? Congressman Russell, sorry. I was saying your name wrong. Mr. Russell. Oh, thank you. Look, when we went into Iraq, for example, we had five very clear objectives. It was defeat Saddam's army, and then it was to kill or capture Saddam himself, it was to stabilize the area and key infrastructure, and then it was to set the conditions for free elections and nascent institutions, and then they could rebuild governance for themselves. How do I remember all five of those things? Because it was very, very clear to us when we went in. And you know what? That was the spring of 2003. Every one of those objectives we met. I think part of it--and I totally agree with you and even find myself in agreement with many of Dr. Pape's statements. But as we debate the politics of it here, let's have a crystal- clear view of what created and got us there. It was intransigence. It was abandonment. Our State Department has to be involved with that, as well. Mr. Welch. I agree with that. Thank you, Congressman Russell. Go ahead. Mr. Pape. The first step, I think, is to see that it is a false dichotomy that it is either nation building or no political strategy. A good example of the middle ground that we need to navigate is Bosnia in the 1990s. I am sure many of you know that for years there was an awful civil war occurring, '92 to '95, in Bosnia. Well, there is no civil war there now. It is actually quite stable. How did that happen? That happened not because we went in to nation-build Bosnia, but it is also not because we just walked away. It is because we navigated a political strategy that really worked with the three different warring factions, and that is why that is stable. That is a really good example, and it is one that we should be using for the future. Sir, I would also like to say that I am very pro-military. I worked with the U.S. Air Force for three years in the 1990s. I was one of the faculty that helped stand up the School of Advanced Air Power and Space Studies that now exists to this day. I educate to this day; the Air Force and the Army sends me military officers to get Ph.D.s. Some of my military officers, one of whom came to the University of Chicago, is running Air Force intelligence in South Korea. One is commanding U.S. forces in Syria right this second. So I absolutely believe we have the best men and women with the best morals that are involved in the military. The other thing I would like to say is you and I have an awful lot that we should go and talk about because when we toppled Saddam, we had objectives but not a plan for the Sunnis, which opened the door to AQI. And then what happened is we had this false idea that they were all religious. Well, I was one of the people with my work, coming to Washington dozens of times to speak with NSA, CIA, our Secretary and Deputy Secretaries of Defense to argue for what became the Anbar Awakening. So I wasn't just loosely doing this from Chicago. I came to speak to our 3rd ID in February 2007 before they went into the surge in Baghdad for two hours in front of all their military officers to talk specifically about their strategy in the different neighborhoods in Baghdad. I fully believe we need to not have this repeat of a problem that we let it unravel. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair notes the presence of our colleague from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, and I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to fully participate in today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered. The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky for 5 minutes. Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Gorka, it is a pleasure to have you here today. I have a few questions for you. First of all, in your opinion, what should our level of support for the Iraqi government be moving forward? Mr. Gorka. Thank you. The level of support in Iraq isn't about the Iraqi government. I am going to get technical for a moment here, but bear with me. The outline of this argument is in the Military Review article that I have given to the committee. In the United States U.S. Army doctrine, there are two types of function that fall under irregular warfare. One of them is counterinsurgency. Everybody is familiar with that, the so-called Petraeus doctrine, Field Manual FM 324. The other one, which is less well known, is called Foreign Internal Defense. It is one of the core missions that the Green Berets were created to execute. America is not good at counterinsurgency writ large because we are not an empire. Counterinsurgency is what empires do on their own soil, whether it is France in the northern Akwa Akpa in North Africa, which became Algeria, or whether it is the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland or elsewhere. What we are exceptionally good at is foreign internal defense such as El Salvador, such as Colombia. It is not about how we support or how much we support the Iraqi government. It is about how everybody who needs to be part of the solution in Iraq is part of the solution. The great test--I think it was the Iraqi member who mentioned this--is now the political objective. Iraq, whether or not we invaded under correct objectives or not, is irrelevant. We did, and we are there, and we are assisting Iraqi forces. As a former African American general said, you break the china in the china shop, you have to fix it. So how do we do that? We have to have our local partners, all of them, not just the Baghdad government, be part of the solution. The objective is a very simple one, sir. Everybody who lives in Iraq has to agree that living together in a functioning Iraq is better than a continued civil war or instability. It sounds simple, but as Clausewitz said, war is simple but not easy. So the challenge is not how much we support Baghdad but the following question, as Mr. Pregent has rightly demonstrated, that we must not allow Baghdad to become an appendix of Tehran, and we have allowed it to do so for far too long. We have to have our local Sunni allies, not just from Iraq but from the region, such as Egypt, such as Jordan, buy into the future of Iraq and assist them to stabilize the region. All too often--and I will end on this--our successes against the Sunni jihadists in Iraq have led to the Shia jihadists, such as the IRGC and the Kuds Force, profiting from those successes. So the goal is to support Baghdad as much as possible while supporting our other partners even more. Thank you, sir. Mr. Comer. That leads me to my next question, Dr. Gorka, and I get asked this a lot. Should Americans expect to be in Iraq indefinitely? Mr. Gorka. A great question. In my time in the White House as strategist to the President, I always reminded people of the question number one of strategy: Why should we care? It is a very simple question. Some nations--I know it is not politically correct. Some nations are more important than others. It is called life. Iraq is a geo-strategically important nation. How long should we expect to be there? Let's go back to the mission set. Why are we there? To make sure that that part of the world is not used to plan and execute attacks against us here in America or against our partners and allies. That is the metric. How long does that take? How long is a piece of string? But at the end of the day, it is much more effective to help our local Sunni partners effect that stability than to have U.S. forces in U.S. uniforms that are targets on the ground be there for a long period of time. So the ideal situation is, again, foreign internal defense, a very small footprint of trainers and advisors who help our local partners execute that stabilization mission. And if I may, with regards to the parallel to Bosnia, Bosnia and the Balkans is not a good example of strategy. I don't know when Dr. Pape was last there, but Bosnia has become a hive of recruitment for Iran and it is a hotbed of extremism today. It may not be a civil war as it was in the 1990s, but Bosnia is not solved in any way, shape, or form. Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes. Mr. Jordan. I thank the Chairman. Dr. Gorka, in his testimony Dr. Pape basically said that not much of the credit should go to the Trump Administration, it should also go to the Obama Administration. In fact, he said in his testimony, ``The Obama Administration reacted quickly and decisively, leading a coalition to use air power like a hammer to smash numerous ISIS military offensives and contain it,'' talking about how the Obama Administration did an amazing job dealing with ISIS, and I think his point was terrorism at large. Do you agree with that assessment of Dr. Pape? Mr. Gorka. Not in the slightest. It makes for a good PowerPoint visual, but it wasn't an anvil and a hammer. It was a scalpel used now and again in a fashion in which the Commander in Chief was not interested in winning. Will is key to success. Remember, the former senator from Illinois campaigned for president under a very simple bumper sticker when it came to national security. Let's remind ourselves, 10 years ago he said Afghanistan was the good war, Iraq was the bad war. Once he became Commander in Chief, he was locked into that narrative, which meant sooner or later, if he was going to be true to his campaign pledge, we had to leave Iraq. And I agree with the statements already made, we are not responsible for the creation of ISIS, but the decision of the then-Commander in Chief to leave without a SOFA--we could have gotten a SOFA. It is not a question. America has always managed to get Status of Forces Agreements. We could have got one. Leaving without a SOFA meant that ISIS could become the most powerful jihadi organization of the modern age. Talking to the military, it is very simple: the Commander in Chief and his White House did not have the will to win because they had made an ideological decision that Iraq was the wrong war. Mr. Jordan. Mr. Pregent, what would be the--I mean, if you had to summarize the legacy of the Obama Administration when it comes to foreign policy and dealing with terrorism, what would you say that it was? Mr. Pregent. Well, unfortunately, the call saying that ISIS was a JV team was unsettling for a lot of us that followed the Zarqawi movement from the al-Qaeda model to the ISIS model. What I would say to the Obama strategy against ISIS, Mosul was left to ISIS for two-and-a-half years, to 4,000 ISIS fighters. A population of 1.6 million Sunnis was left under brutal control by this terrorist army for two-and-a-half years without a single effort to call up the 30,000 Sunnis that Maliki had kicked out of the Iraqi security forces. Fallujah was left to ISIS for three years. So if you look at the strategy, there was no attempt in the beginning to build a Sunni force like we did during the surge, the awakening, the Anbar Awakening, the Sons of Iraq. We couldn't do it because the Administration had embedded 5,000 Americans with a predominantly Shia force that was heavily influenced by the IRGC Kuds Force. It basically made our advisers hostages to our policies in Iraq. If we called for the standing up of a Sunni force, it would put our soldiers in harm's way. Mr. Jordan. Broaden it out a little bit. What are things like today in Libya? Mr. Pregent. It is ungoverned space. ISIS can do what it wants ---- Mr. Jordan. Wasn't that supposed to be--I had the privilege of serving on the Benghazi committee, and my read on all of it was that Libya was supposed to be the Obama Administration's shining example of foreign policy success, Secretary Clinton, the State Department's example of how it was going to work: throw out a dictator, usher in the Arab Spring, put no troops on the ground, and this was how it was going to work. And what we wound up with was that tragedy on September 11th, 2012, and then this narrative where, because it happened 56 days before an election and it went against their narrative during the campaign, they had to create this story that it was somehow inspired by a video, a video-inspired terrorist attack. So when I think about the legacy of the Obama Administration relative to terrorism and what Dr. Pape said in his opening comment, I just see an entirely different scenario altogether. Am I accurate, Dr. Gorka? Dr. Gorka, and then Mr. Pregent. Mr. Gorka. I will be very blunt, as blunt as you have been, sir. For eight years, narrative was more important than reality. It wasn't the reality on the ground. It was spin. And when you have the deputy national security adviser whose qualifications are a Master's degree in fictional writing, it tells you everything you need to know. Mr. Jordan. Mr. Pregent, you get the last word. Mr. Pregent. I would just say that the message that was sent to the terrorists was an unserious one, and it actually led to ISIS and other groups. Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 minutes. Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the Ranking Member, and thank you to the panelists for this informative hearing. So, Dr. Pape, I would sort of like to talk about why we can learn lessons from what has happened on the military side. It is more sort of where we go from here. So recently in the San Francisco Bay area, where I am from, the FBI fortunately caught a disaffected gentleman who is a former Marine Corps veteran who was working through social media to plan to blow up Pier 39, a very touristy area, over the Christmas holiday. So in the context of--I am confident that the American military is adjusting with our partners to take care of a military threat, but it is the radicalization, the use of social media to turn Americans into radicals and to appeal to this radicalization. To me, it is the combination of disaffected human beings wherever they are in a globally connected community. So talk to me a little bit about how sophisticated their ongoing operations are vis-a-vis social media. Mr. Pape. Absolutely, sir. This is something I study; and our center, CPOST, a half-dozen full-time people, 40 people work on this problem, the propaganda problem. And I was just at our U.S. Attorney's office in Chicago just a couple of days ago giving a two-hour briefing to the new attorney general for Chicago who has just come in. This is a serious problem that the end of the caliphate has not yet stopped, if it is going to stop at all. So our national counterterrorism representative for the Midwest started that briefing by giving a two-minute statement saying that we have seen no decline in the pace of radicalization inside the United States with the collapse of the caliphate. In fact, Saipov just did the attack in New York in November when most of the caliphate was gone. So you are exactly right, sir, to be concerned. The fundamental problem that we are seeing is that inside-- the threat we face here at home is now a home-grown threat. I have looked at all 158 cases of individuals indicted in U.S. courts for ISIS-related offenses or carrying out attacks inside the United States. Two-thirds of those individuals were born in the United States. The other one-third are immigrants, but they are people who have been here for many, many years. Over 83 percent are watching these jihadi videos as the gateway in. Lots of other things are happening too, but these videos are the gateway that is starting the process. Saipov himself, the guy who did New York, says it was the videos that radicalized him. So, sir, we have to be very vigilant. We can't just sort of think, oh, yes, we dealt with ISIS and it is dead and we are going to walk away. We really have to pay attention here inside because the video propaganda doesn't die with the caliphate. The video propaganda is really difficult to get off the Web. It can go to the Dark Web. There is a whole lot more to say about this, but we are nowhere near in a position to think we have cleansed the threat, and it really would be kind of foolish to think that internally, yes, we are done, check that box. Mr. DeSaulnier. So to go to the second part about encryption, as we develop new technologies and they learn from those technologies or use them, our struggle here in Congress to preserve American traditional civil liberties but also do all our due diligence to make sure we are making people safe here in America and in the West from terrorist attacks, could you talk a little bit about that, particularly encryption applications? Mr. Pape. Yes. A few years ago there was a terrific panel. Michael Morrel was on the panel. It was a commission. Jeff Stone, a professor from the University of Chicago was on this, to really look closely at our steps of international phone calls to see whether or not--because this was Snowden and so forth, became quite a big deal. We need a new such major effort to really look closely at exactly where we should move that bubble. Jeff Stone, a former dean of the University of Chicago Law School, professor of civil liberties, provost--we need to bring together security experts, legal scholars to really look closely at exactly--because the fact of the matter is we are developing more encryption technology day by day, and the terrorists are only just a few weeks behind. Mr. DeSaulnier. Let me ask you one last question, Dr. Pape. So in the context of sewing more radicals in Syria or Iraq, what are our responsibilities to go in and rebuild those countries, particularly Syria? Mr. Pape. It is tremendously in our strategic interest. There are moral issues, sir. But the fundamental problem is we have created, over a period of many years, since 2003, enormous governance problems for Sunnis in Iraq, and now the spillover effects in Syria, and unless we take diplomatic efforts with a sustained political strategy to, number one, prevent score settling among the folks we actually worked with; number two, to have more direct economic support; and number three, to mediate the Sunni/Shia divide, we are going to be right back here again, or very likely, in just a few years. Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman. The Chair notes the presence of our colleague, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to fully participate in today's hearing. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hice for 5 minutes. Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pregent, let me ask you, all the bureaucratic processes that were added under the Obama Administration, can you address through the international security team, can you address how that impacted the military? Mr. Pregent. Well, commanders were being questioned by aides in the National Security Council whether or not they should actually go forward with a target. One of the biggest complaints coming from combatant commanders was that they weren't necessarily trusted to make those decisions. Initially, again, we talk about aircraft flying with munitions that weren't able to drop their bombs when they actually had targets of opportunity on the ground. The biggest complaint is the targets of opportunity. That is a small window in which a commander has an opportunity to hit ISIS and hurt it, and when you have to call back to D.C. for permission to do it because there happens to be an oil tanker in the convoy, the ISIS convoy, that not only allows that target of opportunity to go away but it sustains a terrorist organization. Remember, ISIS early on, in 2015, was estimated to receive $500 million a year in the illicit oil trade, and that was because they were able to simply move during the daytime. Initially, one of the biggest problems with the ROE as it relates to getting permission from D.C. to do something was that ISIS could move around freely during the daytime without being hit. Those convoys who were flying black flags after taking territory should have never been allowed to move without being hit, and the biggest complaint was that they had to get permission from D.C. Mr. Hice. Okay, so you are saying that our commanders were not trusted, and with that the National Security Council, they were actually making decisions about strikes rather than our leaders in the field? Mr. Pregent. Right. They were delaying the decisions, which made the targets of opportunity go away, and then they were questioning whether or not they should be attacking convoys with oil in them anyway due to environmental concerns. Mr. Hice. This seems like insanity to me. So what other decisions was the National Security Council making that should have been made by our commanders on the field? Mr. Pregent. Well, I can only contrast the difference between the Obama and Trump Administrations. Combatant commanders now can make those decisions on the ground. They are able to use lethal force to degrade ISIS, to defeat ISIS, and they are trusted, and that should be no surprise. Both H.R. McMaster and Secretary Mattis were both combatant commanders in Iraq. They didn't have to ask D.C. for permission to do anything. So it is good that they pushed it down to combatant commanders in Iraq and Syria to be able to do these things without asking permission, as well as Afghanistan. So that is the key difference. Mr. Hice. All right. So with that, obviously, there has been an enormous difference in impact and what has been accomplished from the previous administration and the rules of engagement versus now. Mr. Pregent. Yes. ISIS, the leadership, once we initially had success with our information operations campaigns. In 2015, we talked about an imminent move on Mosul. That resulted in ISIS highlighting targets and convoys of ISIS fighters and equipment to leave Mosul and go to Syria during the daytime without being hit. That is not happening now. We did not see ISIS try to reinforce Mosul. We did not see ISIS try to reinforce any of the territories that were taken under the Trump Administration. One of the key differences also is every piece of territory that ISIS lost under the Obama Administration using this proxy force of a predominantly Shia Iraqi security force with IRGC militias, there was a negotiated evacuation of ISIS fighters. You saw that in Fallujah with convoys leaving Fallujah. You saw that in Ramadi. Initially in Mosul we saw that, but the combatant commanders on the ground wanted to close off Mosul so nobody could get out, and that was one of the differences that I think has expedited the loss of territory for ISIS. Mr. Hice. The way you phrased it a while ago was extremely strong, where our commanders were not trusted. That is just stunning to me. Whereas now they are trusted, and the difference of outcome between those two points of view is enormous. Mr. Pregent. I will just go back to what Secretary Gates did in Afghanistan. He walked into a Joint Special Operations Center and saw a phone line connected directly to the NSC. He said what is that for? They said it goes back to the NSC. He said rip it out of the wall. If they call you, if the White House calls you, you tell them to call me. That is a key difference. Mr. Hice. That is excellent. Thank you for your testimonies, each of you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois for 5 minutes. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis, and thank you, Ranking Member Lynch, for allowing me to participate in today's hearing. And thanks to all of you for coming today. On January 27th, 2017, the White House issued a Holocaust Remembrance statement that made no mention of the Jewish people, Jewish deaths, or the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination. This is a notable break from past administrations. President George H.W. Bush's Remembrance statement was explicit. ``On Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Memorial Day, Jews recall the Nazi atrocities that claimed the lives of six million of their fellow Jews.'' President George W. Bush was just as clear in his statement. The Holocaust was ``a policy aimed at the annihilation of the Jewish people.'' It is important to accurately remember the past, even more so in these types of situations. According to Holocaust historian Deborah Lipstadt, minimizing the Third Reich's focus on Jews is a common tactic of Holocaust deniers and neo-Nazis. Dr. Gorka, on Monday, February 6th, 2017, Michael Medved asked you on CNN if President Trump's statement was ``at least questionable in being the first such statement in many years that didn't recognize that Jewish extermination was the chief goal of the Holocaust.'' Your response was, ``It's a Holocaust Remembrance statement. No, I'm not going to admit it because it's asinine.'' Dr. Gorka, it wasn't asinine for President George H.W. Bush to recognize Jewish extermination in his Holocaust Remembrance statement, was it? Mr. Gorka. I don't know if the good member, Mr. Krishnamoorthi, has arrived at the wrong hearing. I was invited here to discuss the Trump policies towards the defeat of ISIS. If you wish to lower this meeting to a ---- Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Sir, please answer my question. Did you understand my question? Mr. Gorka. Well, since it was so inaccurate, it is hard-- Michael Medved does not work for CNN, number one. Number two, you have arrived 75 minutes into this hearing and may have arrived at the wrong hearing. So, no. I would like to ask you, do you know ---- Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I will assume that you are not prepared to answer the question. Mr. Gorka. If you keep interrupting me--would you like ---- Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Mr. Gorka, I will reclaim my time. Dr. Gorka, please answer the question. Was it asinine of President George W. Bush to recognize Jewish extermination in his Holocaust Remembrance statement? Mr. Gorka. It is asinine ---- Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Please answer the question. Mr. Gorka. Will you hector me, or allow me to answer? Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I allowed you. Mr. Gorka. Will you continue to hector me while I am to answer? Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Will you answer the question? Mr. Gorka. I am trying to, but you are interrupting me. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Please do so. Mr. Gorka. The President's grandchildren are Jewish. How asinine is it to posit that his White House would do anything not to recognize the tragedy of the Holocaust? That is my answer. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Dr. Gorka, are you saying that it was not questionable that it was asinine to mention that this Holocaust Remembrance statement omitted the mention of Jews? Mr. Gorka. It is asinine to posit that a Holocaust Remembrance statement is not about the Holocaust. Yes, I hold that line; it is asinine then, it is asinine now. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. So you stand by your statement. In recent years there has been a disturbing rise in far- right parties in Europe, from AFD in Germany to Marie Le-Pen's National Front in France, to Jobbik in Hungary. In fact, the President of the European Jewish Congress, Moshe Kantor, described Jobbik as ``unabashedly neo-Nazi'' in an October 1st, 2014 interview with the Times of Israel. Dr. Gorka, in an August 6th, 2007 interview with Hungary's Echo TV, when asked if you supported the formation of a militia run by Jobbik, you responded ``that is so.'' You explained this militia as a necessary response to ``a big societal need.'' You, of course, stand by this statement; correct, Dr. Gorka? Mr. Gorka. No, because I never made that statement. That was a 12-minute interview which had been scurrilously edited down to two-and-a-half minutes. That is a lie, sir, on the record. It is a distortion of the facts. I reject it. And my father, who defended Jews during World War II as a teenager, has been recognized on the record by Rabbi Billet and the Tablet magazine, the most important Jewish magazine, as having done so. Sir, I reject your absolute smear campaign ---- Mr. Krishnamoorthi. You can argue all you want with the record, sir. Mr. Gorka. It is an edited interview. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. You can debate with me on television about this record. Mr. Gorka. It is 13 minutes long. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. We will hand this to the reporter so they can verify what you said. Mr. Gorka. Absolutely, and I will share with them ---- Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Sir, on August 15th, 2007, the World Jewish Congress ---- Mr. Gorka. Mr. Chairman, are we here to discuss ISIS? Mr. Krishnamoorthi.--called this militia a serious violation of human rights. Do you still support this organization? Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired. I appreciate that. That was a little bit far afield. But I will say, if we are going to be bringing up things related to Israel, this subcommittee has taken the lead on not only framing the issue of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital--I led the trip last March where we looked at the different sites that will be ready. We were disappointed when the President didn't announce that in May, so we had another hearing here in November stressing that this is something that he should follow through on. And to his great credit, he did that, and I am eagerly anticipating news from the State Department about how they are going to implement that directive. We are not going to be satisfied if they take years to do it. It needs to happen this year, and we need to have a temporary site up and running. So we are going to follow that issue 100 percent. I just give the President a lot of credit because we haven't talked about it since we did our hearing in November. That was a big, big deal, long overdue. Other presidents have promised it. Jerusalem is and always has been the capital of the Jewish people. And with that, I want to thank the witnesses again for appearing with us today. The hearing record will remain open for two weeks for any member to submit a written opening statement or questions for the record. If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]