United States 116th Congress Status: Passed House 1 R cosponsors

S 178 — UIGHUR Act of 2019

Last action — Second cloture on the motion to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2652) not invoked in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 51 - 44. Record Vote Number: 207. (CR S6343)

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Bill Text

What changed in the latest version

308 added · 446 removed

Plain-language change summary

The amendment to the bill changes its title to the “Uighur Intervention and Global Humanitarian Unified Response Act of 2019” and shifts the focus from condemning human rights violations to addressing various human rights abuses by China against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities. Additionally, it updates the listed congressional committees involved, removing some and adding others. These changes clarify the legislation's intent and specify the committees tasked with overseeing its provisions.

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178 Referred in House (RFH)] <DOC> 116th CONGRESS 1st Session S.
178 Engrossed Amendment House (EAH)] <DOC> In the House of Representatives, U.
178 _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES September 12, 2019 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ AN ACT To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.
S., December 3, 2019.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1.
Resolved, That the bill from the Senate (S.
178) entitled ``An Act to condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.'', do pass with the following AMENDMENT:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:
SECTION 1.
This Act may be cited as the ``Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019''.
This Act may be cited as the ``Uighur Intervention and Global Humanitarian Unified Response Act of 2019'' or the ``UIGHUR Act of 2019''.
The purpose of this Act is to direct United States resources to address gross violations of universally recognized human rights, including the mass internment of over 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominately Muslim ethnic minorities in China and the intimidation and threats faced by United States citizens and legal permanent residents.
The purpose of this Act is to direct United States resources to address human rights violations and abuses, including gross violations of human rights, by the People's Republic of China's mass surveillance and internment of over 1,000,000 Uighurs and other predominantly Turkic Muslim ethnic minorities in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;
and (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China has a long history of repressing approximately 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni Muslims, particularly Uyghurs, in the nominally autonomous Xinjiang region.
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China has a long history of repressing Turkic Muslims, particularly Uighurs, in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
These actions are in contravention of international human rights standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
(2) In May 2014, Chinese authorities launched their latest ``Strike Hard against Violent Extremism'' campaign, using wide- scale, internationally-linked threats of terrorism as a pretext to justify pervasive restrictions on and human rights violations of members of the ethnic minority communities of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
(2) In recent decades, central and regional Chinese government policies have systematically discriminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial, among others.
The August 2016 transfer of former Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across the region.
(3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as a result of the central government's severe repression is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government of the People's Republic of China as evidence of ``terrorism'' and ``separatism'' and as an excuse for further disproportionate response.
Scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and think tanks have provided ample evidence substantiating the establishment by Chinese authorities of ``reeducation'' camps.
(4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their latest ``Strike Hard against Violent Extremism'' campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, internationally linked threats of terrorism were used to justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human rights violations against, the ethnic minority communities of Xinjiang.
Since 2014, Chinese authorities have detained no less than 800,000 Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other ethnic minorities in these camps.
(5) Those policies included-- (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across the region, including the arbitrary collection of biodata, such as DNA samples from children, without their knowledge or consent;
(3) Those detained in such facilities have described forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, and food deprivation, as well as denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told by guards that the only way to secure release was to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty.
(B) the use of QR codes outside homes to gather information on how frequently individuals pray;
(C) facial and voice recognition software and ``predictive policing'' databases;
and (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of movement across the region.
(6) Chinese security forces have never been held accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014).
(7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across the region.
(B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of government policy, including ``eradicating tumors'' and ``spray[ing] chemicals'' on crops to kill the ``weeds''.
(C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (traditional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in Xinjiang schools and universities.
(8) In 2017, credible reports found that family members of Uyghurs living outside of China had gone missing inside China, that Chinese authorities were pressuring those outside the country to return, and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained in large numbers.
(9) There is ample credible evidence provided by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and think tanks substantiating the establishment by Chinese authorities of ``political reeducation'' camps.
(10) Independent organizations conducted interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat Samarkan, Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along with others who had been detained in such facilities, who described forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement, as well as uncertainty as to the length of detention, humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told by guards that the only way to secure release was to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty.
Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018), Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip (2018), Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin (2017), and Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died while in the custody of the Chinese authorities in ``political reeducation'' camps, without proper investigation of the circumstances.
(4) Uighurs and ethnic Kazakhs, who have now obtained permanent residence or citizenship in other countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment from Chinese officials.
(11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now obtained permanent residence or citizenship in other countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment from Chinese officials.
At least five journalists for Radio Free Asia's Uighur service have publicly detailed abuses their family members in Xinjiang have endured in response to their work exposing abusive policies across the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
(12) Under pressure from the Government of the People's Republic of China, countries have forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the non-refoulement principle and their well-founded fear of persecution.
(5) In September 2018, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as High Commissioner the ``deeply disturbing allegations of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-education camps across Xinjiang''.
States returning Uyghurs include Egypt, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and India.
(6) The Government of the People's Republic of China's actions against Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, whose population was approximately 13 million at the time of the last Chinese census in 2010, are in contravention of international human rights laws, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, both of which China has signed and ratified, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed.
(13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia's Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their family members in Xinjiang have endured in response to their work exposing abusive policies across the region.
(14) Several United States-based companies are conducting business with Xinjiang authorities without sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure their business operations do not create or contribute to human rights violations.
(15) The Government of the People's Republic of China is increasingly investing in the ``Belt and Road Initiative'' across Xinjiang and throughout Central Asia, extending its influence through organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization without regard to the political, religious, cultural, or linguistic rights of ethnic minorities.
(16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, and individual members of the executive branch and Congress have all expressed growing concern regarding the pervasive human rights abuses across Xinjiang and the ``political reeducation'' camps.
(17) In August 2018, the United Nations Committee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged the Government of the People's Republic of China over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment of mass arbitrary detention camps.
(18) Between August and September 2018, Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by either flatly denying them or insisting that the facilities are ``vocational training centers''.
(19) In September 2018, newly appointed United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as High Commissioner the ``deeply disturbing allegations of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-education camps across Xinjiang''.
(20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington Post editorial board wrote, ``At stake is not just the welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the technologies of the 21st century will be employed to smother human freedom.'' (21) In December 2018 testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Scott Busby testified that the number of those detained in camps since April 2017 was ``at least 800,000 and possibly more than million''.
(22) In December 2018, independent media reports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have been released from camps being forced to labor in nearby factories for low wages under threat of being sent back to ``political reeducation'' camps.
(23) In December 2018 and January 2019, Chinese officials organized visits to ``political reeducation'' camps in Xinjiang for a small group of foreign journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western countries.
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In the months preceding the visits, international media reported that officials worked to remove security features from some ``political reeducation'' facilities, and coached detainees and area residents not to make negative comments about the camps.
Reports also indicated that officials had transferred large numbers of detainees to detention facilities in other parts of China.
(24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region as ``a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid'' and the repression in the Xinjiang region as a ``slow motion Tiananmen''.
(25) On December 31, 2018, President Donald J.
Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 105-409), which condemned China's ``forced disappearances, extralegal detentions, invasive and omnipresent surveillance, and lack of due process in judicial proceedings,'' authorized funding to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, and supported sanctions designations against any entity or individual that-- (A) violates human rights or religious freedoms;
or (B) engages in censorship activities.
It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the President should condemn abuses against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting damage of China's current policies, and immediately close the ``political reeducation'' camps, lift all restrictions on and ensure respect for internationally guaranteed human rights across the region, and allow for reestablishment of contact between those inside and outside China;
It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the President should condemn abuses against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities and call on such authorities immediately-- (A) to close the ``reeducation'' camps;
(2) the United States Government should develop a strategy to support the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous United Nations Special Rapporteurs' urgent calls for immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, including the ``political reeducation'' camps, and instruct representatives of the United States at the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United States to condemn the mass arbitrary detainment, torture, and forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the People's Republic of China;
(B) to lift all restrictions on and ensure respect for human rights;
(3) the Secretary of State should consider the applicability of existing authorities, including the Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law 114-328), to impose targeted sanctions on members of the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state security apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere;
and (C) to allow those inside China to reestablish contact with their loved ones, friends, and associates outside China;
(4) the Secretary of State should fully implement the provisions of the Frank Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114-281) and consider strategically employing sanctions and other tools under the International Religious Freedom Act (22 U.S.C.
(2) the Secretary of State should-- (A) fully implement the provisions of the Frank R.
6401 et seq.) and to employ measures required as part of the ``Country of Particular Concern'' (CPC) designation for the Government of the People's Republic of China that directly address particularly severe violations of religious freedom;
Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114-281);
(5) the Secretary of Commerce should review and consider prohibiting the sale or provision of any United States-made goods or services to any state agent in Xinjiang, and adding the Xinjiang branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang Office of the United Front Work Department, or any entity acting on their behalf to facilitate the mass internment or forced labor of Turkic Muslims, to the ``Entity List'' administered by the Department of Commerce;
and (B) should consider strategically employing sanctions and other tools under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C.
(6) United States companies and individuals selling goods or services or otherwise operating in Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public or financial filings, to publicly assert that their commercial activities are not contributing to human rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China and that their supply chains are not compromised by forced labor;
6401 et seq.), including measures required by reason of the designation of the People's Republic of China as a country of particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b)(1)(A)(ii) of such Act that directly address particularly severe violations of religious freedom;
(7) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appropriate United States law enforcement entities should track and take steps to hold accountable officials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate not only United States citizens and legal permanent residents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur- Americans, and Chinese-Americans, but also Chinese nationals legally studying or working in the United States;
(3) the Secretary of State should work with United States allies and partners as well as through multilateral institutions to condemn the mass arbitrary detention of Uighurs in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and coordinate closely with the international community on targeted sanctions and visa restrictions;
(8) the Secretary of State should work with traditional United States allies and partners to take similar steps and coordinate closely on targeted sanctions and visa restrictions;
and (4) the journalists of the Uighur language service of Radio Free Asia should be commended for their reporting on the human rights and political situation in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region despite efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to silence or intimidate their reporting through the detention of family members and relatives in China, and the United States should expand the availability of and capacity for Uighur language programming on Radio Free Asia in the region.
(9) the Secretary of State should appoint a United States Special Coordinator for Xinjiang, from officers and employees of the Department of State, who will coordinate diplomatic, political, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, counterterrorism, security resources, and congressional reporting requirements within the United States Government to respond to the gross violations of universally recognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region, including by addressing-- (A) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities;
(B) the deployment of technologically advanced surveillance and police detection methods;
and (C) the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism claims used to justify the policies of the Government of the People's Republic of China in Xinjiang;
(10) the United States Special Coordinator for Xinjiang position should continue until the mass surveillance and internment of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities has ended and all detainees released;
and (11) the full and timely implementation of sections 408, 409, and 410 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) is critical to demonstrating unwavering support by the United States for the universally recognized human rights of all ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities in China, including Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.
NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT.
UPDATING STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a report to assess national and regional security threats posed by the crackdown across Xinjiang, the frequency with which Central and Southeast Asian governments are forcibly returning Turkic Muslim refugees and asylum seekers, and the transfer or development of technology used by the Government of the People's Republic of China that facilitates the mass internment and surveillance of Turkic Muslims, including technology relating to predictive policing and large-scale data collection and analysis.
Section 901(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246;
(b) Annex.--The report required under subsection (a) shall include an unclassified annex with a list of all Chinese companies involved in the construction or operation of the ``political education'' camps, and the provision or operation of surveillance technology or operations, across Xinjiang.
104 Stat.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
84) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7), (8), and (9) as paragraphs (8), (9), and (10), respectively;
and (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
``(7) United States policy toward the People's Republic of China should be explicitly linked with the situation in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, specifically as to whether-- ``(A) the mass internment of ethnic Uighur and other Turkic Muslims in `political education' camps has ended;
``(B) all political prisoners in the region are released;
``(C) the use of high-tech mass surveillance and predictive policing to discriminate against and violate the human rights of members of specific ethnic groups is evident in other parts of China;
and ``(D) the Government of the People's Republic of China has ended efforts aimed at cultural assimilation and particularly severe restrictions of religious practice in the region;''.
PROTECTING CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM INTIMIDATION AND COERCION.
APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS UNDER GLOBAL MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY ACT WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees that outlines any and all efforts to provide information to and protect United States citizens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the United States, who have experienced harassment or intimidation by officials or agents of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Communist Party within the United States and those whose families in China have experienced threats or detention because of their work or advocacy.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of senior officials of the Government of the People's Republic of China who the President determines are responsible for or who have knowingly engaged in serious human rights abuses against Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in China.
(b) Database of Detained Family Members of United States Citizens and Residents.--The Secretary of State should explore appropriate mechanisms to establish a voluntary database to which United States citizens or permanent resident family members of the Uyghur diaspora can provide details about missing family members, with a view towards pressing for information and accountability from the Government of the People's Republic of China and to take appropriate measures to expedite the asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic Muslim minorities.
Such list shall include the following:
(1) Senior Chinese officials, such as Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, who are directly responsible for the ongoing repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
(2) Senior Chinese officials responsible for mass incarceration, political indoctrination, or reeducation efforts targeting Uighurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities.
(b) Form.--The list required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
(c) Sanctions Imposed.--On the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees the list described in subsection (a), and as appropriate thereafter, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 1263(b) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328;
22 U.S.C.
2656 note) with respect to any foreign person that the President has identified on the list.
(d) Exception for United Nations Headquarters Agreement;
Enforcement.--Subsections (e) and (f) of section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under this section to the same extent as such subsections apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under such section 1263.
(e) Waiver for National Interests.--The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under subsection (c) if the President-- (1) determines that such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States;
and (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees notice of, and a justification for, the waiver.
(f) Regulatory Authority.--The President shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry out this section.
(g) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.-- (1) In general.--The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this Act shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(2) Good defined.--In this subsection, the term ``good'' means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.
REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHINA'S XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that-- (1) describes the current status and reach of United States broadcasting to the Xinjiang region and Uyghur speaking communities globally, barriers to the free flow of news and information to these communities, and, if appropriate, detailed technical and fiscal requirements necessary to increase broadcasting and other media to these communities globally;
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies and civil society organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available on the website of the Department of State a report on human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
(2) describes efforts to intimidate Radio Free Asia and Voice of America reporters reporting on human rights issues in the People's Republic of China;
(b) Matters To Be Included.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
and (3) in consultation with the Global Engagement Center at the Department of State, describes and assesses disinformation and propaganda by the Government of the People's Republic of China or other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization targeting Uyghur communities globally and efforts to downplay gross violations of universally recognized human rights occurring in the Xinjiang region and any activities or programs that address these efforts.
(1) An assessment of the number of individuals detained in political ``reeducation camps'' in the region and conditions in the camps for detainees, including an assessment, to the extent practicable, of whether detainees endure torture, efforts at forced renunciation of their faith, or other mistreatment.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to commend and support the journalists of the Uyghur language service of Radio Free Asia for their reporting on the human rights and political situation in Xinjiang despite efforts to silence or intimidate their reporting through the detention of family members and relatives by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(2) An assessment of, to the extent practicable, the number of individuals in the region in highly-controlled forced labor camps.
(3) A description of the methods used by People's Republic of China authorities to ``reeducate'' Uighur detainees, including an identification of the Chinese agencies in charge of such reeducation.
(4) An assessment of the use and nature of forced labor in and related to the detention of Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and a description of foreign companies and industries benefitting from such labor in the region.
(5) An assessment of the level of access to the region Chinese authorities grant to foreign diplomats and consular agents, independent journalists, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations.
(6) An assessment of the repressive surveillance, detection, and control methods used by Chinese authorities in the region.
(7) A description, as appropriate, of diplomatic efforts by United States allies and other nations to address the gross violations of universally recognized human rights in the region and to protect asylum seekers from the region.
REPORT AND SEMI-ANNUAL BRIEFING.
RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT, REEXPORT, AND IN-COUNTRY TRANSFERS OF CERTAIN ITEMS THAT PROVIDE A CRITICAL CAPABILITY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO SUPPRESS INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY, FREEDOM, AND OTHER BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, after consulting relevant Federal agencies and civil society organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available on the website of the Department of State an interagency report that includes-- (1) an assessment of the number of individuals detained in political ``reeducation camps'' and conditions in the camps for detainees in the Xinjiang region, including whether detainees endure torture, forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment;
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to protect the basic human rights of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in the People's Republic of China.
(2) a description, as possible, of the geographic location of the camps and estimates of the number of people detained in such facilities;
(b) List of Covered Items.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the President-- (A) shall identify those items that provide a critical capability to the Government of the People's Republic of China, or any person acting on behalf of such Government, to suppress individual privacy, freedom of movement, and other basic human rights, specifically through-- (i) surveillance, interception, and restriction of communications;
(3) a description, as possible, of the methods used by People's Republic of China authorities to ``reeducate'' Uyghur detainees, as well as the People's Republic of China agencies in charge of reeducation;
(ii) monitoring of individual location or movement or restricting individual movement;
(4) an assessment of the number of individuals being arbitrarily detained, including in pretrial detention centers and prisons;
(iii) monitoring or restricting access to and use of the internet;
(5) an assessment of forced labor in the camps and in regional factories for low wages under threat of being sent back to ``political reeducation'' camps;
(iv) monitoring or restricting use of social media;
(6) a list of Chinese companies and industries benefitting from such labor, and a description of actions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang concurrent with the People's Republic of China's Tier 3 designation under the 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report;
(v) identification of individuals through facial recognition, voice recognition, or biometric indicators;
(7) an assessment of the level of access People's Republic of China authorities grant to diplomats, journalists, and others to the Xinjiang region and a description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor human rights conditions in the Xinjiang region;
(vi) detention of individuals who are exercising basic human rights;
(8) an assessment of the repressive surveillance, detection, and control methods used by People's Republic of China authorities in the Xinjiang region, and a list of individuals who hold senior leadership positions and are responsible for ``high-tech'' policing, mass incarceration, and reeducation efforts targeting Uyghur and other predominately Muslim ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region;
and (vii) forced labor in manufacturing;
(9) a description of United States diplomatic efforts to address the gross violations of universally recognized human rights in the Xinjiang region and to protect asylum seekers from the region, including in multilateral institutions and through bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China, the nations of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and other countries;
and (B) shall, pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C.
and (10) a description, as appropriate, of diplomatic efforts by United States allies and other nations to address the gross violations of universally recognized human rights in the Xinjiang region and to protect asylum seekers from the region.
4801 et seq.), include items identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) on the Commerce Control List in a category separate from other items, as appropriate, on the Commerce Control List.
(b) Briefing and Supplemental Materials.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary's designee, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees covering the subjects listed in subsection (a).
(2) Support and cooperation.--Upon request, the head of a Federal agency shall provide full support and cooperation to the President in carrying out this subsection.
At the time of each briefing, the Department of State shall provide unclassified written materials detailing the subject matters covered in paragraphs (1), (2), (4), (6), and (9) of such subsection.
(3) Consultation.--In carrying out this subsection, the President shall consult with the relevant technical advisory committees of the Department of Commerce to ensure that the composition of items identified under paragraph (1)(A) and included on the Commerce Control List under paragraph (1)(B) does not unnecessarily restrict commerce between the United States and the People's Republic of China, consistent with the purposes of this section.
(2) Termination.--The briefing requirement under paragraph (1) terminates 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Special License or Other Authorization.-- (1) In general.--Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall, pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C.
SEC.
et seq.), require a license or other authorization for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer to or within the People's Republic of China of an item identified pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A) and included on the Commerce Control List pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(B).
10.
(2) Presumption of denial.--An application for a license or other authorization described in paragraph (1) shall be subject to a presumption of denial.
REPORT ON SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE XINJIANG REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(3) Public notice and comment.--The President shall provide for notice and public comment with respect actions necessary to carry out this subsection.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, except as provided in subsection (c), submit to Congress a report that includes a statement of whether the persons described in subsection (b) meet the criteria to be designated for the imposition of sanctions under section of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-238;
(d) International Coordination and Multilateral Controls.--It shall be the policy of the United States to seek to harmonize United States export control regulations with international export control regimes with respect to the items identified pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A), including through the Wassenaar Arrangement and other bilateral and multilateral mechanisms involving countries that export such items.
(e) Termination of Suspension of Certain Other Programs and Activities.--Section 902(b)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246;
2656 note) because the persons-- (1) are responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in the Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China;
2151 note) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ``and China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region'' after ``Tibet'';
or (2) materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, such violations.
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(b) Persons Described.--The persons described in this subsection are the following:
(3) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``or'' after the semicolon and inserting ``and'';
(1) The Party Secretary for Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China, Chen Quanguo.
and (4) by adding the following new subparagraph:
(2) Senior full or alternate members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China whose professional responsibilities relate to the governmental administration of the Xinjiang region, or who have conducted business with government entities in the Xinjiang region.
``(F) the ending of the mass internment of ethnic Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, including the intrusive system of high-tech surveillance and policing in the region;
(c) Exception.--The Secretary shall not be required to submit a report under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines, not later than days after the date of the enactment of this Act, that the Government of the People's Republic of China allows independent, unrestricted, and unsupervised access to the Xinjiang region for international human rights organizations.
or''.
Passed the Senate September 11, 2019.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Commerce control list.--The term ``Commerce Control List'' means the list set forth in Supplement No.
1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
(2) Export, in-country transfer, item, and reexport.--The terms ``export'', ``in-country transfer'', ``item'', and ``reexport'' have the meanings given such terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C.
4801).
JULIE E.
Clerk.
ADAMS, Secretary.
116th CONGRESS 1st Session S.
178 _______________________________________________________________________ AMENDMENT
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Action History

  1. Second cloture on the motion to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2652) not invoked in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 51 - 44. Record Vote Number: 207. (CR S6343)

  2. Considered by Senate (Message from the House considered). (consideration: CR S6318)

  3. Considered by Senate (Message from the House considered). (consideration: CR S6050-6052)

  4. Second cloture motion on the motion to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2652) presented in Senate. (CR S6050)

  5. Motion to proceed to consideration of the House message to accompany S. 178 agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 48 - 46. Record Vote Number: 198. (CR S5923)

  6. Considered by Senate (Message from the House considered). (consideration: CR S5923-5924)

  7. Cloture on the motion to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2652) not invoked in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 52 - 47. Record Vote Number: 168. (CR S5532-5533)

  8. Considered by Senate (Message from the House considered). (consideration: CR S5433)

  9. Motion by Senator McConnell to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2499) withdrawn.

  10. Motion by Senator McConnell to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2652) made in Senate. (CR S5433)

  11. Cloture motion on the motion to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2652) presented in Senate.

  12. Motion to proceed to consideration of the House message to accompany S. 178 agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 47 - 42. Record Vote Number: 153. (CR S4617)

  13. Measure laid before Senate by motion. (consideration: CR S4618-4622)

  14. Motion by Senator McConnell to concur in the House amendment to S. 178 with an amendment (SA 2499) made in Senate. (CR S4618)

  15. Message on House action received in Senate and at desk: House amendment to Senate bill.

  16. Mr. Sires moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended.

  17. Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H9201-9208)

  18. DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on S. 178.

  19. At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.

  20. Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H9209)

  21. Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 407 - 1 (Roll no. 644).(text: CR H9201-9203)

  22. On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 407 - 1 (Roll no. 644). (text: CR H9201-9203)

  23. Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

  24. Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.

  25. Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by Unanimous Consent.

  26. Message on Senate action sent to the House.

  27. Received in the House.

  28. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

  29. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

  30. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

  31. Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment by Unanimous Consent.(consideration: CR S5450-5452; text: CR S5450-5452)

  32. Passed Senate with an amendment by Unanimous Consent. (consideration: CR S5450-5452; text: CR S5450-5452)

  33. Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Without written report.

  34. Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Without written report.

  35. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 99.

  36. Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.

  37. Introduced in Senate

  38. Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Sponsors

Sponsorship breakdown

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1 sponsors · 0 co-sponsors · 546 not signed on

Sponsors (1)

Co-sponsors (0)

None.

Not signed on (546)

546 members have not signed on to this bill.

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"Not signed on" means a member has not sponsored or co-sponsored this bill — it does not imply opposition. Members flagged Voted No have a recorded No vote on this bill.

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Frequently asked questions

Who sponsors S 178?
S 178 is sponsored by Rubio, Marco (Republican).
What is the current status of S 178?
This bill died with 116th Congress. It reached “Passed House” and never advanced before the session ended, so it can no longer move — a new version would have to be reintroduced in the current session.
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