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- EXAMINING THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS [House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE INTERIOR, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 6, 2018 __________ Serial No. 115-71 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://oversight.house.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 30-940 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Blake Farenthold, Texas Jim Cooper, Tennessee Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Thomas Massie, Kentucky Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Mark Meadows, North Carolina Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Ron DeSantis, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Dennis A. Ross, Florida Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Mark Walker, North Carolina Jamie Raskin, Maryland Rod Blum, Iowa Jimmy Gomez, Maryland Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California Will Hurd, Texas Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Gary J. Palmer, Alabama John P. Sarbanes, Maryland James Comer, Kentucky Paul Mitchell, Michigan Greg Gianforte, Montana Sheria Clarke, Staff Director Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director William McKenna, General Counsel Becca Brown, Counsel Kiley Bidelman, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy and Environment Blake Farenthold, Texas Chairman Paul A. Gosar, Arizona, Vice Chair Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Dennis Ross, Florida Jamie Raskin, Maryland Gary J. Palmer, Alabama Jimmy Gomez, California James Comer, Kentucky (Vacancy) Greg Gianforte, Montana C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on March 6, 2018.................................... 1 WITNESSES James C. Dalton, SES Director of Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Oral Statement............................................... 4 Written Statement............................................ 6 Mr. Sean Strawbridge, Chief Executive Officer, Port of Corpus Christi Authority Oral Statement............................................... 9 Written Statement............................................ 11 Ms. Kirsten Mickelsen, Executive Director, Upper Mississippi River Basin Association Oral Statement............................................... 18 Written Statement............................................ 21 Mr. Jim Weakley, President, Lake Carriers' Association Oral Statement............................................... 27 Written Statement............................................ 29 APPENDIX Statement for the Record of The Honorable John R. Moolenaar, submitted by Chairman Farenthold............................... 56 Letter from the South Florida Water Management District Executive Director, submitted by Mr. DeSantis............................ 58 Questions for the Record for Mr. James C. Dalton, submitted by Members of the Committee....................................... 63 EXAMINING THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ---------- Tuesday, March 6, 2018 House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and Environment Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Washington, DC The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Blake Farenthold [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Farenthold, Ross, Palmer, Comer, Gianforte, Plaskett, and Raskin. Also present: Representatives DeSantis and Mitchell. Mr. Farenthold. The Subcommittee on Interior, Energy, and Environment will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. We are going to start with my opening statement. Good morning. Today the Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and Environment will examine the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which plays a critical role in the development and execution of engineering projects across the nation. Today we will discuss ways in which communications and interactions between the Corps, localities, and the public can be improved, and project delivery can be streamlined. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is one of the largest engineering agencies in the world. They manage a wide range of projects that affect our constituents on a daily basis, from dredging to flood protection to construction at our military bases. America relies on the Corps' ability to complete projects that keep their communities safe and keep vital transportation lanes open to grow our economy. For example, in the district I represent in Texas, we have been working with the Corps of Engineers for three decades on the Corpus Christi Ship Channel Improvement Project. This project would allow larger ships that can now transit the wider and deeper Panama Canal to access the Port of Corpus Christi Channel from the Gulf of Mexico, lowering transportation costs and making U.S. energy more competitive. While many dredging projects facilitate imports from foreign countries, this project will result in roughly $7 billion in increased exports from U.S.-produced energy products. With the recent announcement of the President's budget, we received the good news that the Trump Administration proposed $4.8 billion for the Corps' civil works budget, which includes $13 million in funding for the Corpus Christi Ship Channel Expansion Project in Fiscal Year 2019. This was not an easy win for our district. Despite having been authorized by Congress three times, this project has been continuously delayed by bureaucracy and what I believe to be the prior Administration's hostility to oil and gas. This project is not alone in that manner. The Army Corps of Engineers currently has a stunningly large backlog for their projects. Approximately $96 billion worth of projects are being bogged down in red tape and, quite frankly, Congress' broken appropriations process. Recent flooding in the Houston area during Hurricane Harvey can also be linked to long overdue public works projects that the Corps is involved with to update, improve, and add reservoirs and levees. Corps delays and congressional hurdles to funding are costing billions of dollars in lost economic benefits and increased cost, and in areas with flood control issues are costing lives. In talking to my colleagues here in Congress, it seems like almost every member of Congress has a Corps issue. In fact, we have quite a few members who do not serve on this committee who have asked to participate because they see a problem in their district. We expect to see some of them today. We need to ensure that the Army Corps of Engineers is doing what it can to get these projects done in a timely, cost effective, and safe manner. I look forward to hearing ideas and suggestions from our panel today and am hopeful this committee can help create solutions to improve the working relationship between the Corps and our localities, our businesses, and the American people. With that, I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Ms. Plaskett, from the Virgin Islands for her opening statement. Ms. Plaskett. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing regarding the work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. I would also like to thank the witnesses from the Army Corps and local organizations who will provide valuable insights and ideas. The Army Corps performs a very important role throughout our country, from issuing permits that balance economic development and environmental protection to assisting with the Federal Government's response to natural disasters. This past fall, the 103 American citizens living in my territory, the U.S. Virgin Islands, were hit by two devastating hurricanes. Today, they are still struggling to recover. Unfortunately, the Army Corps was extremely slow in the support for this recovery. First, the Army Corps is responsible for overseeing the removal of 1 million cubic yards of debris from the islands of St. Thomas and St. John. I have heard serious concerns from my constituents that the Army Corps acted much more slowly than the local Department of Public Works, which completed debris removal on St. Croix. Second, the Army Corps were staggeringly slow in installing the blue tarp roofs on houses that were seriously damaged by hurricanes. According to reporting in the St. Croix Source, a local paper, weeks after the hurricanes devastated the Virgin Islands, the Army Corps had only installed 282 of these temporary roofs. The U.S. Virgin Islands is, unfortunately, accustomed to the slow pace of assistance from agencies such as the Army Corps. For seven years, Coral World Ocean Park on St. Thomas waited for the Army Corps to conclude the Section 4.404 permitting process in order for the park to obtain the permit it needed to continue with an expansion project that would enhance tourism. This delay nearly caused the project to be abandoned. Such a setback by Coral World Ocean Park would have been truly devastating given that the park is a major tourist attraction that employs local Virgin Islanders at a time when people are working hard to get back on their feet. But let's be clear, and I really want this to be clear: I am not questioning the dedication of the hard-working people of the Army Corps. I believe that you all are doing what you can to serve the American people. What I am questioning is whether the Corps is hurting from being significantly understaffed and underfunded, and I would like to know what we, not as Democrats, not as Republicans, but as members of Congress, can do to help. Today we need to have an important discussion. We need to hear what the Army Corps will do differently in the future to address challenges. We especially need to hear from the Army Corps what it needs from Congress in order to perform its work better for the American people. Through oversight and accountability, hearings like these will cause the Army Corps to serve the American people with the speed and the effectiveness they deserve. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. Now I am pleased to introduce our witnesses. We have Mr. James Dalton, who is the Director of Civil Works for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We have my constituent, Mr. Sean Strawbridge, the Chief Executive Officer of the Port of Corpus Christi Authority. We have Ms. Kirsten Mickelsen, the Executive Director of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association; and Mr. Jim Weakley, the President of the Lake Carriers' Association. Welcome to you all. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. Would you all please stand and raise your right hand? [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Farenthold. Let the record reflect all the witnesses answered in the affirmative. You may be seated. In order to allow for discussion, we would like you to limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be made a part of the record. If you will take a look in front of you, you will see you have a clock that will count down the time. It has a red light, a yellow light, and a green light. It works just like the traffic lights. The green light means go, the yellow light means hurry up, and the red light means stop. Please also remember to press the button to turn on your microphone, and the closer you are to the microphone, the better we can hear you and the better you will sound. So we will start with Mr. Dalton. We will give you the first 5 minutes, sir. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF JAMES C. DALTON, SES Mr. Dalton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Plaskett and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the Honorable R.D. James, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, and General Semonite, Chief of Engineers, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Again, I am James Dalton, and I currently serve as the Director of Civil Works for the Corps. Previously I served as the Chief of Engineering and Construction for the Corps' headquarters, and I have also served at the district and division levels. Since Congress first authorized our navigation mission in 1824, the Corps has worked hard to develop and implement solutions to our nation's water resource challenges. We were able to do this because we have a world-class workforce of talented and dedicated professionals who are passionate about what they do. None of our work is done alone, however, but with the full participation and hard work of many others. We appreciate the value and depend upon the support of the Administration, the Congress, and all of our partners to succeed in our mission. I am very proud of the work that the Corps accomplishes, but I am equally aware that the organization can improve, and I have been and remain committed to instituting changes to the Corps' delivery process in order to become more efficient and effective. The Corps faces a multitude of challenges, some old and some new. Much of our infrastructure is well beyond its design and economic life, yet the requirements have never been greater. The demands on the Federal budget continue to grow as our infrastructure ages, and we find more and more annual appropriations going to O&M at the expense of both investigations and construction. Today we have $96 billion in construction requirements, representing the Federal share on a multitude of projects. We have close to 100 ongoing feasibility studies, which, if authorized, will simply add to the Federal budget requirement. Our feasibility studies are formulated with the assumption of efficient funding, and all of them are multi-year projects, yet we budget on an annual basis with no assurance that the adequate funding will be available from year to year. This certainly creates frustration and uncertainty with our non- Federal sponsors. Together we must remove the barriers to develop and improve our water resources infrastructure. We must encourage and incentivize alternative project delivery, streamline Federal procedures for delivering projects, and reduce unnecessary Federal oversight to facilitate timely delivery of projects. We recognize the Corps' role in the future may be different than it has been in the past and that our level of involvement in project delivery may vary from project to project. The Corps is fully engaged in support of multiple efforts aimed at streamlining our regulatory processes. Currently, the Corps is addressing topics such as establishing discipline and accountability in the environmental and permitting review for infrastructure, reviewing the nationwide permitting program to identify modifications that will increase the efficiency of decision-making, and working with the EPA in reviewing the 2015 Waters of the U.S. rule. Our goal is simply to simplify the process for gaining infrastructure permits. The Corps continues to work on policy and administrative changes that can improve infrastructure delivery. We are flattening the organization by delegating decision-making authorities and other responsibilities from the Washington level to the division and district levels. We are also transitioning to a more risk-informed decision-making organization because we often find our technical experts that are close to the issues can make the decisions based on their experience, knowledge, and competence in an area. We are also looking at how best to capture the total value of a project and working with most communities that have massive plans for their areas. We are also reviewing existing authorities that may leverage non-Federal financing such as WRDA 1986 Section 203 and Section 204. Section 203 authorizes the non-Federal to undertake a feasibility study. The Corps simply wants to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. We recognize the need to address internal policies, regulations and processes, and cultural impediments in order to remain relevant in the future. We want to be value- added to delivering solutions, whatever role we may have in that endeavor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. This concludes my testimony, and I look forward to answering any questions you might have. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Dalton follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Dalton. We appreciate your being here. Mr. Strawbridge, you are recognized now for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF SEAN STRAWBRIDGE Mr. Strawbridge. Chairman Farenthold, Ranking Member Plaskett, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the honor of appearing before the subcommittee and participating in this distinguished panel on such an important topic. My name is Sean Strawbridge, and I am testifying before this committee in my capacity as the Chief Executive Officer for the Port of Corpus Christi Authority. I also bring to you a perspective shaped by over 25 years of experience working on energy, transportation, and trade-related issues. There are 926 seaports in the United States, accounting for approximately 26 percent of the national GDP. My port, the Port of Corpus Christi, is currently the fourth largest port in the United States in total revenue tons, and the largest energy export gateway in the nation in market value. It is also a national strategic military seaport in support of the American war-fighter overseas. Recently, the Energy Information Administration accelerated its forecast for when the United States would become a net exporter of its energy production from 2026 to 2022. The last time the United States was a net exporter of its energy production was 1953, nearly 70 years ago. The Port of Corpus Christi is at the apex of this energy renaissance as the global gateway for American energy. In describing our experience with the United States Army Corps of Engineers, one has to go back 28 years to 1990 when Congress mandated the commencement of a feasibility study to determine costs and impacts of deepening and widening the Corpus Christi Ship Channel from 45 feet to 54 feet. It has been a long and at times painstakingly slow and bureaucratic process to move this project to fruition. The feasibility study was completed in 2003. The OMB approval came for the project in 2007. Congress authorized the project in WRDA in 2007, and again reauthorized in WRDA 2014, and in WIN 2016 there was clarifying guidance language that was provided for the Corps to follow. During this lengthy approval process, the project costs grew enormously. At the time of the initial authorization, the Corps' chief report estimated costs of construction at $188 million. In the 10 years it took to finally execute the project partnership agreement with the Corps, that cost estimate had ballooned to $327 million. The Port of Corpus Christi could be handling more energy exports. Our project alone is forecasted to increase exports by an estimated $36 billion annually, or one-tenth of the current trade deficit with China. Estimated transportation cost savings for our customers are in excess of $300 million. We are extremely pleased that the President recently recommended the project in its Fiscal Year 2019 budget, yet we remain understandably concerned about how long it took to reach this point and how long it will likely take for the Federal Government under the current process to execute their mandated scope and cost share for this urgently needed energy infrastructure project. The Port of Corpus Christi's cost share for this project is $102 million, and we are pleased to report we have our cost share in the bank ready to go. In fact, we have already funded the first construction contract completely and transferred $32 million of port money to the Corps last September to commence construction, yet construction has yet to begin and we continue to wait for the Corps to secure that first dredging contract. At the current Federal funding levels and Corps' estimated timeline for construction, this project could conceivably take another decade to complete. Yet, we believe we can execute on the project much faster and much more cost effective. If we apply the same inflationary formula that increased the project cost over the past decade, the estimated project cost could conceivably be over $525 million, or more, and continue to frustrate America's energy exports. I want to emphasize that overall the Port of Corpus Christi enjoys an excellent working relationship with the dedicated and professional women and men of the Army Corps of Engineers. But recognizing their, at times, strained capability to execute on projects and the significantly underfunded project appropriations there is only one step towards solving some of these issues. I believe I can speak for most ports in the nation and certainly for the Port of Corpus Christi when I share the belief that interactions with the Corps of Engineers work best when there is alignment on project importance, greater transparency and sharing of information between the parties, and a willingness to collaborate in the spirit of reaching consensus. The time for policy and structural changes which expedite completion of infrastructure projects across the nation is upon us. We have been and continue to be a good partner to the Federal Government. Thus, one suggested solution is to grant more authority for ports to execute on Corps construction projects. Ports are already in the construction and dredging business today. We are responsible for dredging from the Federally-authorized channels to our docks. We can execute on these projects much faster and with less expense if given that opportunity. Giving the Corps the ability to delegate its authority to states and port authorities to manage certain projects is a model already followed by the United States Department of Transportation. The Federal Highway Administration grants similar authority to states to build surface transportation projects. In closing, the Port of Corpus Christi takes very seriously its role serving as a trustworthy steward of the Corpus Christi Ship Channel and the significant economic impact it provides to the region, the state, and the nation. And it is in this spirt of supporting our highest national interests that I have offered this testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify in front of this subcommittee. [Prepared statement of Mr. Strawbridge follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Strawbridge. Ms. Mickelsen, you are recognized now for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF KIRSTEN MICKELSEN Ms. Mickelsen. Thank you, and thank you, Chair Farenthold, Ranking Member Plaskett, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate today's opportunity to talk with you all about our experiences working with the Corps and how we might improve our working relationship with the agency. My name is Kirsten Mickelsen. I am the Executive Director of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association. We represent the five states that border the Upper Mississippi River from where the Ohio River confluence comes in, all the way up to the Twin Cities and the Illinois River. We were formed in 1981 by the governors of those states to serve as an advocate, provide a forum for coordination and information sharing and collaborating with Federal agencies that have responsibilities for managing the river, such as the Corps. So our board members are made up of governor-appointed liaisons, and we represent Departments of Transportation, Agriculture, DNR, Economic Development, and those with water quality responsibilities. So, what that allows us to do is to take a step back and really think about how we manage a large ecosystem like the Upper Mississippi River in an integrated and a comprehensive lens and context. The Upper Mississippi River, I just want to talk about it for a second for those of you who are unfamiliar with it. It is a very significant national resource. It generates $584 billion annually, supporting only nine sectors, and only two counties bordering the river. It is very important to our states for transportation, water supply, whether for manufacturing or drinking water, fish and wildlife habitat, recreation and economic development. Congress recognized this in 1981 by declaring the Upper Mississippi River a nationally significant ecosystem and a nationally significant navigation system, and has remained committed to this. The river is highly complex, and it is very challenging to manage. There are a lot of uses that depend on it, and if you do one management action it could have implications for others. So the Corps has really been a strong partner for the states and our local partners and how we think about best managing that river. And maybe given that we have three districts managing the Upper Mississippi River, including St. Paul, Rock Island, and St. Louis, and we have five states and a lot of local governments and parties that are interested in the river, we are almost forced to coordinate and collaborate and discuss. And we really appreciate the Corps and the staff of the districts that are committed to managing the river in ways that support all uses and are supported by collaborative, knowledge- based solutions, and we look forward to that remaining. There are a few reasons why we do this well. One is that we have these communication forums with well-defined decision- making processes that are inclusive of the states and all of our stakeholders, and we make a collective effort to share information that turns into knowledge and that informs decision-making. Through that flow and deliberative dialogue and planning, we are able to find solutions that are effective, efficient, and sustainable to address water resource challenges. With specific construction projects, whether they are structural or non-structural measures that our states and our non-profit partners want to partner on and to advance collectively, we find that achieving these shared solutions are challenged by constraining budgets and policies. I wanted to just pick today--I could talk all day long about policies that affect our ways of implementing these projects, but I wanted to focus in on the Corps' cost-share agreement, project partnership agreements, and the way that they are structured. I am sure several of you in the room are maybe stakeholders that have alluded to these challenges, but they are really structured in a way that protects the Federal Government and requires a non-Federal sponsor, whether that is the state or a non-profit or a port authority, potentially, to assume all liability and to assume O&M in perpetuity. Our state attorneys general are unable to execute these agreements, constitutions don't allow for it, or tort law, and we would like to see that addressed. In the testimony I offer language that we are hoping to seek through WRDA. But basically, it is a directive that I think the Corps needs to realign these agreements. What our states are asking for is not to step away from liability but to examine any legal challenges in context. So that is what this language hopes to do. Again, we hope to seek it in WRDA. There is an explanation as to why the language as it currently is in the cost-share agreements conflicts with our state constitutions and tort law, and I hope you will take a look at that. Also, to pick on the piece of O&M, these projects are designed to be 50 years. The Corps used to have a 50-year term limit in the agreement and took that away. So now the states and non-profits are, in perpetuity, forever, assigned to take care of the O&M as prescribed by the Corps. And one other reason that I just want to talk about this being problematic is that the Corps has the ultimate decision for planning, for materials that are used, for the construction and design. They are the only point of contact with the constructor, but yet you are asking the non-Federal sponsor to assume all liability, regardless of context and only for fault and negligence, which is hard to prove. So again, we are hoping to get that addressed in WRDA. We think that will allow us to partner. We think as the Federal Government continues to want to involve non-Federal sponsors on these cost-share projects, and we find a way to address this so that the cost-share agreements reflect the Corps' attitude to really partner on addressing the water resource issues. One other thing I just wanted to mention while I was here is that our non-profit partners in WRDA 2007 classified them as a non-Federal cost-share sponsor, and we think that that provides a lot of great opportunities, particularly for ecosystem restoration projects. But right now, the Corps does not accept gifts that were donated to the non-Federal sponsor, like rock or something like that, that maybe a private entity would want to donate to the Corps, because they don't account for the value of that good. They only account for the cost that it was for that agency. We think that would also have maybe implications to port authorities or maybe to the states that receive donated goods. So we hope that that also is changed so that it enables our non-Federal partners to stand forward and get the credit that they deserve for bringing resources to the table. [Prepared statement of Ms. Mickelsen follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. Mr. Weakley? STATEMENT OF JIM WEAKLEY Mr. Weakley. Good morning. I represent 13 American companies operating 45 vessels. We employ 1,600 people and move 100 million tons of cargo, generating 103,000 jobs, with an economic impact of $20 billion. I will describe the Great Lakes Navigation System and focus my testimony on how a gap in Corps policy, combined with flawed assumptions and illogical conclusions, risks 11 million jobs. The Great Lakes Navigation System, including the Soo Locks in Michigan, is a transportation network for iron ore and other commodities that enable the manufacturing of steel, automobiles, appliances, ships, and other products in the U.S. We depend on the Army Corps to maintain this marine highway. Without the locks connecting Lake Superior to the lower locks, we could not do our job. Our decade-plus quest for a valid benefit-to-cost ratio for a replacement Soo Lock project has been stymied by the Corps' resistance to common sense. The cargo, if there was a lock outage, the Corps assumed could move by rail. We immediately pointed out that the rail connections don't exist and that the Great Lakes steel mills can't receive ore by rail. A Department of Homeland Security study confirmed this. DHS concluded that a six-month outage of a larger lock would cause 11 million Americans to be unemployed, more than 800,000 unemployed in each of Michigan, Texas, and Ohio. A recession would result. It took congressional intervention to force the Corps to re-look at their assumptions. The Corps admitted to us that the lack of a rail alternative is new to them, and that their policies don't say how a BCR should account for this. We engaged with the Corps at the beginning and at every step of this $2 million, more than 2-year economic reevaluation. We included rail, mining, steel, and vessel experts, and the Corps' report should be drafted soon. Within the past six weeks, however, we learned of two new fatal flaws that will reduce the BCR to less than half of what it should be. According to the Corps economists, a rail transportation alternative at the lock would cost between $4 and $10 billion, with the Corps' contractor estimate of $6.5 billion. That cost should be compared to the cost of building a new lock, but that is not what the Corps is doing. They are using an unsuitable averaging model to set the cost of the rail alternative at $2 billion. Averaging makes sense when you can rent capacity from an existing railroad, but not when you have to build rail infrastructure. That is like building a 900-foot lock instead of a 1,200-foot lock because the average size of the vessel is smaller than the maximum size of the vessel. If you only paid 30 percent of the cost of building the railroad capacity in need, it doesn't mean that you get to use the needed capacity 30 percent of the time; it means that you never get to use that capacity because 30 percent is not enough to complete the rail connection. The Corps is also unnecessarily adding part of the cost of the rail connection to the cost of building the new lock in the BCR calculation. Despite our efforts to engage the Corps, we fear that $2 million of taxpayer funding will again result in a significantly flawed BCR that will under-count the project's transportation savings. This risks failure of Great Lakes iron ore transportation and a substantial portion of our manufacturing economy. Eleven million jobs are at risk, not because the Corps has to but because they choose to. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Weakley follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. I note the presence of my colleague, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, and at this point I would like to ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to participate fully in this hearing. Without objection, so ordered. We also have a statement for the record from Mr. Moolenaar. We will include that in the record. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Farenthold. I usually wait until the end to ask my questions, but I am going to go ahead and take the Chairman's prerogative and go first, because this is an issue that I have been working on since Day 1 here in Congress. I am going to start with Mr. Strawbridge. You have been working 25 years in transportation logistics and trade, and in your testimony you talk about lack of transparency, lack of communication, lack of funding as some of the challenges. Is that within individual Corps districts, or is it more of the Corps as a whole? Can you talk a little bit more about the effects of that? Mr. Strawbridge. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I guess the short answer is it depends. In our particular case, depending upon what the issue is, we will have disagreements between our Corps district on interpretations, disagreements with their own division, and perhaps disagreements with headquarters. We had a recent disagreement at the division level. It took one email that I wrote to senior counsel at headquarters to have it resolved. But the point is, why does the sponsor, why does the partner have to navigate all the various silos within the Corps to get an answer? I think that things can improve. I think we have seen some improvement, particularly in a post-Harvey environment. It is disappointing to have to see a major catastrophic event kind of bring us all together. In a post-Harvey environment, we have seen some improvement. But frankly, we are a little battle weary. It should not take 28 years for us to get a dredging project to the point where it is now. So there is certainly room for improvement. Mr. Farenthold. So you got a delay widening and deepening and dredging project. The Port of Brownsville has some shoaling issues that were put out for bid and got zero bids back. Have we reached the capacity where we can't do some of these projects, Mr. Dalton? Is there a problem with capacity and getting these done? Mr. Dalton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think we have reached a problem with capacity here that we can't get things done. A lot of it is based on timing, just when we actually solicit for these projects. We have a concern also about some of the prices that we are getting as compared to our government reasonable prices. But when we meet with industry, we don't get the impression that they are tapped out. Mr. Farenthold. Okay. Mr. Dalton. So I think we have the capacity. Mr. Farenthold. Mr. Strawbridge, you talked a little bit about the non-Federal sponsors taking more control of the projects. Ms. Mickelsen talked about the Corps almost entirely being in charge, the liability potentially being with the non- Federal sponsor. Mr. Strawbridge, could you tell us a little bit about what you think, how we could fix that or some of the concerns associated with that and what some of the legal issues are? Mr. Strawbridge. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I can't agree more with Ms. Mickelsen and her position that the non-Federal sponsor is put in a--I think when we talk about these project partnership agreements, the term ``partnership'' is one that we have to really question, because a lot of the liability and responsibility is put on the non-Federal sponsor, including funding. In our particular case, we do dredging. We dredge between the Federal channel and the docks. We believe that we can execute on those projects faster and likely cheaper than the Army Corps of Engineers, and so we like to advocate that we give an opportunity for those construction projects to be able to execute on those projects without having a lengthy Section 404, 408, or Section 10 permitting process, just essentially have the Corps delegate its 204 authority to its non-Federal sponsor to be able to execute on those projects. Mr. Farenthold. Mr. Dalton, can we do that under current law, or do we need to do something to--it seems like if you can get somebody else to take on some of the workload and you just supervise, that sounds like a pretty good idea. Mr. Dalton. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So, a couple of responses to that. One, I agree with Mr. Strawbridge that in some cases, maybe in many cases, the non-Federal entity might be able to get a project done faster and at lower cost, primarily because, in the cases that we have observed, they have gotten funding up front. So that means that contractors can commit to a schedule. They can control and manage their risk. So we are looking at different authorities that we currently already have that allow us to do this. As I mentioned in my oral statement, WRDA 1986 has the Section 203 authority that allows a non-Federal to conduct a feasibility study, and Section 204 allows a non-Federal to actually construct a project. So we are looking at--in fact, we are exercising those authorities. I don't think in the past we have used those authorities as much as we perhaps could have. The second part of the comment from him and Ms. Mickelsen refers to actually something written in law that says that the Federal Government is to identify the non-Federal sponsors responsible for O&M for that project, and it went from 50 years to perpetuity because our projects don't stop at 50 years. They are still ongoing. And also there are liability requirements in the WRDA. I apologize for not having that in front of me to tell you exactly which one that is. I can certainly provide that to you as a matter of record. But that is a law that we are abiding by, in response to that. Mr. Farenthold. We do want to get the job done and, of course, we frequently do the WRDA bills, so the things that you need to be fixed and feel like would be helpful is something that we need to know about up here. I see my time has expired. I will now recognize Ms. Plaskett for 5 minutes--5-and-a-half, since I went over. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. I have heard the concerns that you all have raised, as well as local concerns that are in the Virgin Islands as well, regarding different issues, whether it is stretching the permitting process, et cetera. One of the ones that stood out and is most recent in the Virgin Islands has been the debris removal that was put to the Army Corps of Engineers. Major General Ed Jackson, in written testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, stated as of October 31st, 2017--this is after the hurricane of September 6th--only 141 cubic yards of the estimated 1 million cubic yards of debris had been removed. Mr. Dalton, can you give some light as to this failure to remove almost 90 percent of the debris more than a month, almost two months after the hurricane, and why the Army Corps was slow in performing this function? Mr. Dalton. So, I am not real sure that I can provide you all the details of what happened in the past. I know that the status as of today is I think 94 percent or so of that debris has been removed, collected I should say, and we are in the process of looking for disposal methods to ensure we have those on the contract. The information I have before me says that 94 percent of the 870,000 cubic yards of debris have been collected. We anticipate a WRDDA renew vegetative transportation disposal contract in April to include disposal options and criteria. Ms. Plaskett. But do you understand, when you say in the past, you make it sound like it was two years ago when it was actually just a couple of months ago. But I wanted to know--I have heard the concern and I wanted to know, do you have any reasoning why it was slower in St. Thomas and St. John, where the Army Corps was responsible for it, as compared with the island of St. Croix, where the local government was responsible? Mr. Dalton. I would have to look into that and get back with you. I don't know at this point. Ms. Plaskett. You are unaware of why that is? A second one would be during the same hurricane recovery, when the Army Corps was put in charge of the installation of your blue roof program which installs the temporary tarps over homes of hurricane victims. At the time, almost well over a month that the hurricane had struck, we had about 14,000 homes that were affected. And after almost two months, only 282 of the temporary roofs had been installed, recognizing that this was still the rainy season, and so individuals' homes were still being rained on during this time. Can you explain what were the issues that the Army Corps had in the slowness of the installation of those? Mr. Dalton. One of the reasons, I believe, that we couldn't move as fast as we had planned to do is that the blue roof design that we had had to be modified because some of the houses didn't really have enough structure left to actually attach the roof. Ms. Plaskett. Got it. So you were used to installing blue roofs on homes that had portions of the roof removed, as opposed to, in the Virgin Islands after a category 5, the entire roof structure was gone. Mr. Dalton. That's correct, Congresswoman. Ms. Plaskett. And then when you made this assessment that this was the problem, how was that information then sent back to the Army Corps in real time, and how were they able to make modifications and changes? Is there a process for that, a formal process for that? Mr. Dalton. Well, the formal process in times of disasters and emergency recovery are things that we probably do a lot more direct than we would following a normal process. The normal process for making changes like that would actually include a design modification that has to be reviewed and approved, et cetera. So there is a lot more bureaucracy there than we would normally do in an emergency situation. There, the authority was with the folks that were on the ground, and the changes were made immediate. Ms. Plaskett. So you used your creative engineering ingenuity to just make the changes in real time. Mr. Dalton. Yes, Congresswoman. What I would say is that we are trying to get to a point where we allow professional judgment and engineering judgment to govern. Ms. Plaskett. And does Congress give you the wherewithal in the law to do that? Mr. Dalton. We do, yes. Ms. Plaskett. Okay, great. Thank you. I am also concerned--and I recognize the work, and I saw how much the Army Corps was right in the thick of things and really being supportive, even in terms of what I mentioned earlier, with Coral World and the length of processing of those permits. Ms. Mickelsen, in your written testimony you voiced concern about the Corps' ability to manage your area, the Upper Mississippi. Do you think that understaffing and underfunding of the Corps is at the root of your concerns? Ms. Mickelsen. I certainly think it is an underfunding issue. It is also, I think, an issue of getting priorities in the budget and getting past cost/benefit as the criteria as currently assumed or used in OMB and the Corps, and how that differentiates. For channel maintenance and our lock infrastructure, we have over $1 billion in backlog, and we are not able to take care of it. Also for channel maintenance, the Corps is in a very reactive position because of funding. They have not been able to take care of sediment as it is filling in the river and keep the 9-foot navigation channel open and safe and reliable. What that does to our states is, when you get a flood to drought or a drought to flood or whatever and sediment drops quickly, the Corps has been behind, and they classify that as an emergency situation. Ms. Plaskett. Ms. Mickelsen, you have to quickly--I am well past my time. Ms. Mickelsen. Oh, I am sorry. Anyway, they are in an emergency situation and the states are in-between closing the navigation channel for business or streamlining permitting and not doing their legal obligations to do that. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. And that shouldn't be counted against me. Sorry. [Laughter.] Mr. Farenthold. All right. We will recognize now the gentleman from Kentucky for 5 minutes. Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is for Mr. Dalton. As you know, most of our nation's locks and dams are now over 50 years old. Unsurprisingly, we are experiencing breakdowns across the Inland Waterway System that caused costly and unnecessary wait times for barges on these rivers. A prime example of this are the recent failures at locks and dams 52 and 53 on the Ohio River, which have caused several shutdowns on this busy commercial navigation route over the past year. Thankfully, this outdated infrastructure will soon be replaced by the Olmsted Lock and Dam which is scheduled to open later this year after nearly 30 years of delays. My question to you is, what lessons has the Corps learned from the Olmsted project, and how can we improve the process for pending and future projects? Mr. Dalton. Thank you, Congressman. I think our biggest lesson learned from Olmsted is that funding is a major component of that, because if we had funded that project to full funding, then we would be able to assign contracts, award contractors, hold contractors to a schedule, hold ourselves to a schedule rather than piecemeal the project as we did with Olmsted. Also, a pretty important lesson learned was the way we actually constructed Olmsted, and using the modeling that we did before to decide to construct is probably something we would take a look at for future projects. Mr. Comer. Okay. Thank you. And for the rest of the witnesses, I would like to hear your thoughts about the importance of community involvement and input with regard to Corps-managed projects. Do you have any specific recommendations on how to improve communication and interaction between different stakeholders and the Corps? Anyone? Ms. Mickelsen. Well, yes. I will give a prime example. In Pool 4 at the navigation channel, the Corps has a dredge material plan, and I think there are some conflicts with lawyers and how to present plans. Basically, just one example of an instance, rather than having a community approach around dredge material disposal and what to do with that, there was a proposal that the Corps wanted to do to do eminent domain to a third-generation farmer, and basically the lawyer said that the Corps could not consult with or notify that public landowner in advance. So they dropped that plan on their doorstep literally, as well as their neighbors, and that created an uproar. But what it did show also is that our local communities and our farmers and all those throughout the whole region are removed from the river and why it is managed and how it is managed, and we need to have these continual conversations so we know why we need to invest and what kind of measures the Federal Government needs to do to take care of our navigation channel. Mr. Comer. Great. Anyone else? Mr. Strawbridge. Congressman, we at the Port of Corpus Christi have to run interference between the community and the Corps often, and what happens is we get phone calls where applications for Corps permits or adjustments will sit fallow for months or even years, and without somebody else to turn to, they will turn to the Port Authority to assist them with that, and we are happy to do that. Again, we do value the relationship that we have with the Corps at the district, the division, and HQ. But certainly there is room for improvement with the user-friendliness of the Corps with the community. Mr. Comer. Yes, sir. Mr. Weakley. Congressman, in my written testimony I talk about a success story when we dealt with our dredging crisis. It took us 10 years, and we spent a lot of time communicating at the district, the division, and the headquarters level, but we have turned the page on that. In the Soo Lock project, we invoked the same process to try and engage frequently at multiple levels, and we met disappointing results in the same process. Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama for 5 minutes. Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Listening to Mr. Strawbridge's testimony about the frustration over the length of time to get action on dredging the Corpus Christi Channel brings up a number of issues that other members, not necessarily this committee, have brought up about the lack of action from the Corps. You said in your testimony, Mr. Dalton, that there are more than 100 feasibility studies underway. Is that correct? Mr. Dalton. Yes, that is correct. Mr. Palmer. How many of those are over five years old? Mr. Dalton. I would have to look and see. The majority of those are probably over five years old, without a doubt, because if ---- Mr. Palmer. I would like for you to give us a list of feasibility studies and how long they have been underway, if you could do that in writing. I would also like to know what are you spending on those studies. Mr. Dalton. If I could, Mr. Congressman, those studies, we characterize those as legacy, a lot of those as legacy studies. AS you probably know, a few years ago we revised our process to complete feasibility studies within three years and $3 million, as opposed to longer. So most of those 100 feasibility studies were started long before the 3/3/3 requirement that is now law, but we will certainly provide you with a list of those. As to how much we are spending on those, I will have to look at that and provide it. Today's standard is $3 million for a feasibility study. Mr. Palmer. Well, my problem with this is that there are various reports indicating that taxpayers would save anywhere from $3 to $8 for every $1 invested in flood mitigation, for example, and similar types of investments. If you are just going to study the projects or only going to build small parts of it, you are really not helping out there. There is no benefit to the taxpayers. I will give you an example. There are several examples here, but I am going to give you a few examples of where the Corps spent tens of millions of dollars and has taken decades without actually building anything. The Corps spent over $80 million on the Morganza Project in Southwest New Orleans and has not yet put a shovel in the ground. The West Shore Project was in study phase for 42 years--I want to emphasize that, Mr. Chairman--42 years, before the Corps finally issued a project recommendation that authorized construction for 2016. I don't know what they have done as of now. The impact of the August 2016 flood in Baton Rouge, which this committee addressed, could have been significantly reduced if the Comite Diversion had been built. That is the canal between that river and a deeper, wider channel. That had been proposed for 30 years, and it cost the taxpayers billions of dollars, and the people who were affected by that flood are never going to get over it. These are just a few examples. The reality is that our nation has approximately 215 disasters that have cost the taxpayers over a billion dollars, and that is just since 1980. When you include the 2017 hurricanes, it will cost our nation nearly $1.5 trillion to pick up the pieces and try to respond to these, where a lot of the problems could have been avoided, could have been mitigated if the Corps would quit studying and start working. How do you respond to that? Mr. Dalton. So, Mr. Congressman, that goes really to the heart of some of the things that we are trying to change within the organization right now. First of all, what we did in the past with those approximately I will say 100 studies, some of those that you are referring to, we can't go back and recover that. What we are trying to do is make sure in the future that we don't do the same thing and spend that kind of money on studies. So what we are doing is we are trying to become a more risk--make decisions more based on risk and uncertainty rather than try to model everything until we get to a 99 percent solution, and we believe that that will certainly help us to get studies done faster and for lower cost. Mr. Palmer. Let me go back to Mr. Strawbridge and the Port of Corpus Christi. The United States is in a position to dominate the world in energy. It is absolutely critical that our ports be able to handle the shipping that is going to be necessary to do that. It is absolutely critical for our economy. So my suggestion is, for the good of the country and to conclude my part of this hearing, is that the Corps implement the three-year strategy and that we begin immediately to work. I really think it is a good idea to delegate a lot of these projects down to the state and local level. I think that we will see projects implemented much more expeditiously, and I think it will save us a boatload of money, not to use that metaphor lightly. I thank the Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. We will now go to the gentleman from Montana, Mr. Gianforte. Mr. Gianforte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Dalton, thank you for being here today. I appreciate the hard work that the Corps does across the country managing a large, diverse set of projects, and in some cases, like the Houston Shipping Channel, you have done your job to get ready for the project, and Congress has not done our job in giving you the resources. In other cases you have done your job and Congress has given you the money, and other problems come up. This is the case with the Lower Yellowstone Intake Project in my home state of Montana. The Lower Yellowstone Intake Project has provided a dependable supply of irrigation water to 58,000 acres and over 400 family farms in Montana and North Dakota for over 100 years. To protect the endangered palette sturgeon, Congress funded a bypass channel and improvement to let the fish circumvent the intake dam and access 165 miles of additional river. A Federal District Court has granted an injunction against the project, saying it does not do enough for the sturgeon. Certainly, doing nothing does nothing for the fish. I appreciate the Corps' willingness to continue to pursue the project and want to commend your staff in the Omaha district for their level of engagement. That is what this hearing is about, improving communications. I know that several towns in Montana are also working with the Corps to update their levee systems, particularly the towns of Glasgow and Mile City, and navigating the confusing maze of Federal requirements and funding opportunities, and they need timely feedback from the Corps. What can we do to improve the process to ensure folks that are trying to get these permits and projects moved along get the necessary feedback they need in a timely way from the Corps? Mr. Dalton. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. So, we are committed to trying to communicate better with our public so that, in fact, they do have information faster than what we have done in the past. We are looking at different ways to communicate, perhaps using more social media just for general public information. But certainly for those that are working on projects that need our input, we are glad to step up and help them as much as possible. I commend Mr. Strawbridge. He said that he didn't really think it was necessary to go straight to the headquarters to get a solution. But oftentimes what happens, until we are able to change the culture from what we have, we don't know that problems exist. We don't know that people are not getting feedback that they need until they tell us. So we would prefer to find out sooner rather than later. Certainly we would say to you and your constituencies that if there is a problem with lack of feedback, we would like to know about that. Mr. Gianforte. Okay, good. And just to follow on a question that the Chairman asked about this Section 203 and 204 delegation authority that you have to allow you to use private- sector firms to do either feasibility or construction, you mentioned that maybe you haven't used it quite as much as you could have. When can you use it? Is it applicable--is it your understanding that Congress has given you the authority to use Section 203 and 204 for all potential Corps projects? Mr. Dalton. Yes, sir. I am not aware of any restrictions that would say we cannot use it on certain types of projects. It is just one of the things that we are looking at now, trying to use non-Federal entities to carry out some of the work that the Chairman mentioned that could take place that we started looking at this. So we have a handful of 203 studies that the non-Federals have taken on, as well as some 204s. Mr. Gianforte. And we have talked about the backlog of feasibility projects that have kind of gone on for decades. What criteria should the Corps be using to determine when to use private-sector firms? Because by your own testimony, you said that using this Section 203 and 204 would lower the cost for taxpayers and allow us to get projects done faster. That seems like something we all should be working towards. When should you be using 203 and 204? Mr. Dalton. What we wait for is a non-Federal to actually request or say that they have an interest in taking on a project like that. So the complexity associated with it is still the environmental requirements, because a 203 is provided to our Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, and if a decision is made to move forward with that project, now it becomes a Federal action. Mr. Gianforte. So I understand that if there is a private- sector entity willing to take on that delegation from the Corps, you are game. Mr. Dalton. For a feasibility study and construction. Mr. Gianforte. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. We will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Ross. Mr. Ross. Thank you, Chairman; and I thank the witnesses for being here and appreciate your testimony and presentations today. I happen to be one of the seven House members who represent the Tampa Bay area. Mr. Dalton, I want to say thank you to you and the Corps for, over the past few months, helping to secure new start funding for the Port of Tampa to embark on the Big Bend Project. I hope that when this is completed expeditiously, that it will be an example of a good example of a partnership. The Tampa Bay Port Authority has expanded tremendously, and in addition to cruise ports, cargo ports are doing containers, we have expanded with complementary ancillary rail for distribution of cargo. It is coming along. However, this has been going on for more than 15 years. I guess my first question to you, Mr. Dalton, is what can we do to advance the President's goal of finding ways to get project to construction faster? I know this is kind of piggybacking on Mr. Gianforte's question earlier. Mr. Dalton. There may be a number of things that we could do to move those projects along faster. The first is that we have to make sure that we have a completed design for those. So we are looking at the incentives. The Administration has introduced incentives and grants as perhaps ways that we could look to move projects along faster. We don't know what the fruits of that will be yet because it is something not yet tested with us, but we are looking at different means of financing projects because we think that is part of the key to move projects along faster than they have been. Mr. Ross. And, Mr. Strawbridge, how would you feel about that? Do you have any suggestions in addition to that to move these construction projects faster? Mr. Strawbridge. Well, one of the challenges that we face, Congressman, is when we advocate for us to execute on the work, the Corps says that is fine, but then we are responsible for the entire cost of the project. We don't think that is fair. What we are trying to do is help out the Corps in our district in the post-Harvey recovery environment. The Corps district, appropriately so, is focused on flood risk mitigation and flood control projects. Those are life-saving projects. We are saying let us focus on those projects that create more livelihoods, like the deepening and widening of the Corpus Christi Ship Channel, without us having to bear the entire cost of the project. Mr. Ross. There appears to be a lot of time spent in the planning and development stage, too much time. I guess my question is, is there a duplication of engineering and studying, and can that be consolidated in an effort to try to save time? Mr. Strawbridge. I believe it can be, sir, absolutely, I think through a separation or a division, a divide and conquer approach. Let the Corps be a regulatory and oversight permitting agency. Let us do the design, let us do the ---- Mr. Ross. I mean, there are protocols. There are standards in the industry, and I think what is important is that technology has advanced to such a degree that we ought to be able to do these preliminary development and engineering studies a lot quicker and be accepted from one agency to the next. Would anybody else like to comment on that? Ms. Mickelsen. We found that the Army Corps in the districts on the Upper Mississippi have been doing that now with ecosystem restoration projects, thinking the way you are doing, can we move parts of the design forward while we are on this planning part that we have kind of figured out, and it is going really well when they are doing that. They don't always do that, but if they could apply that metric to other projects, I am sure that would go well. Mr. Ross. I appreciate that. Back to you, Mr. Dalton. I also represent an area, or have in the past, of the phosphate industry. The last vestige of this industry is just right south of my district. Quite frankly, we are in a competing global market with this, and phosphate feeds America. I mean, it feeds the world with fertilizer. There is an issue about a CWA 404 permit, that it takes six to eight years for the Corps to issue it, but yet the state can do the same thing in three to four years. Is there any explanation for that, and is that something that could be resolved or expedited by consolidation of efforts in studies? Mr. Dalton. Congressman, I am not familiar with that particular issue and that permit. I will certainly go back and try to find out ---- Mr. Ross. Thank you. Mr. Dalton.--what is taking so long. One thing I would say here is that we would like to implement things like, for instance, design build, and you can add studies into those, as Ms. Mickelsen said. But the way we currently authorize projects, they are authorized in different phases. When we were down in New Orleans with the post-Katrina work, we issued the largest design build contract that Civil Works had ever issued. That was because we had funding up front, which means that you could actually start that project while you are actually designing it, or maybe in some cases finishing the study associated with it. You can't do that the way we are currently authorized for our projects. Mr. Ross. So it sounds like we can consolidate the design and engineering, but it all comes down to a function of funding to get it started. Mr. Dalton. In our case, it is also the authorizations. Mr. Ross. Right. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. I notice the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Mitchell, has arrived. He is a full committee member but not a subcommittee member. Therefore, I would like to ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to participate in this hearing. Without objection, so ordered. I will now recognize the other gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for 5 minutes. Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In Florida we have a really significant problem with Lake Okeechobee. There is a dike surrounding the lake that is at risk for failing, which obviously impacts the people who are close to there; but then also the fact that the Army Corps has sent billions of gallons of polluted water to both coasts of Florida. That has degraded the local environment and harmed the local economies. In fact, in 2016, there was a major algae bloom. It shut down some of the beaches for a time, really knee-capped the fishing industry and tourism. So we really want to solve that problem in Florida, and we have something now called the EAA Reservoir Project, and this is something that the officials in Florida have been working with the Army Corps on now for several years. In July of 2016, we had the Assistant Secretary of the Army say that the Corps was ready to start the project as soon as the non-Federal local sponsor was ready. So in the following legislative session, the Florida legislature passed legislation directing the local sponsor to expedite the project, setting aside $800 million for the state share of the cost, signed into law May of 2017, and the Corps obviously was aware of the state legislation because it was invited to participate in a committee hearing. It actually provided state legislators with information during that hearing. So non-Federal local sponsor notified the Corps of its desire to move forward with the project on June 26, 2017. At the Corps' request, the non-Federal local sponsor utilized the 203 process, which was authorized in WRDA from 2014, and it allows the non-Federal local sponsor to prepare a feasibility study on its own and obtain technical assistance from the Corps. They pay for it. The state of Florida tried to do that, but for months the Corps dragged its feet and would not identify the areas for which it would provide technical assistance. It was only within the past few weeks that the Corps has finally agreed to a scope of work, but the large majority of the project planning was done without the requested assistance from the Corps. What I would like to do is I have a letter from the South Florida Water Management District Executive Director, Ernie Marks. It has the timeline of the correspondence with the Corps. Without objection, I would like to enter this into the record. Mr. Farenthold. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. DeSantis. So my question for you, Mr. Dalton, is given the significance of this project to Florida, are you satisfied that the Corps has acted with the deliberate speed necessary so that we can forestall another season with these harmful discharges as soon as possible? Mr. Dalton. So, Mr. Congressman, Section 203 was not something, as I mentioned before, that we had utilized a lot in the past. So the guidance that we created was almost done at the same time the South Florida Water Management District submitted the request to do the 203. Our initial response back, I think, had more things identified that we could not do as opposed to what we could do. We have since looked at that and tried to turn that around. So it has been a learning process for us. I think we are on a good path now to implement Section 203, and we certainly are sensitive to the releases from the Herbert Hoover dike going out to the estuaries as not something certainly desired by anyone. Mr. DeSantis. So you think that the Corps now is in a position with 203 that you will be able to move more quickly in dealing with these projects? Mr. Dalton. I absolutely do. Yes, sir. Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Now, is the Corps prepared to act quickly upon receipt of the report on the EAA Reservoir from the South Florida Water Management District and get it to Congress within the 2018 WRDA cycle? We think it is very important that that be teed up for WRDA this year. If it is, I think that will be very beneficial to what we are fighting for down in Florida. Mr. Dalton. With that, I would have to look at the schedule and get back with you. The reason I say that is because the project goes from the non-Federal over to our ASA to make a decision before it gets to Congress. I haven't looked at that schedule yet to say whether it meets the WRDA 2018 schedule, but I certainly will do that. Mr. DeSantis. Well, I would request that you do that. And I would also request that if it doesn't, that we take some steps to get that done, because if we can get it in 2018 WRDA, I think we are going to be in a much better position to be able to solve this problem, which I know you guys are interested in solving because you are sick of hearing us talk about it, and I know people down in Florida want to solve it. So if you can look at it, figure out where we are, and if we are not where we need to be, let's get it to where we need to be so we can get it in this cycle. I think that would be very, very important for Florida, and I thank you for your consideration. I yield back. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. I will now recognize the gentleman from Michigan for 5 minutes. Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank the committee members for their acceptance of my participation here today. The reason I came for this hearing is a significant issue in Michigan in my area and in this country is the Soo Locks. The reality is that the extent of the cargo that goes through the Soo Locks, the economic impact on this country is huge. At this point in time, 90 percent of the tonnage that transits the Soo Lock goes to the Poe Lock. I would have to look here. The Poe Lock was opened in 1969. In 1986, Congress authorized the building of a new, an additional 1,200-foot lock for redundancy and some resiliency to avoid the issues that are created should the Poe Lock have an issue. Thus far, surprisingly, or I guess disappointingly, nothing has happened on that. Mr. Weakley, you expressed some concerns in your testimony about the economic analysis being done by the Army Corps. Could you highlight for me just the key components of that briefly so we can continue on with questions, sir? Mr. Weakley. Yes, sir. Briefly, I will break it down into two areas. One is what I call comparison of the construction costs, and the other is the lock inflation. So what the Corps is doing in their analysis is they are comparing the full lock costs to one-third of the rail construction costs. What they should do is compare the full cost of constructing a lock with the full cost of constructing a rail alternative. Mr. Mitchell. Well, my understanding is a rail alternative is somewhere between $6 and $10 billion, depending on how much we have to project in terms of being carried on a rail line, because there isn't adequate rail coverage in that area. Is that correct? Mr. Weakley. Yes, sir. We have heard an estimate range from $4 to $10 billion from the Corps' economist, but the Corps has a contractor that estimated the cost at $6.5 billion for the rail alternative. Mr. Mitchell. Let me stop you there real quick. Mr. Dalton, could you explain this to me? I mean, my background is economics and public policy. Why is it that the Army Corps would say we are only going to consider a third of what the acknowledged numbers are as we compare the economic viability of building another lock? Could you explain that to me? Mr. Dalton. Probably, sir, not to your satisfaction, because it is one of those areas, quite honestly, talking with the economist, that I have a similar question to try and understand. We recognize to replace the lock it is somewhere between $4 and $10 billion. And the $2 billion that is currently being used, my understanding of that is looking to see if, in fact, you had to use transportation to move, in the absence of the lock, that part of this cost would be accepted by or handled by what you have in reserve at storage yards, spare capacity I would say. Mr. Mitchell. Let me stop you, Mr. Dalton. Have you ever been to the Soo Locks? Mr. Dalton. I have. Yes, sir. Mr. Mitchell. Have you looked to see if any storage capacity is there? I am from Michigan, as you know, and I am trying to figure out how they think we are going to stack up-- let me stop for a second. Mr. Weakley, between the two of you, have you looked at the economic impact should the Poe Lock go down for any period of time? What is the economic impact? Mr. Weakley. Eleven million Americans will be unemployed, and those layoffs will begin within two weeks of a long-term outage. Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dalton, how have you considered that in your economic analysis, or the Army Corps? How is that computed into the economic analysis? Mr. Dalton. I will have to take a look to give you a more complete answer on the economics associated with it and how we are doing the economic analysis. What I would say is that the questions that Mr. Weakley are bringing up is something that we are also questioning within the Corps of Engineers, taking a look at that economics. A validation report is actually being done. I think you mentioned that you just found out a couple of weeks ago or so that, in his words, there is a fatal flaw. So we will take a look at that. I will take a look at that. Mr. Mitchell. I suggest that considering a third of the cost of putting in the rail infrastructure, never mind the delay in doing that because it does not currently exist--if you look at the DHS report, they indicate the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis in the case that there is not sufficient rail infrastructure at the Soo Locks to address the issue if the Poe Lock fails, if it shuts down for any period of time. As Mr. Weakley says, the reality is we will lose 11 million jobs within two weeks, or start losing them within two weeks of the Soo Locks coming down. So I am trying to figure out how--I would like to ask, if you would, sir, that you gather some of your economists who think that they have done a good job here. I would ask my staff to get with you. I want them to wander over. Please tell them I am an economist. I would love to talk to them about what the numbers are, because I think they fall far short of addressing the economic impact of Soo Locks, and the delay is now unacceptable to get the lock, an additional 1,200-foot lock built. We have now reached a point where we can no longer tolerate this kind of risk. Mr. Dalton. Yes, sir. Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. I have a few more questions, so we will do a second round of questions, but it doesn't look like it is going to take too long. I want to start off and talk a little bit about the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. Years ago, Congress set up a user fee for funding the maintenance of our harbors, rivers, and the like. Unfortunately, that money does not all go to harbor maintenance. In fact, our appropriations committee has taken quite a bit of that back and is spending it on other things. Mr. Weakley, I have heard from folks within your industry that they would even be willing to see an increase in that user fee if the money were actually devoted for what they were told it was going to be devoted for in the beginning. Is that accurate within the industry? Mr. Weakley. Yes, sir, not just from the Great Lakes perspective but nationwide. We led a coalition called the RAMP Coalition, Restore America's Maritime Progress, to free up some of that trust fund, to set our trust fund free. Since 1986, that trust fund has accumulated over $9 billion in excess collections. It spends about half of what it takes in, although I will say within the past couple of years, thanks to congressional intervention, more of that is being spent, although we are still significantly less than the revenues it takes in on an annual basis. Mr. Farenthold. Do any of the other members of the panel have any suggestions for ways the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund can be improved or better used? Mr. Strawbridge. Certainly, Congressman, a mandate that it be used for what it is collected for would be a good start. I know the American Association of Port Authorities, of which the Port of Corpus Christi Authority is a member, has taken a formal position in that regard, and we support the AAPA's position on the HMT. Mr. Farenthold. So, when I came into Congress, one of the things we did was ban earmarks. In the past, a lot of these big projects were actually funded with congressional earmarks. What sort of change have you seen, Mr. Strawbridge-- and I will ask Ms. Mickelsen the same question-- since the earmark ban? Has it been good? Bad? Indifferent? Mr. Strawbridge. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, infrastructure in this country, for the most part, prior to the abolition of earmarks in 2010, much of the infrastructure in this country was built on earmarks. And in the absence of earmarks, I think the unintended consequence is that infrastructure projects take much longer and have much less funding associated with them. We certainly see that at the Port of Corpus Christi. Twenty-eight years to get us to where we are today, and we still have not turned ---- Mr. Farenthold. Is it a dollars and cents or timing issue, or both? I notice you have the Federal share on the Port of Corpus Christi is over $100 million. You have about 10 percent of it this year, and basically you are just hoping you continue to get that stream. Mr. Strawbridge. Well, it is actually over $200 million. The Federal portion today is $225 million. Our portion is $102 million. We have worked hard to raise our money. We have our money ready to go, and it has only been in the last month that we were included in the President's budget. That still is not an approved budget, so we don't know what the actual appropriation will be. But if it goes in that same drips and drabs, this project will take over another decade to execute on. That would be nearly 40 years from the time Congress mandated we first study this project to actual execution. Mr. Farenthold. I am not a dredging expert, but I would imagine to dredge the--how long is the ship channel? Mr. Strawbridge. We have 29 miles of ship channel that are ---- Mr. Farenthold. I imagine it doesn't take 10 years to dredge that. So you have cost associated with getting the dredge out there, dredging a few miles of it, and see you next year. Mr. Strawbridge. That is exactly right. In the absence of those targeted funds, the Corps will only contract for what has been appropriated. We believe that this contract, unconstrained by funding, we could execute on the entire project in four years or less. Mr. Farenthold. Do you think it would be cheaper? Mr. Strawbridge. Certainly. Mr. Farenthold. Ms. Mickelsen, do you have anything to weigh in on the topic? Ms. Mickelsen. Yes, I do. I agree completely that it would be less expensive. I think the ban on earmarks has had the opposite effect on what we wanted. Maybe it is taking a re-look at earmarks. But it has prevented us from doing really important work. For example, the navigation ecosystem sustainability program, we have it authorized, we have it ready, but it depends on a congressional earmark. And instead of having a public forum on what our nation's priorities for funding are, we are depending on biases within the administration, within OMB or the Corps, and you have to try to inform all those levels, whether it is the districts, the division headquarters and OMB, and then you are relying on these cost/benefit analyses that are not reflective of the actual infrastructure needs. So it is a big problem, and it is affecting the Corps' budget. The Corps is set up as a line item. Any line item budget, whether it is going to a district or whether it is a completely regional program with national benefits. Mr. Farenthold. Great. Ms. Plaskett, do you have some more questions? Ms. Plaskett. Sure. One of the things I wanted to go back to, Mr. Dalton, when we talked about the responses and some of the projects that you are working on, can you talk with me a little bit about the hurricane season that is going to be coming up on us? It is less than three months away. Almost all climate scientists agree that this change is happening. I have seen reports that say that this hurricane season is going to be as severe or more severe than last year's. Has the Army Corps had meetings with other Federal agencies to coordinate plans and make other preparations for the possibility of what the season may look like? Mr. Dalton. Yes, Congresswoman. What typically happens with us as hurricane season approaches is we have tabletop exercises with other Federal agencies. FEMA is often the lead for this collaboration. We talk about what we think, the possibilities of what could happen. We look at resources. One of the things that the Corps typically does is ensure that we include all of our districts or divisions and not just those that might be in affected areas, probably for the obvious reasons, because those in affected areas are not ones that we can count on immediately following an event. Ms. Plaskett. But when you have the tabletops to go through how you respond, do you include those people from those areas? Mr. Dalton. We include local, like flood control ---- Ms. Plaskett. I don't know, because I know one of your problems with the blue roof was that you didn't know how to find addresses in the Virgin Islands, and that is why you couldn't get to them. So are people involved who can present to you the issues that may be unique to an area so that you can address those on the tabletop? Mr. Dalton. We do include some members of the community, mostly from the emergency offices, EOCs. But I will certainly take a look to see if we should have done more than what we did, obviously, from what you are saying. Ms. Plaskett. Okay. Thank you. And, Mr. Weakley, in your testimony, I wanted to know how you experienced communication issues working with the Army Corps division and headquarters. Mr. Weakley. Well, I will tell you that at the district level it has been outstanding. At the division level it hasn't been as good as the districts. To Mr. Dalton's credit, we met with him personally. In fact, he set up the dispute resolution meeting, and that is where we discovered the two fatal flaws. What I have learned through my experience is that it is kind of incumbent on us to knock on the door, and to the Corps' credit the door is usually opened and answered. Ms. Plaskett. And is that door open at the local level, or is it at the regional or headquarters? Where do you find that it is easier to get that done? Mr. Weakley. To be frank, it is open at all levels, but the closer we are to Sault St. Marie, Michigan, the better they understand it, the more supportive they are. At the division level there is a significant drop-off. At the headquarters level there is a marginal drop-off. Ms. Plaskett. Sure. Mr. Strawbridge, what has been your experience? Mr. Strawbridge. At the district level I think our relationship is good. We also have Corps personnel in Corpus Christi itself. One of the challenges we see, though, is the billet for the commander at the district, it is a three-year billet, and usually the commanders that are put in that, it is their last billet before retirement. We see that that three years is probably not enough, not a long enough billet to get the things done that we need done. We need more leadership, consistent leadership at the district level. We have seen a marked improvement in our relationship at headquarters, and frankly we have had to go to headquarters to get guidance because we just don't get the responsiveness that we need at the local or regional level. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. Ms. Mickelsen, you were shaking your head yes. So you would agree as well? Ms. Mickelsen. I would agree as well that we often have to go to headquarters to get resolution on issues, and I think most of that is because, from our perspective, that is where the decision-making happens, and that influences what districts are able to do. We have also seen that rivers are complicated and these issues are complicated, and once we get district commanders and division commanders that are two to three years in that get it and understand the need for it ---- Ms. Plaskett. When they finally get it, then they have to go. Ms. Mickelsen.--then they have to go. Ms. Plaskett. And then the indemnification, I know you had concerns with that. Ms. Mickelsen. Yes, substantial concerns with that. Our states will not sign on to agreements if that indemnification clause is in there. I think it is an additive to also being in perpetuity, which is not in law; that was a Corps decision. Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. And you were talking about disaster relief, Ms. Plaskett. I do have a couple more questions along those lines. I think you might find these useful for your situation in the USVI as well. Mr. Dalton, in your opinion, should fully authorized Corps projects located in disaster-prone areas be prioritized and fully funded to have the work begin immediately? Mr. Dalton. I think any time we identify a risk to the public, and in most cases those projects you are referring to would be risk to the public, I think, yes, they should be fully funded and prioritized to reduce public risk. Mr. Farenthold. And do you think the $96 billion backlog of Corps projects, not including the disaster recovery projects like Harvey, Irma and Maria, affect the Corps' ability to assist Texas, Florida, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico in their recovery efforts? I mean, do you all just have too much on your plate? Mr. Dalton. I don't know each one of those $96 billion projects, but I would say most of those projects are projects that affect, or at least at one time, when they were authorized, affected the public safety. We are looking at those projects to determine which ones of those we should actually probably de-authorize, if any, because of the age of them, and maybe circumstances have changed. But I would say the majority of those projects are life safety related. Mr. Farenthold. All right. And along those same lines, during Hurricane Harvey there was a great deal of flooding in Houston, and there has been quite a bit of publicity associated with the releases of water from the Addicks and Barker reservoirs that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is involved with. We have talked about it a lot in the media, but could you give us a brief synopsis from the Corps perspective of what happened there? Mr. Dalton. Addicks and Barker are a couple of dams that were put in place to reduce the risk to Houston, downstream Houston. So when those projects were first, I believe, constructed, there was not the development upstream of the projects that exists today. So we have identified or had identified real estate that was in the flood pool of Addicks and Barker, but over time the development occurred. I believe that people were not notified properly that they were in an area that would be inundated depending on what the flood risk situation was, or the flooding was within the Addicks and Barker reservoirs. So in many cases, I don't think people knew that they were living ---- Mr. Farenthold. Do you know whose responsibility it was to notify them? Mr. Dalton. I think it was the real estate agent's responsibility to notify them, that they sold the homes and they were at one time identified as being in a flood pool. Mr. Farenthold. When you all decided you were going to have to release the water, how did you all communicate that to the folks beforehand? How long, and can you talk about that process? This hearing is about communications. From what I hear from my friends in Houston, my colleagues who represent Houston, they were not given a lot of notice about that and it really caused some problems. Mr. Dalton. So, Mr. Chairman, as you know, that whole issue right now is in litigation. So ---- Mr. Farenthold. You have to be careful what you say, I guess. Mr. Dalton. Absolutely. But from what I understand, and we have had conversations with our folks locally, is that there had been communications with the local emergency management officials, not necessarily directly with the public, but that is who we normally communicate with. Mr. Farenthold. I have about a minute left, Mr. Dalton. What would you like the public specifically in Houston to understand about the decision the Corps made with respect to those water releases and the choices the Corps made about communicating with them? Mr. Dalton. Right now, the Corps was in a place to where in order to operate those projects to do what they were intended to do, which was to reduce flood risk to Houston, we actually held water within the operations requirements of those dams, and you get to a point where you start having overflow going around through the spillway. If we didn't release water to Houston or contained it, the water would be released anyway. So at that point, those projects, the capacity of those projects was probably just simply exceeded. Mr. Farenthold. All right. Thank you very much. Did you have anything else, Ms. Plaskett? [No response.] Mr. Farenthold. I would like to thank our witnesses for being here. I think we had a very productive conversation. You have given us some thoughts on ways we can reform the process. This is the Oversight and Reform Committee. Several of us on this committee, or subcommittee, also serve on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which is also involved in this project, and we will make sure the appropriate folks on that committee are able to review the testimony and the transcript of today, and hopefully we will be able to make a difference from this hearing. Again, thank you all for being here. The hearing record will remain open for two weeks for any members to submit written opening statements or questions for the record. I would appreciate you all responding to any of the questions we forward your way. If there is no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]