S 2222 — Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act

(1) UnderseaThe communicationGovernment cablesof (inthe thisPeople's ActRepublic referredof toChina as(PRC) ``underseahas cables'')increasingly areused criticalgray infrastructurezone essentialtactics forto globalundermine communication,the commerce,security of Taiwan and nationalchange security,the particularlystatus forquo Taiwan,in whosethe economicTaiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and securityaround stabilityTaiwan, reliessuch heavilyas onthe underseaincidents cableinvolving connectivity.the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.

(2) TheUndersea Governmentcables ofand theother People'scritical Republicundersea ofinfrastructure Chinaare hasa increasinglyprimary usedvulnerability grayfor zoneTaiwan tacticsthat tocould underminebe thetargeted securityby andthe sovereigntyPRC ofto Taiwan,cripple includingthe suspectedcommunication sabotagecapabilities of underseaTaiwan cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidentsevent involving the severing of cablesa aroundconflict in the Matsu Islands of Taiwan Strait and otherof keybroader regionshybrid inwarfare 2023tactics. and 2025.

(3)Disruption Underseaof cablescritical areundersea ainfrastructure primarywould targetsignificantly inimpact the strategyability of theTaiwan Governmentto ofcommunicate theboth People'sdomestically Republicand ofinternationally, Chinaleading to cripplea thebreakdown communication capabilities of Taiwan in themilitary, eventeconomic, ofand asocial militaryfunctions. conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare tactics.

Disruption(3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea cablesinfrastructure wouldhas significantlybeen impactcompounded theby abilityan increasing number of Taiwanforeign tovessels communicatesuspected bothof domesticallyinvolvement andin internationally,sabotage, leadingincluding toPRC-linked avessels, breakdownwhich inpose military,direct economic,threats andto socialTaiwan's functions.critical infrastructure.

(4) The vulnerabilityability of Taiwanthe PRC to attacksdisrupt onor damage critical undersea cablesinfrastructure hasis beena compoundedcritical byelement anof increasingits numberstrategy ofaimed foreignat vesselsdisrupting suspectedTaiwan's ofmilitary involvementand incivil sabotage,communications includingand Chinese-linkedisolating vessels,Taiwan whichin arethe perceivedevent asof directa threatsblockade, quarantine, or other attempt to Taiwan'sforce criticalunification infrastructure.with the PRC.

(5) TheRecent abilityactivities ofby theforeign Governmentadversaries, ofparticularly the People'sPRC, Republichave increased the risk of Chinasabotage and disruption to disruptcritical orundersea severinfrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables isthat aeffectively criticalcut elementinternet access to the 13,000 residents of itsTaiwan's militaryMatsu strategyIslands, aimedwho athad softeningto Taiwan'srely defenseson andmicrowave isolatingradio Taiwantransmissions fromto internationalprovide supportlimited ininternet theaccess eventfor of50 andays invasionuntil ora militarycable confrontation.ship was able to complete repairs;

(6)(B) Recentin activitiesJanuary by2025, foreignTaiwan's adversaries,Chunghwa particularlyTelecom thereported People'sdamage Republicto an undersea cable north of China,Taipei haveand increasedidentified thea risk``suspicious ofvessel'' sabotageregistered as the Shunxin-39 and disruptionthe toXin underseaShun-39, cableswhich servinghad Taiwantraveled andin othera nations.criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged;

Notably,(C) in FebruaryJanuary 2023,2025, thea MatsuMongolia-flagged Islandsvessel ofnamed Taiwanthe experiencedBaoshun majorwas internetdriven disruptionsaway dueby toTaiwan's twocoast underseaguard cablesafter beingsuspicious severed,movements withoff suspicionsthe pointingcoast towardof deliberateNew externalTaipei; interference.

Furthermore,and (D) in JanuaryFebruary 2025, ChunghwaTaiwan's Telecomcoast reportedguard damagedetained tothe anTogo-flagged internationalHong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable andin identifiedthe aarea ``suspiciouswas vessel''--thesevered, Chinese-with linkedthe cargocaptain shiplater Shunxin39--nearadmitting to dropping the affectedship's area.anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''.

The(6) CoastSince Guard2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan hasand indicateda concernssimilar thatnumber thatin vesselthe mayBaltic haveSea, beenwith involvedauthorities in deliberatelyTaiwan cuttingand theEurope cable.suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents.

InThose aincidents subsequenthighlight incident,the Taiwanvulnerability seizedof thecritical Togo-flaggedundersea Honginfrastructure, Taias 58,well suspectedas the difficulty of deliberatelyproving severingsabotage anor underseaholding cable.perpetrators accountable.

(7) The Coastsabotage Guard of Taiwancritical acknowledgedundersea theinfrastructure possibilityconstitutes ofgray China'szone involvementtactics asdesigned partto ofdestabilize aand ``greyundermine areainternational intrusion''.security while falling short of direct military confrontation.

(7)(8) SinceSeveral 2023,regional theremechanisms have been atestablished leastto 11bolster casesthe security of damage to undersea cablescables, aroundincluding Taiwanthe andNordic aWarden similarinitiative numberfor inmaritime thedomain Balticawareness Sea,and withthe authoritiesQuad inPartnership Taiwanfor andCable EuropeConnectivity suspecting Chinese and RussianResilience, involvementaimed inat severalenhancing incidents,the althoughsecurity someand damagesresilience haveof beenundersea attributedcables toin naturalthe causes.Indo-Pacific.

Those(9) incidentsTaiwan highlightis the vulnerabilityworld's of21st thoselargest criticaleconomy systemsby topurchasing graypower zoneparity tactics and thedeeply difficultyintegrated ofin provingthe sabotageglobal orinformation holdingand perpetratorscommunications accountable.technology supply chain.

(8)Any Therestrictions sabotageto ofits underseainternet cablesconnectivity constitutesor grayenergy zonesecurity tacticswould designedhave toa destabilizedirect andimpact undermineon internationalthe securityworld's withouteconomy. direct military confrontation.

(9)(10) SeveralTo regionalcounter mechanismsthe havethreats beendescribed establishedin tothis bolstersection and safeguard the securityresilience of underseaTaiwan, cables,it includingis theimperative Nordic Warden initiative for maritimethe domainUnited awarenessStates and theits Quadallies Partnershipto fortake Cabledecisive Connectivityaction andto Resilience,bolster aimedTaiwan's atdefenses enhancingfor thecritical securityundersea infrastructure and resiliencefoster ofinternational underseacooperation cablesto inprotect thethose Indo-Pacific.critical assets.

(10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for undersea cables and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets.

TAIWANDEFINITIONS. UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.

(a)In Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,section: the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').

(b)(1) Priority.--TheCritical Initiativeundersea shallinfrastructure.--The prioritizeterm the``critical protectionundersea andinfrastructure'' resiliencemeans-- of(A) underseasubsea cablesenergy nearinfrastructure, Taiwan,including with a focussubsea oncable, counteringpipeline, threatsor fromother equipment installed on, beneath, or within the People'sseabed, Republicto oftransmit Chinaelectricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the criticalsupport infrastructure of Taiwan.offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities;

(c)or Key(B) Focussubsea Areas.--telecommunications (1)infrastructure, Advancedincluding monitoringsubsea andfiber-optic detectioncables capabilities.--Inand carryingrelated outequipment theinstalled Initiative,on, thebeneath, Secretaryor ofwithin State, in coordination with the Secretaryseabed, of Homeland Security and theused Secretaryto oftransmit Defense,communications, shalldata, developvoice, andvideo, deploy advanced undersea cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of detecting disruptions or potentialother sabotageelectronic insignals, real-time,as includingwell by informing Taiwan, as appropriate,associated oflanding earlystations warningsand fromfacilities. global intelligence networks.

(2) RapidSabotage.--The responseterm protocols.--In``sabotage'' carryingmeans outactions, theor Initiative,preparations for future actions, taken with the Secretaryintent ofto Statecause shall--defective (A)production establishof, rapidoperation responseof, protocolsor fordamage repairingto severedcritical undersea cablesinfrastructure, orincluding mitigatingthe disruptions;integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

andSEC. (B) work with allies of the United States to help Taiwan develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on undersea cables and minimize downtime.

(3)4. Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional allies, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the detection of suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea cable routes;

TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.

(a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').

(b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC.

(c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks.

(2) Rapid response protocols.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions;

and (ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime.

(B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A).

(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure;

(4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional allies and global partners to protect the undersea cable networks near Taiwan.

(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea cablesinfrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and deliberatesabotage. interference.

4.

COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.

(a) Working With Partners To Counter Chinese Sabotage.--The President shall work with Taiwan and like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the use by the Government of the People's Republic of China of undersea cable sabotage as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on that Government to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of undersea infrastructure.

(b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with Taiwan to raise global awareness of the risks posed by interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China in undersea cables, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical infrastructure.

SEC.

IMPOSITIONCOUNTERING OFPRC SANCTIONSGRAY WITHZONE RESPECTTACTICS. TO SABOTAGE OF UNDERSEA CABLES.

(a) InWorking General.--TheWith Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall imposework thewith sanctionslike-minded describedinternational inpartners subsectionto (b)implement withstrategies respectthat todirectly anycounter personthe Government of the People'sPRC's Republiccritical ofundersea Chinainfrastructure thatsabotage theactivities Presidentas determinespart isof responsibleits forgray orzone complicitwarfare, inincluding damagingby underseaincreasing cablesdiplomatic criticalpressure toon the nationalPRC securityto adhere to international norms regarding the protection of Taiwan.critical undersea infrastructure.

(b) SanctionsRaising Described.--TheAwareness.--The sanctionsPresident describedshall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in thisinternational subsectionforums arethat address gray zone tactics and the following:protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

SEC.

6.

IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.

(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage;

or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage;

and (2) any foreign person that knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);

(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;

(C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity;

(D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions;

(E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions;

or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity.

(b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions.

(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(c)(d) Implementation;

(d)(e) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception forto intelligencecomply activities.--Thiswith united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to activitiesthe subjectadmission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the reportingUnited requirementsStates underto titlecomply Vwith the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the NationalUnited SecurityNations, Actsigned at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of 1947the (50United U.S.C.States;

or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.

(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

(2)(3) Exception torelating comply with international agreements.-- Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with respect to theimportation admission of angoods.-- alien(A) toIn thegeneral.--A Unitedrequirement States if such admission is necessary to complyblock withand theprohibit obligationsall oftransactions thein Unitedall Statesproperty under the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on June 26, 1947, and enteredinterests intoin forceproperty onunder Novemberthis 21,section 1947,shall betweennot theinclude United Nations and the Unitedauthority States, or therequirement Conventionto onimpose Consularsanctions Relations, done at Vienna on Aprilthe 24,importation 1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967, or other international obligations of thegoods. United States.

(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.-- (A) In general.--The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(e)(f) Definitions.--InNational Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section:section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States;

and (2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.

(g) Definitions.--In this section:

alien.--Thealien; terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

etc.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

(2) PersonAppropriate ofcongressional thecommittees.--The people'sterm republic``appropriate ofcongressional china.--Thecommittees'' termmeans-- ``person(A) of the People'sCommittee Republicon ofForeign China''Relations means--and (A)the anCommittee individualon whoBanking, isHousing, aand citizenUrban orAffairs national of the People'sSenate; Republic of China;

and (B) an entity owned or controlled by the GovernmentCommittee ofon theForeign People'sAffairs Republicand of China, organized under the lawsCommittee ofon theFinancial People'sServices Republic of China, or otherwise subject to the jurisdictionHouse of theRepresentatives. Government of the People's Republic of China.

(3) UnitedForeign states person.--The term ``United``foreign States person'' means--means (A)an anyindividual United States citizen or anentity alienthat lawfullyis admittednot fora permanent residence to the United States;States person.

(4) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;

6.7.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter,thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing-- (1) any incidents of interference inor sabotage related to critical undersea cablesinfrastructure near Taiwan;

<all>SEC.

8.

INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States.

(b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group-- (A) to be chaired by the National Security Council;

and (B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate.

(2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall-- (A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats;

(B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan;

(C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group;

(D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans;

(E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions;

(F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate;

and (G) regularly test and refine contingency plans.

(3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes-- (A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group;

(B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements;

(C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness;

and (D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group.

Amend the title so as to read:

``A bill to enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.''.

Calendar No.

323 119th CONGRESS 2d Session S.

2222 _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________ February 10, 2026 Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the title