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Second Regular Session Seventy-fifth General Assembly STATE OF COLORADO REREVISED This Version Includes All Amendments Adopted in the Second House LLS NO.
NOTE:
26-0710.01 Conrad Imel x2313 SENATE BILL 26-005 SENATE SPONSORSHIP Weissman and Gonzales J., Coleman, Hinrichsen, Jodeh, Kipp, Marchman, Rodriguez, Wallace, Amabile, Ball, Bridges, Cutter, Danielson, Exum, Kolker, Lindstedt, Snyder, Sullivan HOUSE SPONSORSHIP Mabrey and Zokaie, Bacon, Boesenecker, Brown, Duran, English, Froelich, Garcia, Gilchrist, Jackson, Joseph, Lindsay, McCormick, Nguyen, Paschal, Rutinel, Rydin, Sirota, Smith, Story, Titone, Velasco, Willford, Woodrow e n m 6 E n 0 U U , O i y H a a Senate Committees House Committees R M Judiciary Judiciary r Appropriations Appropriations 3 d A BILL FOR AN ACT d e 2 C ONCERNING STATE COURT REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL S a 2 U U 6 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OCCURRING DURING IMMIGRATION H g a d M ENFORCEMENT ,AND ,IN CONNECTION THEREWITH ,MAKING AN e d APPROPRIATION .
This bill has been prepared for the signatures of the appropriate legislative officers and the Governor.
2 Bill Summary d 6 e 0 (Note:
To determine whether the Governor has signed the bill or taken other action on it, please consult the legislative status sheet, the legislative history, or the Session Laws.
This summary applies to this bill as introduced and does m 2 T n 4 notreflectanyamendmentsthatmaybesubsequentlyadopted.Ifthisbill N g y passes third reading in the house of introduction, a bill summary that E i a S e r applies to the reengrossed version of this bill will be available at R e r F http://leg.colorado.gov.) 3 The bill creates a statutory cause of action for a person who is injured during a civil immigration enforcement action byanother person i a 2 who, whether or not under color of law, violates the United States e 2 T d 3 A n 2 E d a Shading denotes HOUSE amendment.
SENATE BILL 26-005 BYSENATOR(S)WeissmanandGonzalesJ.,Coleman,Hinrichsen,Jodeh, Kipp, Marchman, Rodriguez, Wallace, Amabile, Ball, Bridges, Cutter, Danielson, Exum, Kolker, Lindstedt, Snyder, Sullivan;
Double underlining denotes SENATE amendment.
also REPRESENTATIVE(S) Mabrey and Zokaie, Bacon, Boesenecker, Brown, Duran, English, Froelich, Garcia, Gilchrist, Jackson, Joseph, Lindsay, McCormick, Nguyen, Paschal, Rutinel, Rydin, Sirota, Smith, Story, Titone, Velasco, Willford, Woodrow.
S d r Capital letters or bold & italic numbers indicate new material to be added to existing law.n e Dashes through the words or numbers indicate deletions from existing law.
CONCERNING STATE COURT REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OCCURRING DURING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT , AND , IN CONNECTION THEREWITH , MAKING AN APPROPRIATION .
m F A constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement.
A person who violates the United States constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement is liable to the injured party for legal or equitable relief or any other appropriate relief.
The action must be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues.
SECTION1.
SECTION 1.
Legislativedeclaration.(1) Thegeneralassembly finds and declares that:
Legislative declaration.
(a) Sincetheearliestdaysofthenation,theUnitedStatessupreme court has held, in cases such as Little v.
(1) The general assembly finds and declares that:
(a) Since the earliest days of the nation, the United States supreme court has held, in cases such as Little v.
(b) In later 19th centurycases as well, the United States supreme court held that federal officials could be liable for damages even for reasonsrelatingtobutbeyondthelawfulscopeoffederalduties,Mitchell v.
________ Capital letters or bold & italic numbers indicate new material added to existing law;
dashes through words or numbers indicate deletions from existing law and such material is not part of the act.
(b) In later 19th century cases as well, the United States supreme courtheldthatfederalofficialscouldbeliablefordamagesevenforreasons relating to but beyond the lawful scope of federal duties, Mitchell v.
(c) The United States supreme court has long held that federal employees are not inherently beyond the reach of state laws simply because they are federal employees.
(c) The United States supreme court has long held that federal employeesarenotinherentlybeyondthereachofstatelawssimplybecause theyarefederalemployees.Forexample,inJohnsonv.Maryland,254U.S.
For example, in Johnson v.
(1920), the court noted, "[A]n employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment", and in Colorado v.
Maryland, 254 U.S.
Symes, 286 U.S.
51 (1920), the court noted, "[A]n employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment", and in Colorado v.
510 (1932), the court stated, "Federal officers and employees are not, merely because they are such, granted immunityfrom prosecution in state courts for crimes against state law".
Symes, 286 U.S.510(1932),thecourtstated,"Federalofficersandemployeesarenot, merelybecausetheyaresuch,grantedimmunityfromprosecutioninstate courts for crimes against state law".
(d) Decades later, the United States supreme court continued to recognize the role of state law in holding federal officials accountable for legal violations, noting in Wheeldin v.
(d) Decades later, the United States supreme court continued to -2- 005 recognizetheroleofstatelawinholdingfederalofficialsaccountablefor legal violations, noting in Wheeldin v.
(e) When the United States supreme court recognized a federal lawcauseof action for violation of certain constitutionalrightsinBivens v.
(e) When the United States supreme court recognized a federal law cause of action for violation of certain constitutional rights in Bivens v.
388 (1971), that cause of action was in addition to, rather than instead of, traditional state law remedies.EvenoneofthedissentingjusticesinBivensnotedtheongoing role of state courts,ting, "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States".
388 (1971), that cause of action was in addition to, rather than instead of, traditional state law remedies.
(f) More recently, congress has made federal statutory law the exclusive remedyfor certain claims sounding in tort, but this exclusivity specifically "does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government [.
EvenoneofthedissentingjusticesinBivensnotedtheongoingroleofstate courts, writing, "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States".
.] whichisbroughtfora violation of the Constitution of the United States", 28 U.S.C.
(f) More recently, congress has made federal statutory law the exclusive remedy for certain claims sounding in tort, but this exclusivity specifically"does not extend or applyto a civil action against an employee oftheGovernment[...]whichisbroughtforaviolationoftheConstitution oftheUnitedStates",28U.S.C.sec.2679.Theprimesponsoroflegislation amending the federal "Tort Claims Act" to provide for limited exclusivity took pains to clarify, "We make special provisions here to make clear that PAGE 2-SENATE BILL 26-005 the more controversial issue of constitutional torts is not covered by this bill.
sec.
2679.
The prime sponsorof legislationamendingthefederal"TortClaimsAct"toprovide forlimitedexclusivitytookpainstoclarify,"Wemakespecialprovisions heretomakeclearthatthemorecontroversialissueofconstitutionaltorts is not covered by this bill.
(g) In 2022, in declining to extend the scope of the Bivens action inEgbertv.Boule,596U.S.
(g) In 2022, in declining to extend the scope of the Bivens action in Egbert v.
482 (2022), the UnitedStatessupremecourt observed that legislatures, not courts, are the better branches of government to fashion damages remedies;
Boule, 596 U.S.
-3- 005 (h) Initsmostrecentlycompletedterm,theUnitedStatessupreme court declined, in Martin v.
482 (2022), the United States supreme court observedthatlegislatures,notcourts,arethebetterbranchesofgovernment to fashion damages remedies;
United States, 145 S.
(h) In its most recently completed term, the United States supreme courtdeclined,inMartinv.UnitedStates,145S.Ct.1689(2025),toextend the doctrine of supremacy clause immunity beyond its traditional criminal law context;
Ct.
(i) Violating the federal constitutional rights of residents of the UnitedStateshasneverbeenandcanneverbe"necessaryandproper"tothe execution of the laws and powers of the United States within the meaning of article I, section 8, clause 18 of the United States constitution;
1689 (2025), to extend the doctrine of supremacyclause immunitybeyond its traditional criminal law context;
and (j) In enacting this act, the Colorado general assembly affirms its longstanding and rightful role as a sovereign state in providing forumin its courts for adjudication of claims of federal constitutional violations.
(i)Violating the federal constitutional rights of residents of the United States has never been and can never be "necessaryand proper" to the execution of the laws and powers of the United States within the meaningofarticleI,section8,clause18oftheUnitedStatesconstitution;
and (j)In enacting this act, the Colorado general assemblyaffirms its longstanding and rightful role as a sovereign state in providing forum in its courts for adjudication of claims of federal constitutional violations.
In Colorado Revised Statutes, add 13-20-1302 as follows:
In Colorado Revised Statutes, add 13-20-1303 as follows:
13-20-1302.
13-20-1303.
Civil action for violation of constitutional rights duringimmigrationenforcement-relief-attorneyfees-timelimitto commence action - definition.
Civil action for violation of constitutional rights during immigration enforcement - relief - attorney fees - time limit to commence action - definition.
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(1) APERSON WHO HAS THEIR RIGHTS THAT ARE GUARANTEED BY THE UNITEDS TATESCONSTITUTIONVIOLATEDBYANOTHERPERSONWHO , ACTING UNDER COLOR OF ANY FEDERAL ,STATE, OR LOCAL LAW , IS PARTICIPATINGINCIVILIMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENT ,MAYBRINGACIVIL ACTIONAGAINSTANOTHERPERSONWHOSECONDUCTWASTHEPROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VIOLATION.
(1) A PERSON WHO HAS THEIR RIGHTS THAT ARE GUARANTEED BY THE U NITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATED BY ANOTHER PERSON WHO , ACTING UNDER COLOR OF ANY FEDERAL , STATE , OR LOCAL LAW , IS PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT , MAY BRING A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST ANOTHER PERSON WHOSE CONDUCT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSEOFTHEVIOLATION .A PERSONFOUNDTOHAVEVIOLATEDTHE U NITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHILE PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ISLIABLE TOTHE PERSONWHOSE RIGHTSAREVIOLATEDFOR LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RELIEF OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF .
A PERSON FOUND TO HAVE VIOLATED THE U NITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHILE PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL IMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENTISLIABLETOTHEPERSONWHOSERIGHTSARE VIOLATEDFORLEGALOREQUITABLE RELIEFORANYOTHERAPPROPRIATE RELIEF.
PAGE 3-SENATE BILL 26-005 (2)(a) NANACTIONBROUGHTPURSUANTTOTHISSECTION ACOURT SHALL AWARD REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO A PREVAILING PLAINTIFF.
-4- 005 (2) (a) N AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION ,A COURT SHALL AWARD REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO A PREVAILING PLAINTIFF.
N ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,A COURT SHALL DEEM A PLAINTIFFTOHAVEPREVAILEDIFTHEPLAINTIFF 'SSUITWASASUBSTANTIAL FACTOR OR SIGNIFICANT CATALYST IN OBTAINING THE RESULTS SOUGHT BY THE LITIGATION.
N ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIE, A COURT SHALLDEEMAPLAINTIFFTOHAVEPREVAILEDIFTHEPLAINTIFF SSUITWAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR OR SIGNIFICANT CATALYST IN OBTAINING THE RESULTS SOUGHT BY THE LITIGATION.
(b) W HENAJUDGMENT ISENTEREDINFAVOROFA DEFENDANT THE COURT MAY AWARD REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES TO THE DEFENDANT FOR DEFENDING ANY CLAIMS THE COURT FINDS FRIVOLOUS .
(b) W HEN A JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT, THECOURTMAYAWARDREASONABLECOSTSANDATTORNEYFEESTOTHE DEFENDANT FOR DEFENDING ANY CLAIMS THE COURT FINDS FRIVOLOUS .
(3) T O THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE U NITED STATESCONSTITUTIONAND 42U.S.C.
(3) TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 42U.S.C.
SEC.1983, AGRANTOFIMMUNITYTO A DEFENDANT , INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ;
SEC.1983,A GRANT OF IMMUNITY TO A DEFENDANT , INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO , SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ;
SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY ;STATUTORY IMMUNITY , INCLUDING THE "C OLORADO G OVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY A CT",ARTICLE 10OF TITLE24;
SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY ;
OR COMMON LAW IMMUNITY ,DOES NOT APPLY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTIO.
STATUTORY IMMUNITY , INCLUDINGTHE "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY A CT",ARTICLE 10 OF TITLE24;OR COMMON LAW IMMUNITY ,DOES NOT APPLY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION .
(4) AS USED IN THIS SECTIO,UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES , CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT "MEANS AN ACTION TO INVESTIGATE, QUESTION,DETAIN, TRANSFER,OR ARREST A PERSON FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING FEDERAL CIVIL IMMIGRATION LAW .
(4) A S USED IN THIS SECTIO,UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES , CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT "MEANS AN ACTION TO INVESTIGATE QUESTION ,DETAIN TRANSFER ,ORARRESTAPERSONFORTHE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING FEDERAL CIVIL IMMIGRATION LAW .
"IVIL IMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENT "DOESNOTINCLUDEANACTIONCOMMITTED BY A PEACE OFFICER WHO IS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PEACE OFFICER'S DUTIES CONSISTENT WITH STATE LA.
"CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT "DOES NOT INCLUDE AN ACTION COMMITTED BY A PEACE OFFICER WHO IS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PEACE OFFICER'S DUTIES CONSISTENT WITH STATE LAW.
(5) PURSUANTTOSECTION 13-80-102,ACIVILACTIONDESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION MUST BE COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES .
(5) PURSUANTTOSECTION 13-80-102,ACIVILACTIONDESCRIBEDIN THIS SECTION MUST BE COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES .
-5- 005 SECTION 3.
SECTION 3.
(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
(1) Thefollowingcivilactions,regardlessof thetheoryuponwhich suitisbrought,oragainstwhomsuitisbrought,mustbecommencedwithin two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
(k) AllactionsbroughtunderRSUANTTO section13-21-109(2);
PAGE 4-SENATE BILL 26-005 (k) All actions brought underPURSUANT TO section 13-21-109 (2);
AND (l) AACTIONALLEGINGAVIOLATIONOFCONSTITUTIONALRIGHTS DURING CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT BROUGHT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13-20-1302.
AND (l) AN ACTION ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURINGCIVILIMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENTBROUGHTPURSUANTTOSECTION 13-20-1303.
If any provision of this act or the application of this act to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.
If any provision of this act or the application of this act to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invaliditydoesnotaffectotherprovisionsorapplicationsoftheactthatcan be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.
(1) For the 2026-27 state fiscal year, $125,604 is appropriated to the department of law.
For the 2026-27 state fiscal year, $125,604 is appropriated to the department of law.
This appropriation is from the legal services cash fund created in section 24-31-108 (4), C.R.S., from revenue received from the department of personnelthatiscontinuouslyappropriatedtothedepartmentofpersonnel from the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510 (1)(a), C.R.S.
This appropriation is from the legal services cash fund created in section 24-31-108 (4), C.R.S., from revenue received from the department of personnel that is continuously appropriated to the department of personnel from the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510 (1)(a), C.R.S.
The appropriation to the department of law is based on an assumptionthatthedepartmentoflawwillrequireanadditional0.5FTE.
The appropriation to the department of law is based on an assumption that the department of law will require an additional 0.5 FTE.
-6- 005 SECTION 6.
SECTION 6.
The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservationofthepublicpeace,health,orsafetyorforappropriationsfor the support and maintenance of the departments of the state and state institutions.
The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety or for appropriations for PAGE 5-SENATE BILL 26-005 the support and maintenance of the departments of the state and state institutions.
-7- 005
____________________________ ____________________________ James Rashad Coleman, Sr.
Julie McCluskie PRESIDENT OF SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE THE SENATE OF REPRESENTATIVES ____________________________ ____________________________ Esther van Mourik Vanessa Reilly SECRETARY OF CHIEF CLERK OF THE HOUSE THE SENATE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROVED________________________________________ (Date and Time) _________________________________________ Jared S.
Polis GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF COLORADO PAGE 6-SENATE BILL 26-005
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