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- OVERVIEW OF 16 YEARS OF INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN [House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] OVERVIEW OF 16 YEARS OF INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ NOVEMBER 1, 2017 __________ Serial No. 115-43 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://oversight.house.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 28-070 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California Will Hurd, Texas Jimmy Gomez, California Gary J. Palmer, Alabama James Comer, Kentucky Paul Mitchell, Michigan Greg Gianforte, Montana Sheria Clarke, Staff Director Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director William McKenna, General Counsel Brick Christensen, Senior Military Advisor Kiley Bidelman, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on National Security Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Ranking Minority Member Justin Amash, Michigan Val Butler Demings, Florida Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Peter Welch, Vermont Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Mark DeSaulnier, California Jody B. Hice, Georgia Jimmy Gomez, California James Comer, Kentucky Vacancy C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on November 1, 2017................................. 1 WITNESSES The Hon. John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Oral Statement............................................... 4 Written Statement............................................ 6 APPENDIX SIGAR reports submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch... 46 SIGAR Memo regarding Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Data Classified or Restricted for SIGAR's October 2017 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, submitted by Inspector General Sopko........................................ 47 August 22, 2017, Washington Post article titled, ``Here are Six Costly Failures from America's Longest War. No. 1: Cashmere Goats'' submitted by Mr. Duncan................................ 58 OVERVIEW OF 16 YEARS OF INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN ---------- Wednesday, November 1, 2017 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Duncan, Gosar, Foxx, Hice, Comer, Lynch, Welch, Demings, and DeSaulnier. Also Present: Representatives Massie, Jones, and Issa. Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. I appreciate the members accommodating the 10:30 start. It is supposed to follow a tax reform unveil, but I would note for the record that the mysterious tax reform bill is still not unveiled to us, so we are waiting breathlessly for that. I note the presence of our colleague, Mr. Issa from California. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Issa be allowed to fully participate in today's hearing. Without objection, it is so ordered. On September 11, 2001, radical Islamic terrorists attacked our country and killed thousands of innocent men, women, and children. These terrorists, aided and abetted by the Taliban, used Afghanistan as a safe haven and refuge. These terrorists spent years in Afghanistan plotting, waiting for the chance to strike us at home. Throughout the 1990s, the American people watched as the United States suffered terrorist attacks in New York City at the Khobar Towers, at our embassies in East Africa, and against our USS Cole. The failure to act in the run-up to 9/11 emboldened Al Qaeda to attempt a far more devastating attack. By 9/11, 2001, Afghanistan had become a jihadis' paradise and a useful staging ground for Al Qaeda's malevolent designs. American forces responded to the 9/11 attacks with a rout of both Al Qaeda and Taliban forces. Yet, today, after more than 16 years in Afghanistan, it is not clear that things are much better than they were after the Taliban first fell. Is Afghanistan on the brink of becoming a terrorist dream all over again? Are we making the same mistakes over and over again? Should we be just done with this entire godforsaken place? Or should we be concerned that Isis now has a dangerous affiliate, ISIS-K, in Afghanistan that aspires to reach out and strike the U.S. homeland? How do we get this right? Or can we? We are here today to explore whether or not the United States has adapted to the hard lessons we have learned in this long war. We are also holding this hearing today to follow up on a number of projects this committee has investigated over the past several years. It is important to keep a spotlight on these projects and to make sure that our tax dollars are spent effectively and efficiently. Having served on Active Duty in Iraq, I want to make sure we get this right and ensure Afghanistan does not descend into chaos. Today, we are fortunate that before the subcommittee we have Mr. John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, to testify on the recent work his team completed regarding systemic corruption and waste in Afghanistan. He has done outstanding work to ensure our taxpayer dollars are well-spent. Mr. Sopko will also speak on the recent report about AWOL Afghan soldiers here in the United States. Thirty-nine of the 152 Afghans who went AWOL ended up being granted legal status. Twenty-seven were arrested or removed, and 13 are still unaccounted for as of today. These figures are deeply troubling, and I am interested to hear how this happened. I had a chance to sit down with Mr. Sopko last week, and I can tell you that he is a dedicated public servant who has fought corruption and waste for decades. We value your time and appreciate all you have done to help us in this endeavor. So I would like to thank him for coming and look forward to hearing his testimony. With that, I will yield to the ranking member, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for helping the committee with its work. Mr. Chairman, this is an extremely timely hearing on our ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan. I also want to thank the Special Inspector General Sopko for Afghan Reconstruction for appearing before us today to help this committee carry out its oversight mandate. The title of this hearing rightly notes that the U.S. has been at war in Afghanistan for over 16 years. This war has spanned a generation at a cost of about $714 billion, between $714 billion and $2 trillion in taxpayer dollars, and over 2,400 U.S. casualties. While our mission has narrowed to focus on train, advise, and assist of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, and our force levels have sharply dropped from a 2011 peak of over 100,000 to the current estimate of 9,800, it is just as critical that we have a clear strategy. This is why I requested this past June and then again in August with my colleague Mr. Welch that the Oversight Committee hold a hearing on U.S. strategies for Afghanistan and Iraq. Regrettably, the President's recently announced plan for Afghanistan fell far short in providing the details necessary to understand this purported new direction. He said nothing about how many more forces will be needed to carry out this mission or how success will be measured. Our forces need a clear strategy and guidance from their leaders, and the President's plan does not do that. Mr. Chairman, without a clear strategy and plan to carry it out, it becomes difficult to measure success. And our current mission to train the Afghans has been very difficult extremely difficult to gauge. For years, I have been seeking numbers of how many Afghan Security Forces have been trained, and for years SIGAR has had difficulty in getting those figures. This is because the training program was set up without much metrics, and they are still not in place today. A lack of information keeps us from conducting oversight, from knowing what we are doing right and what we need to improve. I would urge the President to bring to Congress a clear and detailed strategy for how he intends to get this mission done. This brings me to a disturbing development, namely the Department of Defense recent decision to retroactively classify certain Afghan National Defense and Security Forces-related force levels in Afghanistan. Members of Congress need to be able to get on the ground, hear from the Americans there, and see with their own eyes what is happening. As a Member of Congress and ranking member on the National Security Subcommittee, I have a duty, as does every Member of this House of Representatives, to carry out the oversight required by the U.S. Constitution. These kinds of travel restrictions that are in place currently are inappropriate and highly concerning. In addition, the classification measures have become much more tightly prescribed in terms of what Mr. Sopko and his team can report to Congress in an open forum. I will ask some questions about that to determine what information is being kept from the American public with respect to our progress or lack thereof in Afghanistan. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. DeSantis. I thank the ranking member. The chair notes the presence of our colleagues, the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Massie, and the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Jones. I ask unanimous consent that they both be allowed to fully participate in today's hearing, although I will be very lenient in accepting any objections to Mr. Massie's attendance. [Laughter.] Mr. DeSantis. But without objection, it will be so ordered. I am pleased to introduce our witnesses, the Honorable John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. He is accompanied by Mr. James Cunningham, senior analyst for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Welcome. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify, so if you can please rise and raise your right hand? [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. DeSantis. Please be seated. All witnesses answered in the affirmative. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your whole written statement will be made part of the record. As a reminder, the clock in front of you shows your remaining time. The light will turn yellow when you have 30 seconds left and red when your time is up. Please also remember to press the button to turn your microphone on before speaking. With that, the chair recognizes Mr. Sopko for 5 minutes. WITNESS STATEMENT STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SOPKO Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here to testify today. As you know, in my written statement, I discuss in the great details the findings, lessons, and recommendations of SIGAR's new report on America's 15 years of security sector assistance to rebuild the Afghanistan Security Forces. With the Afghan conflict in a stalemate, and with a new strategy for U.S. security sector assistance getting underway, the time is ripe for seeking every opportunity for improvement. In that spirit, I appreciate this hearing, which I think is an opportune time to look for recommendations for improvement. That is something I would like to offer to you today in my oral presentation. The first recommendation we have is how to utilize, better utilize and align, our capabilities with the needs of the Afghans. So the first things I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, is that DOD should establish and lead an interagency fact- finding mission to examine the Afghan Security Forces' current and future needs, and realign our advisory mission to ensure that the right adviser and units are partnered correctly with the Afghan soldiers and police. The second thing is we need to have someone in charge. So DOD and NATO should create designated leads for the Afghan army and police responsible for coordinating the training and advisory missions from the ministerial to the operational level. Now the Afghan special forces and the Afghan Air Force have proponent leads right now as part of a comprehensive team in place. That is one of the reasons why both of those forces are more successful than their peers, and we highlight that best practice in our report. The third thing is we need to learn from success. So with the introduction of more than 150 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters for the Afghan Security Forces, we recommend that you recommend that the Army should immediately reach out to the U.S. Air Force to capitalize on their best practices from their training of Afghan fixed-wing pilots. The fourth recommendation, sir, deals with the fact that our trainers in Afghanistan need help, and they need help back here in the United States. So we recommend that, to ensure persistent and comprehensive training while preserving institutional knowledge, we recommend that DOD create an element in the United States staffed with representatives from all of the military and civilian agencies who are specifically trained for Afghanistan as advisers to provide additional support to the training mission in Afghanistan. It is also critically important that those who are assigned view this as career-enhancing. Right now, such an assignment would be career-ending for many of our military and civilians. The fifth point I would focus on is we need to use NATO better. To optimize NATO's participation in Afghanistan, we recommend that DOD and NATO should thoroughly analyze Afghanistan's current advisory needs and each NATO country's capabilities as well as their limitations. We also need to better understand NATO's decision-making process and better synchronize our policymaking with NATO's force generation schedules. The sixth point I would like to make is we cannot forget the important role that State, USAID, the Department of Justice, and other U.S. Government and civilian agencies play in our fight in Afghanistan. To ensure an effective whole-of- government approach in Afghanistan, we must support not only our U.S. military but also the civilian agencies such as State, AID, and Justice, in their missions, which are highly critical for accomplishing our national security objectives there. The administration and Congress should ensure the civilian agencies have the resources they need to make important contributions to this mission. Lastly, most civilian agencies need to get out of the Embassy. In order to support the civilian agencies' ability to conduct their important work in Afghanistan, Congress should encourage DOD and State to immediately finalize an agreement that permits civilian agencies, including SIGAR, to travel outside the Kabul Embassy under U.S. military protection without second-guessing the U.S. military's well-established capacity for providing adequate security. Failure to increase freedom of movement for civilian personnel will hobble a whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and oversight, thus putting the entire mission at an unnecessary disadvantage. In conclusion, I would urge you that every minute the U.S. military has to fill in for a missing civilian agency is 1 minute that the military is not allowed to do their job. Thank you very much. [Prepared statement of Mr. Sopko follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. Mr. Sopko, how long have you been SIGAR? Mr. Sopko. It is going on 6 years. Mr. DeSantis. So how has Afghanistan improved and/or how has Afghanistan worsened in your time being the Inspector General for Afghanistan? Mr. Sopko. It is mixed, Mr. Chairman. The security situation has deteriorated dramatically over those 6 years. On the other hand, we have had some positive results. I think, in particular, the Afghan military, despite the loss of more casualties, is actually doing a better job. But they are up against very serious opponents. So it is mixed. I think the problem now is, with the new strategy, we really do not know what State and AID are supposed to do as part of that strategy. So we are still observing and hoping we can get a better idea on the new strategy going forward. Mr. DeSantis. Now you recently returned from Afghanistan. You got to meet, I think as you alluded to, a lot of the folks on the ground. If just the average American were to come up to you and say, ``What is going on in Afghanistan?'' what is that elevator speech you would give them? Mr. Sopko. It is a stalemate, and the big question is, is it a stalemate going down or is it a stalemate going up? And I do not have a good answer for that, sir. Mr. DeSantis. SIGAR's security assistance lessons learned report is very extensive. What would you say the bottom line of that report is? Mr. Sopko. The bottom line is the U.S. Government was ill- prepared to conduct the security sector mission. They did not understand the size and scope of what they were facing. Our normal security sector assistance is to a developed country. We are helping, let's say, the Turks with a new weapons system. We are helping the Koreans with a new personnel system. This was designing and building an entire military and entire police force. The other problem is we were totally misaligned in our capabilities with their needs, disorganized, did not fully understand and utilize NATO for the things that they could provide. And we have detailed a number of problems with giving too complicated systems, having military officers in the U.S. trying to teach police, having Air Force pilots teaching police, having people who know nothing about personnel systems teaching ministries on how to develop personnel systems. So that was the big problem that we found. Those are the findings and lessons of the report. Mr. DeSantis. So I think that you were able to brief this report to the administration during their Afghanistan strategy review. So does the new strategy announced by the administration reflect any of your recommendations? Mr. Sopko. Yes, it does. I cannot say we can take credit for that, but at least they agree with many of our recommendations. I think one of our recommendations is, for train, advise, assist to work, you have to drive it down below the corps level. So you have to get down to the kandak or below. That is one of the provisions. There are a number of other provisions. I think Mr. Cunningham maybe can give you more details. He participated in all the briefings. If it is okay, sir? Mr. DeSantis. Yes. Sure. Mr. Cunningham. Yes, sir. So we participated in that failure analysis with the chairman of the joint staff, General Dunford. One of the big things we talked about was the realignment of our advisory capabilities to the Afghan needs in the military and police. The current units that are going out were already in pre- deployment training prior to the release of our failure analysis. What we were told is that the new units will have the proper training going forward. We just have not yet seen that put into practice. So cautiously optimistic, but we do know our recommendations did go forward to both the Secretary of Defense and to the White House. Mr. DeSantis. Great. Mr. Sopko, how will we know if DOD and State have acted on your recommendations? And what outcomes can we expect to see on the ground if they follow them? I guess the issue is we have things being identified--I mean, do I have to hold another hearing? I mean, are we going to get a sense in the Congress in relatively short order that some of these changes are being made, particularly with the State Department, because I think there has been a lot of frustration with how they have handled some of this stuff? Mr. Sopko. I think there are some low-hanging fruit that you can pluck right now. And I think and I hope the administration will pluck those and, to draw out that analogy, press them into some good policies. I think I have touched on five or six of them. We can go into more detail on those. There are number of things that can be done right away, short-term turnaround. The simplest is have the Army pick up the phone and call the Air Force on the lessons learned, the best practices from training A-29 pilots. It was fantastic. But as far as we know, the Army has not even picked up the phone yet. I think things like that are just silly. This stove-piping is going to be our death. That is one of the things. And I am happy to provide and discuss, and I know Mr. Cunningham, who wrote the report, we can give you more of those examples of--these are fast turnaround things that you should be seeing the administration do immediately. Mr. DeSantis. Great. My time is up. I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to give you great credit for holding this hearing and drilling down on this issue. I really do appreciate it. Again, thank you, Mr. Sopko. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham, for your good work. Mr. Sopko, 5 years, going on 6 years now, there is an institutional memory that I think you offer us that is very, very helpful during our investigations. I want to talk about the limitations on your travel. So I have been to Afghanistan maybe a dozen times. I know that Mr. Russell and Mr. Issa and others here have been frequent flyers to Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other side of the border. In the past, we have had no problems getting into Lashkargah, Kandahar City. They put us in Strykers. We were able to drive right down to the Pakistan border, a place called Spin Boldak. So we have had wide access in our past oversight investigations in Afghanistan. But, of course, at that time, we had 100,000 troops or thereabouts, so the assets were plentiful. And we had great cooperation from General Dunford and other generals, going back to General Petraeus. What is the situation there now, in terms of your own travel? Mr. Sopko. Ranking Member Lynch, our travel has been restricted. Some of this is because of the point you make. We no longer have 100,000, 120,000 coalition forces. Part of it is also because of the problem with insider attacks. That is something I think even General Dunford recently spoke about publicly, that this is a serious problem. And I know President Ghani has tried to do something about that. My concern--and I will say this. You are a high-visibility target, sir, when you travel. When the chairman travels, even somebody as lowly as I am a high-visibility target. So you cannot use the restrictions on your travel the same for the average diplomat or SIGAR employee. But even with them, there has been a growing reluctance by the State Department to let the people go outside of the Embassy, even to the Green zone. I think the classic--I will cite you two examples, sir, and I do not want to take too much of your time, but one was the U.S. military wanted me to see an Afghan base and to see how they were protecting the taxpayers' dollars by setting up a system to protect fuel. I was to walk 100 feet with my staff with a U.S. military-assigned protection detail that goes over multiple times a day, and the Ambassador refused to let us go, even though General Kaiser and General Nicholson wanted us to see that. That is the problem. Mr. Lynch. Okay. I get the sense of that. I will tell you what, I am sure that this committee will be having codels over in Afghanistan fairly soon. If you could just, not now, but make a list of sites that you need to get out to, I have had great cooperation from General Dunford and Secretary Mattis, for that matter, in terms of travel. So maybe we can combine our resources and plan ahead and make sure you get out to where you need to go. Mr. Sopko. And, Mr. Lynch, the important thing is there is an MOU that was in place. Mr. Lynch. You are eating all my time. I am sorry. Mr. Sopko. Okay. Mr. Lynch. We are going to have to deal with that off-line. The other question I had was, so we have classification issues that were in place for the last 14 or 13 years, and now we have some new classification issues. What am I being denied? What is the American public being denied access to under the new classification regime? Mr. Sopko. I would ask to be made part of the record--we have a seven-page document laying out everything that has been classified. It is basically casualty, force strength, equipment, operational readiness, attrition figures, as well as performance assessments. That would mean, using the new test, it looks like the Afghans can classify anything that is embarrassing. So I have a list of reports here, that I think all of you have probably read, dealing with the Afghan navy that did not exist, dealing with the camouflage that did not exist, and dealing with an airplane that cost nearly $500 million that couldn't fly. Using the new test, I would not be able to tell you in a public setting or the American people how their money is being spent. So this is a slippery slope, sir, that we are now on. Mr. Lynch. Mr. Chairman, I would make a motion that we accept the reports offered by Inspector General Sopko regarding the effect of the new classification regime instituted recently. Mr. DeSantis. Without objection. Do you have copies that you can provide to us? Mr. Sopko. I can give you the whole list of the reports, as well as the copies. But I am happy to give you also this memo, which my staff prepared as to what specifically is now classified. Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Without objection. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the committee, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes. Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. I guess I have one basic question to begin with, and then we will take the discussion from there. First off, thanks for what you do, and I mean that with all sincerity. But what are the consequences of quitting? Mr. Sopko. That is hard for me to describe. The consequences for quitting in Afghanistan? Mr. Russell. Sure. Mr. Sopko. The administration's statement is that, if we do, the country will turn into a terrorist haven. Mr. Russell. Okay, and I agree with that assessment, and I think that ought to frame really everything, Mr. Chairman, that this hearing focuses on, because it will be very easy to talk about time, money, many other things, and we will hear from many members on that. But I am the only Member of Congress in this hearing that actually served in Afghanistan. What I would take exception to is the notion that the design of the military was not thought through. I would be happy to talk with you off-line about how it was designed, how the Soviet forces made a complete disaster of it, where they were not able to retain soldiers, they were not able to train them technically, which you have pointed out in the hearing today that we actually have had great success with that with special forces, with Blackhawk pilots, with a number of other things. There is a multitude of problems in the country, corruption being first and foremost, and everyone on this committee would agree that we need to try to curtail that. But I, sir, remember when large portions of the country were not even occupied by any central government. How many warlords occupy Afghanistan today? Mr. Sopko. Quite a few, sir. Mr. Russell. Where they are in total control of regions, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, maybe 40 percent of Kabul as they are turning it into rubble? How many warlords occupy Afghanistan today? Mr. Sopko. Sir, let me just clarify. We are not talking about ultimate success. As I said, I think there has been success. The report that we released had to do with the training mission and training ---- Mr. Russell. Well, let's visit that, because one of your critiques was that the police are not properly trained, and the military has no business training the police. Are you aware, sir, that when we first began the mission, that NATO took on, many voluntarily, the training of the police, which was welcomed? In fact, I was a delegate to the United Nations Afghan security conference in 2002 that met and discussed these very issues in Geneva, Switzerland, after pulling my jeans and shirt to try to get to Geneva out of a duffel bag after sitting cross-legged on a carpet in Afghanistan. But we understood the security issues there. And one of the problems, sir, was infiltration. They made a disaster of it when you had police forces coming in, goodwill, all of this, no vetting. And they said: Please come on in, and let's do this. We will train you to be police. If you go back and examine the blue on green incidents, most of them come from law enforcement, not the military. NATO, I agree, could be used better in that regard, but we have to look at the things for infiltration. And with regard to the Army not talking or cooperating, I find that very striking since most of our headquarters are fully integrated in the Armed Forces there on the ground. To point to this fact, you stated that the special forces have been quite successful and quite reliable. I would point out that the Army trained those, so they obviously know something about training to technical ability and giving all of that. I guess my point is this. While I applaud efforts on corruption, what is hard for me as a warrior for most of my adult life is it is always people sitting here talking to people sitting there pointing bony fingers with red faces saying, ``Why is this a failure? Why did this go wrong? We should quit. We should pull out.'' And I will tell you what. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I cannot be one of those today. I just cannot. There will be follow-on testimony that we will hear from our colleagues, and I respect that. But quitting is going to have disastrous effects. And the more that we feed this narrative that our Nation does not have the will and the resolve to get things done is part of the problem. Having been a warrior and veteran of several wars, I can tell you this, that when we have this confusing message coming from Congress and coming from others where: We are going to have commitment; no we are not going to have commitment. Oh, we are going to have a timeline; no, we are not going to have a timeline. Oh, we are going to be here for this long with this many troops; no, we are not going to be there for this long with this many troops. Does that have an impact on how the Afghans see resolve and commitment from the United States? Mr. Sopko. I do not know, sir. Mr. Russell. Well, I do. It has a big impact. Mr. Sopko. But, Congressman, let me just tell you, we support the mission in Afghanistan. The reason we issued the report is to try to draw lessons learned ---- Mr. Russell. And I favor that. Mr. Sopko.--and best practices. So we state the facts as we found them. I think you probably would agree in reading the report with 90 percent of what we found and what works. The whole reason we issue these reports are not to say ``gotcha'' to the military. And as General Dunford and others have been very happy, they confirm and help them in designing and implementing better programs for the future. So this report is not an attack on our military. It is not an attack on our mission, sir. It is trying to help the mission. Mr. Russell. And I am glad that you established that, because that is the foundation that we need to be on, and I am grateful for that. I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I am out of time. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes Ms. Demings for 5 minutes. Ms. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I echo the ranking member's comments about this particular hearing. I am definitely glad to see it. As a new Member of Congress, my first codel was to Afghanistan for the purpose of really developing a better understanding of the mission there and also the overall strategy. I also want to take a moment to commend my colleague Mr. Russell, as he leaves, for his service. I do think, as a law enforcement officer, a career law enforcement officer, our overall strategy and exit strategy is also very important. So thank you to both of our witnesses for being here with us today. Mr. Sopko, you said in the quarterly report to Congress from SIGAR notes that the military's retroactive classification of important information about the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces will ``hinder'' your work. I know my colleague Mr. Lynch spoke somewhat about the classification system, the retroactive classification system. Do you believe, and I think you answered in the affirmative on this, but do you believe that the American public should continue to have access to at least basic data on the Afghan National Security Forces? Mr. Sopko. Yes, I do, since they are paying for it. Ms. Demings. Earlier this week, the New York Times reported that Navy Captain Tom Gresback defended the decision to classify the information, saying that it was done at the Afghan Government's request. Do you think that it is an appropriate justification for DOD to classify previously unclassified information based on a request from the Afghan Government? Why or why not? Mr. Sopko. I do not because I believe in transparency, and I think the loss of transparency is bad not only for us, but it is also bad for the Afghan people. Truth, the Bible says that truth will set you free. I think somebody else said, ``But it will be uncomfortable in the beginning.'' And that is what I told President Ghani. ``Your people want to know the truth.'' Ironically, the stuff that was classified, you know, the Taliban know this. They know who was killed. They know all about that. The Afghans know about it. The U.S. military knows about it. The only people who will not know are the people who are paying for it. That is your constituent. That is every one of you who pays taxes. And I think the American taxpayer has a right to know how their money is being spent and whether it is succeeding or not. If you classify this, the only people who will not know what is going on in Afghanistan are the people who are paying for it. Ms. Demings. Has DOD provided you with any other justification for classifying metrics that were previously unclassified? If so, what was it? Mr. Sopko. The only justification was that the Afghans did not want it released. The second justification was a reinterpretation of some policy on classification, but they never gave us a copy of the policy. I think the other telling thing is that they will not identify who classified the material. Ms. Demings. Just last week, Secretary Tillerson visited Afghanistan with a heavy security detail and met with the Afghan President at Brigham Air Force Base, largely because of security considerations. How can SIGAR and congressional committees conduct effective oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan if personnel are confined to the most secure environments? Mr. Sopko. It is extremely difficult, Congresswoman. But as I said before, we are high-visible targets. The average USAID, DOD, SIGAR official is not that visible. But only if we have an MOU with the military providing us that protection or with the State Department providing protection can we do our jobs. And that can be done. And we had an MOU for 6 years with DOD, but now, we have been told, in 90 days, it disappears. Ms. Demings. What sort of support is SIGAR provided in Afghanistan by the U.S. military as it carries out its oversight responsibilities? Mr. Sopko. Actually, we have had great support from the U.S. military, and we still have great support from the State Department security officials. They have been very good. It is just a decision was made by the Ambassador there, and it may have been by main State, we do not know, to abrogate our MOU and not let us follow that through. That is the confusing thing, and we do not think that is really helpful to the mission. Ms. Demings. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. DeSantis. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan from Tennessee for 5 minutes. Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Georgie Anne Geyer, the very respected foreign policy columnist, wrote several years ago that Americans ``will inevitably come to a point where they will see they have to have a government that provides services at home or one that seeks empire across the globe.'' We all have seen very many articles, and there have been hearings over the years, which have described Afghanistan as the graveyard of empires. Backing that up, it was interesting to me, on September 4 of this year, a couple months ago, the New York Times international edition carried a story entitled, ``The Empire Stopper,'' which said foreign powers have tried to control Afghanistan since the 19th century. But the story had a very interesting first paragraph. It said, ``When the American author James Michener went to Afghanistan to research his work of historical fiction, 'Caravans,' it was 1955 and there were barely any roads in the country. Yet there were already Americans and Russians there jockeying for influence.'' Continuing the Times quote, it said, ``Later, the book's Afghan protagonist would tell an American diplomat that one day both America and Russia would invade Afghanistan, and that both would come to regret it.'' Michener wrote that 62 years ago, yet how true it is still today. Then, finally, I will refer to something that William F. Buckley, the icon of conservatism, wrote several years ago. He wrote it about Iraq, but it certainly applies to Afghanistan even more so. Mr. Buckley started out as a strong supporter of the war in Iraq, but before he died, he became a strong opponent. He wrote this. He said, ``A respect for the power of the United States is engendered by our success in engagements in which we take part. A point is reached when tenacity conveys not steadfastness of purpose but misapplication of pride.'' Let me repeat that. ``A point is reached when tenacity conveys not steadfastness of purpose but misapplication of pride.'' Buckley continued. He said, ``It can't reasonably be disputed that if in the year ahead the situation in Iraq continues as bad as it has done in the past year, we will have suffered more than another 500 soldiers killed. Where there had been skepticism about our venture, there will then be contempt.'' I can tell you that I do not really understand how any true fiscal conservative can be in favor of dragging this war on forever. We have been there 16 years. And I think it is a huge understatement to say that I do not agree with the New York Times many times or very often. But the New York Times editorial board on October 22nd, just a few days ago, published an editorial entitled, ``America's Forever Wars,'' pointing out that the U.S. ``has been at war continually since the attacks of 9/11 and now has troops in at least 172 countries.'' The board wrote that, so far, the American people have seemed to accept all this militarism but, ``It is a very real question whether, in addition to endorsing these commitments, which have cost trillions of dollars and many lives over 16 years, they will embrace new entanglements.'' The Times added that the Congress has spent little time considering such issues in a comprehensive way or debating why all these deployments are needed. So I do appreciate the chairman being willing to have this hearing, but it is very sad that we have allowed all these trillions of dollars to have been spent, and all of these lives that have been lost needlessly. I think it is very, very sad. And it is something that I think we are long past the time when we have should have gotten out of Afghanistan, and we should not keep continuing to drag this out. I would like to say, in conclusion, that, Mr. Sopko, I really appreciate the work that you have done pointing out the billions and billions of dollars' worth of waste over there. And I would like to ask unanimous consent that a story from the Washington Post dated August 22nd of this year entitled, ``Here are six costly failures from America's longest war. No. 1: Cashmere goats.''--and this story ran in the Washington Post. I would like to ask unanimous consent that this story be included in the record at this point. Mr. DeSantis. Without objection. Mr. Duncan. And I thank you for yielding me this time. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes Mr. Welch for 5 minutes. Mr. Welch. And I am sorry Mr. Russell is not here, because I, too, would like to pay respect for his service. I want to say to SIGAR that your office has been the ``just the facts, ma'am'' approach to what is happening to taxpayer dollars, and I believe that it has allowed those who believe the policy in Afghanistan is the right direction but it is not necessarily being implemented right, and those who question the wisdom of the policy, basic information about how so much of our spending essentially has evaporated or been transferred to Swiss bank accounts by corrupt officials in Afghanistan. So, Mr. Chairman, I really want to thank you for this hearing, because this office is absolutely essential, whether you take the point of view of Mr. Russell or Mr. Duncan about what is the right policy. Second, the questions about what our policy should be are not the responsibility of your office, so I just want to acknowledge that. Mr. Sopko. That is correct, sir. Mr. Welch. You are looking at where the dollars we have appropriated are going. Are they going into the mission or are they vanishing into thin air? Number three, I have major questions about our policy, and I thought Mr. Duncan had an excellent quote. This is not about our military. I have been to Afghanistan four times, and it is extraordinary, extraordinary to me, to see what our soldiers are accomplishing under extraordinarily, extraordinarily difficult circumstances. But the challenge for us, Mr. Chairman, is it is our job to give them a policy that gives them a shot at success. That is our job. When Mr. Russell is there as a soldier, he has to carry out the mission, but we are the ones that have to give it to him. So looking back at all the SIGAR reports, our dollars are being wasted in pretty gross ways, starting with shrink-wrapped pallets of cash being flown out of the airbase, starting with contracts to deliver water to our soldiers in forward operating bases that have to go through Pakistan and where there are firefights basically used as negotiating ploys by warlords that want to extract much more money in order to allow safe passage for that water to get through, to the recent episode of buying uniforms that had camouflage designs that are suited for Tahiti but not Afghanistan. So I really appreciate your recommendations, and they all make immense sense to me. And I would endorse those, and perhaps our committee could as well. But the fundamental question is the policy that is going to be advocated by the Congress of the United States and whether this thing is working at all. In your investigations, can you make some general comments about the reliability of accountability systems within the Afghani partners that we have, Mr. Sopko? Mr. Sopko. Yes, I can, sir. Basically, we have serious questions about most of the internal accountability capabilities. I actually had a conversation with President Ghani on that on my last trip, and he acknowledged that there are problems in certain agencies or ministries. We actually came to an agreement. He promised to issue a presidential decree giving us access to the internal books and records and individuals of all the ministries, so we can do an in-depth analysis of their internal controls. Mr. Welch. Let me ask one question on that. The last trip I took to Afghanistan, we had some of our Justice Department folks who were there, and they were teaching Afghan Government officials about how to detect corruption. And they had to stop that program because they were teaching people about how to detect corruption who became the people who then implemented corruption. Has that changed? Mr. Sopko. That is still a serious threat. And that is why there was an attempt to set up a vetted anticorruption unit of the Afghan police, their prosecutors and judges. And we are looking into that. The problem is that quite a few of those people were supposed to be polygraphed. They were polygraphed, and a good number failed the polygraphs. But we have never followed through with removing those people. So those are some of the questions that we are looking at. If you are setting up a vetted unit, by definition, you have to follow through with the vetting. You do not polygraph people and then let them stay when they fail a polygraph on corruption. Mr. Welch. I want to thank you and Mr. Cunningham for your service. I yield back. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, for 5 minutes. Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you again. I have the greatest respect for our Inspector Generals, but particularly those who operate in a combat zone, as you have for so many years. And it is interesting that one of the complaints you bring to us today, one of the very valid ones, is that you are not being given enough access in the combat zone to do your job. That is something, hopefully, that the committee can help right. Every Friday night for most of the year on HBO, Bill Maher, a very controversial figure, has his show, and he always has a section called, ``New Rules.'' ``New Rules'' always sort of mocks, if you will, some of the most egregious things. But let me just go through new rules for a moment. New rules: Should the United States Government have an absolute policy of not paying bribes or other corrupt things in order to get border crossings, including, obviously, the delivery of water that was just mentioned? Should that be something we will not do, period? Mr. Sopko. I agree with that. Mr. Issa. Okay. But we are doing it. We continue to do it in country after country. Isn't that true? Mr. Sopko. Sir, I only look at Afghanistan. That is a problem that bribes are being paid. But we try to look into that if we can and stop it. Mr. Issa. I know you do, but when I talk about new rules, this is new rules for the Trump administration. This problem did not begin with this administration or even the last administration. So one of the new rules should be that the convoys turn around, they report to us, and we deal with either Pakistan or Afghanistan and tell them that one of the conditions of our forces doing what we do for them is, in fact, that we do not pay bribes. We do not do it on the foreign corruption act. We should not have our vendors doing it in order to get their convoys to our troops. That is a fair statement under what should be a new rule, if you will. Mr. Sopko. I think the U.S. military is trying to enforce that rule right now. Under the current regime there as well as the prior one, I think they have been trying to do that as much as they can, using conditionality. Mr. Issa. Now you transcend two presidential administrations, the end of the last one and now this one. Mr. Sopko. That is correct. Mr. Issa. And it is fair to say that this one is less corrupt, at least at the top, then the last one, right? Mr. Sopko. Absolutely correct. Mr. Issa. So second new rule: We should not support a President, whether elected or not, that is putting hundreds of millions or billions of dollars into his and his family's pockets and tolerate that the way we did under the last administration. Fair? Mr. Sopko. That is music to my ears, sir. Mr. Issa. Okay. I am going through my lessons learned, because the argument of today is only really germane if it is the argument of the last 16 years that we do not seem to have learned. The last one, which I think is one for this committee, we are nation-building in dozens of nations, including many of them in Africa, every day. To be candid, the Peace Corps all the way back with John F. Kennedy was part of, if you will, shedding to a people what we know that is part of building a nation from the bottom up. Each President I can think of going back a long way has said they are not going to nation-build, if we are going to nation-build, let me ask you the most poignant question. You mentioned the problems of Active Duty uniformed military personnel trying to teach things which they are not particularly suited or trained for, correct? Mr. Sopko. That is correct. Mr. Issa. So shouldn't the new rule be that we develop capability either at the State Department and/or at the Department of Defense, presumably in the Reserve component, and/or somewhere else, that, in fact, finds the people around the United States or even outside, around the world, that, in fact, can be a productive part of nation-building? Mr. Sopko. That is absolutely correct, and that is what we are talking about in our latest report, sir. Mr. Issa. So if we are going to take away something after 16 years of--I call it the Groundhog Day in Afghanistan and Iraq, of being back at the same point that we were at previous times before we let things go awry, and now we are back fighting to a point at which we are hoping not to make the same mistake again, one of the most important things is we as a committee and we as a Nation must find a way to build those institutions, whether those countries want to fully cooperate or not, find a way to build those institutions. And that means we cannot continue to use the same people who, as well-meaning and hardworking as they have been, are not prepared or qualified to exit the country with the kind of skills--and that includes the United States military, if you will, the warfighter trying to be a trainer of mayors or bureaucrats. Mr. Sopko. That is correct, sir. Again, it is trying to align our capabilities. We are not saying we do not have the capabilities. The problem is they are not the ones we are sending because of the way the system was set up. And that is the low-hanging fruit that we can start doing. That is what we talk about, do this assessment. Find out what their needs are, and then come back and find out what our capabilities are, and then make certain the right people go to the right units in Afghanistan. Mr. Issa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Comer, for 5 minutes. Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sopko, thank you so much for being here. Thank you for the work that you do. That is so important to us in explaining the complexities of what is currently going on with this conflict and helping us determine a more successful future for this mission. I also want to make note that I am proud to represent the men and women of Fort Campbell military base in Kentucky. They have been deployed to Afghanistan countless times over the past 16 years, so this issue is very important to me and my district. My first question, in your testimony, you highlighted the challenge that politically constrained timelines pose to reconstruction efforts, particularly ANDSF readiness. I think it is clear that we need to move away from the previous administration's strategy of imposing arbitrary timelines and force levels that do not reflect the situation on the ground. That being said, I have serious concerns with the prospect of an open-ended conflict in Afghanistan that could drag on for another 16 years. So my question is, can you comment on how to balance the need to respond to conditions on the ground while still maintaining key benchmarks and goals for the transition to more complete Afghan security control? Mr. Sopko. I think that can be done, and part of it is being done but with oversight like this by Congress. Do not give open-ended funding. Do not give open-ended acquiescence to a mission. Calling people to task, whether it is at State, AID, or DOD, or the IG community, and tell them what it is. That is our biggest complaint, sir, is we look at metrics, inputs, outputs, and outcomes. And we find agencies that do not even know how much they are spending. But they can maybe tell us how much they have spent it on, how many shoes they bought, how many guns they bought, or whatever. But they do not know what the ultimate outcome is. And your job, I think, in Congress, if I can be so bold as to suggest, is to hold the U.S. Government agencies accountable, just like we are trying to hold them accountable in Afghanistan. But I agree with you on that point, sir. Mr. Comer. The next question, in your testimony, you also noted that U.S. security sector assistance channels in Afghanistan have been meandering and clogged until recently. Do you believe the Trump administration's new strategy is helping to remedy some of these issues? And what recommendations from your report do you think are most important to help improve our train, advise, and assist mission? Mr. Sopko. Congressman, can I defer to my colleague, Mr. Cunningham, who has done most of the briefings and actually helped write most of this report? Mr. Comer. Absolutely. Mr. Cunningham. So we have seen the new administration under General Dunford and Secretary of Defense Mattis actually embrace a lot of the lessons learned and key findings from our report. As I said, during the failure analysis, we were able to implement a lot of the recommendations in our report into that discussion. The problem is some of those recommendations are not being implemented today, but the next units going out is where we may see some change. One of the biggest problems we have is we do not have a deployable police capability that can operate in a non- spermissive environment to develop an Afghan national police force. The Department of Defense does not have an institutionalized capability, and the civilian agencies cannot operate in nonpermissive environments or high-threat environments. So we miss that capability, and that is something that needs to be discussed. The other issue we have noticed is that, at the ministerial level, a lot of the advisers are military uniform personnel who do not receive the pre-deployment training that the civilian advisers receive. The Minister of Defense adviser program run by the Department of Defense excludes uniform military personnel even though they are conducting the mission at the top. So, yes, I do think that there can be small steps done to realign the mission, and I know that they are under discussion. We have just not seen necessarily whether or not they are being implemented today. Mr. Comer. My last question, your recent report found that 152 Afghans went AWOL after traveling to the U.S. for training between 2005 and 2017. First, my question, can you explain why these soldiers are traveling to the United States in the first place? Don't we have training programs in Afghanistan? Mr. Sopko. Sir, the decision was made that they should be trained here. There was some training that you can only do here in the United States. I mean, that is just the way it is. I mean, I cannot really tell you specifically why certain of them were done here. Maybe some can be done back more in Afghanistan, but I think our capabilities were here. Mr. Comer. Has the government done anything to reduce these risks in the future? Mr. Sopko. Yes and no. The Department of Homeland Security was very receptive. The State Department refused to even consider one of our simple considerations, and that is maybe they should personally interview everyone who gets a visa in this program, and they just brushed that aside. That is actually something you could help us with. I think it is just ridiculous. They interview everybody else who gets a visa who comes to the United States. Now, we have identified there is a problem with Afghan military coming here. Over half of the people going AWOL in the United States are Afghans, so, obviously, you have a problem here. The State Department just brushed it aside and said we see no reason to interview them. Well, if it is good enough to interview them for other visas, why not interview them for this? Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair not recognize this the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5 minutes. Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is an extremely important issue here that we are talking about with the high numbers going AWOL. Why are there so many Afghans that go AWOL? What is the deal here? Mr. Sopko. We were not able to interview all of them because some of them have disappeared, but we tried to interview as many Afghans as we could and also talked to people back in Afghanistan and talked to other people. The reasons are mixed. Some of it is they are afraid to go back. It is a war-torn country, so stay here in the United States. Others, they were upset when they found out that to go back to their units, they would have to pay bribes to get their jobs back, and they refused to do it. Others, I think it is just the fact that they are here, and it is a good chance to stay, if they could. And they claimed asylum. Mr. Hice. Is there any national security threat? Because you did not mention that. Mr. Sopko. I am certain there is a national security threat, particularly, we have some people who just totally disappeared, and we do not know where they are. And the State Department has not been very helpful to the Department of Homeland Security in tracking them down. Mr. Hice. Why have they not been responsive to help track these individuals down? Mr. Sopko. I think you have to ask the State Department that. That is the question we have. Mr. Hice. Okay. Are there specific individuals we need to ask? Have you seen obstruction? Have there been individuals at State standing in the way of getting answers? Mr. Sopko. No, I cannot say that. I mean, it is the bureaucracy. Mr. Hice. Someone is running the bureaucracy. As you mentioned, we do not know who these people are. We do not know where they are. There is a certain number that are gone. We need to get a handle on this. Where at the State Department is the bottleneck? Mr. Sopko. We would be happy to brief you and give you information on where the bottleneck is, sir. Mr. Hice. Okay, I would like that. How much money has been spent, do you know, on training these Afghans here in the U.S? Mr. Sopko. I do not know offhand. Let me ask my staff. We do not have that number, sir, but we would be happy to get it. Mr. Hice. Could you get that number for me? Mr. Sopko. Absolutely. Mr. Hice. All right, I would appreciate that. Now you alluded to, a few moments ago, that it is just kind of the way it is, but is there a better way to train these individuals than to bring them back here to the United States? Wouldn't it potentially save a lot of taxpayer money if we were able to train them there in their homeland? Mr. Sopko. Well, Congressman, it probably would save money, but sometimes they have to do it here. I would actually cite one of the places where they do the training, and they have had few people skip town or go AWOL, is right in your hometown. It is at the Air Force Base Moody ---- Mr. Hice. Right. Mr. Sopko.--where the best place to train those pilots is in Moody, and this is one of the success stories we highlight. It is interesting, in that area, and I think it would be worthwhile to talk to the Air Force in Moody about why they are so successful in training those pilots and mechanics, and they go back. So that is one of the success stories. And I think there, they have to do the training there. Mr. Hice. Right, and I would agree. And I have been there, and I have seen what you are talking about. And it is a success story. I guess my thoughts are going beyond Moody and some specialized places where it is succeeding and the overall potential of a national security threat when we are bringing individuals here that we do not know anything really about. They are getting military training. They go AWOL. It sounds as though there is a significant portion of this program that could, wisely, be done in someplace other than the United States. Would you agree with that? Mr. Sopko. I think it is worth looking into. We do discuss that. But I think a first spot is just requiring in-person interviews for these military trainees by the State Department. Mr. Hice. And you are saying that is not happening. Mr. Sopko. That is not happening, and that is what the State Department refused to acknowledge as being helpful. Mr. Hice. All right. And did I hear you correctly moments ago, too, that this does happen with others but is not happening with Afghans? Is that correct? Mr. Sopko. Yes. That is what is so perplexing, because for every other type of visa, they do in-person interviews, but they do not do it for these people. Mr. Hice. So is there a specific policy where these individuals are waived from that particular part of vetting? Mr. Sopko. As far as I know, it is a policy of the State Department, not the policy of the Department ---- Mr. Hice. Just for Afghans? Mr. Sopko. I cannot speak beyond that, sir. Mr. Hice. Who can give me an answer to that? Mr. Sopko. I will have the staff who worked on it get back to you, sir. Mr. Hice. Please do so. Listen, again, I want to join my other colleagues in thanking you for the great work that you do and for your forthright answers here in this hearing. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes Mr. Massie from Kentucky for 5 minutes. Mr. Massie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sopko, thank you for your service in this capacity. I also appreciate your matter-of-fact answers. Can you give us the total tab so far for Afghan reconstruction since we have started in, roughly, 2012? If you want to round it off to the nearest billion? [Laughter.] Mr. Sopko. I should have that at my fingertips. It is $120.78 billion for reconstruction, and that is through September 30, 2017. But that does not include the $7.42 billion that is in the pipeline. That means it has been authorized, appropriated, but not yet spent. Mr. Massie. So the last time you were here 18 months ago, it was $113 billion, roughly. Now we are up to $120 billion, and you say there is $7.4 billion in the pipeline. The reason I ask that question is that stands in contrast to something we heard our President say, that we are fighting terrorism, we are not nation-building, in Afghanistan. It sounds like another $7.4 billion in the pipeline might go to nation-building. I noticed in our own budget, we are not cutting the money for ``nation-building.'' Something else that is a little incongruous that I would like to get out on the table here is I used to see pictures on the Internet of our soldiers standing in poppy fields, and I never reposted those because I thought they might be photoshopped, because I knew we had a war on drugs going on in Afghanistan that, ostensibly, we are eradicating poppy fields over there. How much have we spent, to date, eradicating poppy and in the counternarcotics effort in total in Afghanistan? Mr. Sopko. We cannot break it down to eradication. But altogether, in fighting narcotics, it is $8.6 billion. Mr. Massie. $8.6 billion. I know I asked this question 18 months ago, but I will ask it again. Has production of narcotics in Afghanistan gone up or down since 2002 when we started spending that money? Mr. Sopko. You know, I do not have the exact, going back to 2002. I can tell you from 2015, it has gone up 43 percent. Mr. Massie. Forty-three percent in 2 years, and we are still spending billions of dollars over there to eradicate poppy. I was at a town hall-type meeting this weekend in a factory in my district, and one of the attendees was a gulf veteran. He told me he has been standing in poppy fields and marijuana fields in Afghanistan. So now I know the pictures are real that I see. Those crops are there. He struggled, and I struggled, to try to explain to the rest of the constituents in the room how that could be possible. How is that possible that we are spending billions of dollars, and we can see it everywhere, yet it is not being destroyed? Mr. Sopko. It is possible for a couple reasons. First of all, it is very difficult because of just the security situation. But the second reason is we have no strategy. I have complained for the last 3 or 4 years, ``Where is the counternarcotics strategy?'' Just like we have no strategy for fighting corruption. You need a strategy. Then when you have the strategy, as the good congressman--then you look at inputs, outputs, and outcomes. You get metrics. We have no metrics. We have no strategy. Now, what concerns me is that General Nicholson or General Dunford testify that 60 percent of the funding going to the Taliban terrorists come from narcotics trafficking, and we have no strategy? Now, I think we all read in the press about how we focused on ISIS and their relationship to oil production, and we bombed the heck out of that oil production to cut off that funding source. Poor General Nicholson is trying to fight the Taliban, and no one is focusing on 60 percent of the funding going to the Taliban. Now, that is a serious problem. That is the proverbial elephant in the room. We are never going to win in Afghanistan if we do not focus on the whole narcotics problem. Mr. Massie. In my brief time left, I want to talk about what winning looks like, because I think there is also this public perception that stands in stark contrast to what I have heard from you and also from our Secretary of State recently, who I think is more of a realist here. There is this public notion that we have routed the Taliban, and if we leave, they will come back to power. Yet Secretary Tillerson says that, basically, we are fighting to have a better negotiating position with the Taliban and. Have we routed the Taliban? And when we leave, will they be gone? Mr. Sopko. I am under oath. We have not routed the Taliban. But I am not the best person to answer the questions on how well we have done on the warfighting. I do reconstruction. But, you know, I just have to be honest with you. We have not routed the Taliban. Mr. Massie. I yield back my time. Mr. DeSantis. The gentlemen's time has expired. The chair now recognizes Ms. Foxx for 5 minutes. Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the witnesses who are here today. Mr. Sopko, are you optimistic that the security situation will improve enough to allow your team out to survey and oversee the reconstruction efforts? Mr. Sopko. I believe the security situation will improve, and I believe, if the MOU with the Department of Defense and the State Department on security is written and is carried out, we will be able to get out, not as much as we would like, but we would at least be able to get out. Ms. Foxx. And what is your view on the President's proposed troop increase impacting your ability to conduct oversight? Mr. Sopko. I think it can only help, ma'am. Although most of the advisers in the troop increase will be on advising and training. We hope there will be an increase in what we call guardian angels, not only for them but also for others who need their protection. So we think it is a positive step. Ms. Foxx. And you have may have said this before I came in, but how has the DOD performed in the last year in getting facilities built quickly and at a much fairer price to taxpayers? Mr. Sopko. I cannot give an assessment on that yet. We are actually looking at that right now, and I cannot really tell you what the conclusions are. They are trying. Let's just say that. I think this military team here under General Nicholson has done more than anyone on trying to hold the Afghans accountable on corruption and other things. But I just cannot just give you an estimate on overall success. Ms. Foxx. Let me ask you a couple specific areas. What is the status of the Ministry of Defense building? Last year experienced some significant, lengthy construction delays. Could you give us an update on the status of that building? Mr. Sopko. Well, we made six inspection visits to that building and identified a number of deficiencies. And they accepted our recommendations, DOD did, and I think they have implemented, in that case, all of our recommendations. Ms. Foxx. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeSantis. The gentlewoman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Jones, for 5 minutes. Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate you holding this hearing. I wrote to President Trump on July 18 of this year asking him if he was going to increase the number of troops, to please come to Congress first and let us have a debate on the future of Afghanistan, since we all know we have been there 16 years. In that letter I wrote to the President, I noted that he had made 30 comments before he became a candidate and while he was a candidate about the waste in Afghanistan. I am just going to use one of four that I put in the letter. ``In 2013, you tweeted, 'Let's get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis we train, and we waste billions there. Nonsense. Rebuild the United States of America.'" That is just one of 30 comments he made about the waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan. The next sentence, I said, ``Mr. President, I agree with those remarks and so does the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, my friend and unofficial adviser, General Chuck Krulak. As he said in a recent email to me, no one has ever conquered Afghanistan, and many have tried. We will join the list of nations that have tried and failed.'' Mr. Sopko, I met with you many times officially and unofficially with other Members of Congress. When I listen to what you have shared today and what you shared many times before, and the waste, fraud, and abuse continues to go on, it is a tribal nation. Everyone who has ever been to Afghanistan, from the Russians to Alexander the Great and the British, have never changed one thing in the world. I know there are people who do not appreciate you and your staff and what you do, because many of them are in Congress, not here on this committee today, that would like to cut your funding. That was a story in the newspaper a year ago. This MOU issue probably is because they are dragging their feet, but that is neither here nor there. I do not know that as a fact. Because when the American people see the stories that come out from your report, every Member of Congress gets that same report, these stories, I have a handout, front and back, that I have a list of 50 stories about waste, fraud, and abuse that I give to my constituents back in the district. And I guess what I want to try to get to is that, at some point in time, someone like yourself, General Nicholson, if he is overseeing Afghanistan, has got to say to the American people: We have spent billions and trillions of dollars to rebuild Afghanistan, and we cannot build your bridges and your roads right here in America. At some point in time, this Congress needs to have a debate after 16 years and let us have a new debate on the future of Afghanistan, because I will tell you truthfully that at least 90 Members of the House, both parties, that were not here in 2001. I was here in 2001. And when I hear this waste, fraud, and abuse consistently for 16 years--I am on the on Armed Services Committee--it distresses me as a taxpayer. I have the Marine Base Camp Lejeune in my district. I have talked to Marines, Active Duty and retirees, who have been to Afghanistan five, six, and seven times. And they say nothing will ever change. That has nothing to do with the work that you and your staff do. You all are the truth-tellers. The problem is that Congress continues to pass bills that waste money over there, and we cannot even get a debate. So my last point, very quickly, if you are here 10 years from now, and I will not be here 10 years from now, would you be willing to tell the Members of Congress that the American people who are now financially broke as a Nation have done about all they can do in Afghanistan? I yield back. Mr. Sopko. Congressman, as you well know, and we have had this conversation, I do not to policy. I do process. But I do promise you, the first day I am out of this job, because it is not my job to talk policy, I am happy to publicly tell you what I really think about our mission in Afghanistan. But until then, it is not my job to do that. I support this committee, the chairman, the ranking member, for holding the hearings. I am a history buff. There is a famous quote by President Lincoln: Give the people the facts and the country will be free. That is what our job is. We give you the facts, and you as the policymakers decide whatever you do. I think Congressman Welch was very accurate on that. Whatever side you are on this issue, I just state the facts. You know, I am like the umpire. We had a ballgame that was last night. I am calling strikes and outs and whatever. Some people may not like me, but I am still supporting the game. And that is what my job is. And your job is to then take those facts and handle them appropriately. Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, the gentleman from North Carolina. I want to thank the witnesses. I want to thank Mr. Sopko for your service. I know you have taken trips over there. It is not an easy place to get to or get around. I think you have given us a lot of really good information. And we thank you for that. Obviously, there is some low-hanging fruit that we want to get to, both on the congressional side but also, hopefully, with the Trump administration. So the hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for any member to submit an opening statement or questions for the record. Mr. DeSantis. If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record Publicly published SIGAR reports can be found at https:// www.sigar.mil/AllReports/. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]